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Abstract 
Recent models of the self accord a key role to ‘interoception’, defined as afferent 
information arising within the body affecting the behaviour, emotion and cognition 
of the organism, with or without awareness. The purpose of this thesis was to 
investigate how individual differences in awareness of internal bodily signals 
(‘interoceptive accuracy’ (IA), measured by heartbeat perception) relate to two key 
aspects of self-processing. The first three experiments considered awareness of the 
self from an exteroceptive perspective, while the second three investigated 
awareness of the processing of action. Experiments 1 and 2 manipulated IA by 
enhanced attention to the self. In people for whom IA was initially low, heartbeat 
perception was improved by self-observation in a mirror, as well as by gazing at a 
self-photograph and at self-relevant words. Experiment 3 found a significant 
negative correlation, in women, between self-objectification and IA. Experiment 4 
investigated the relationship between IA and the ‘social Simon effect’. No 
significant effects were found. Experiment 5 found that people with high IA were 
significantly less able to inhibit imitation during ‘automatic imitation’, potentially 
because they are more empathetic and thus prone to imitate. Experiment 6 
investigated the relation between IA and agency, using time-awareness paradigms 
pioneered by Libet et al. (1983) and Haggard et al. (2002). A positive correlation 
was found between IA and ‘intentional binding’, indicating that people with high 
IA have a stronger sense of agency. The result depended entirely on ‘effect 
binding’. Replicating recent reports, effect binding was correlated with the 
amplitude of the early readiness potential in the operant sound condition and also 
with sensory attenuation. However, IA was not linked to either of these variables. 
Taken together, the findings reported here provide support for a model of 
interoceptive accuracy within a predictive coding framework, which is presented in 
the Discussion. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: The Neglected Senses 
1.1 Interoception as a Set of Senses 
Interoception is defined as the afferent information arising from within the body 
that affects cognition, feeling states, and the behaviour of an organism, with or 
without awareness (Cameron, 2002). In contrast to the exteroceptive senses such as 
vision, audition and somatosensation, interoception is a precognitive, sensory 
system which is, in most cases, rather vague and difficult to interpret but capable of 
reaching conscious awareness (Ádám, 2010).  
 
Interoceptive signals arise within four distinct systems - the cardiovascular, 
respiratory, gastrointestinal and urogenital. Proprioception is also sometimes 
regarded as an aspect of interoception (Ádám, 2010; Cameron, 2002; Vaitl, 1996) 
while other authors consider it to be a separate sense (Quattrocki & Friston, 2014) 
or to be part of somatosensation (Craig, 2003). In the early twentieth century, an 
extensive body of physiological research, stemming from the work of Eastern 
European scientists such as Pavlov, identified a variety of ‘interoceptor’ cells 
(Sherrington, 1899) defined as structures which detect stimuli within the body 
(Ádám, 2010; Cameron, 2002; Schandry, 1981; Vaitl, 1996). These have much in 
common with exterosensory receptors, falling into several classes of 
mechanoreceptors, chemoreceptors, thermoreceptors and osmoreceptors. Like 
other sensory signals, afferent signals from the viscera enter the spinal cord through 
the dorsal horn (Cameron, 2002) and are carried on several major nerves, the most 
important of which is the vagus. There is a considerable excess of afferent over 
efferent signalling between the body and the brain, for example, 80% of fibres in 
the vagus nerve are afferent, conveying information from the viscera to the brain 
(Ádám, 2010; Critchley et al., 2007). Many of these signals are likely to be engaged 
in homeostatic regulation of the body. However, some may not be solely 
homeostatic because they produce sensations that are available to conscious 
awareness (Ádám, 2010), in striking contrast to deeply unconscious intra-body 
signals which are engaged only in homeostatic regulation (Panksepp & Northoff, 
2009). Pavlov and colleagues were the first to show that interoception is not entirely 
homeostatic. By directly stimulating interoceptor cells in the mucosa of the internal 
organs of dogs, they proved that interoception has a direct effect on behaviour and 
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famously showed that these effects could be conditioned (Vaitl, 1996).  
 
Further, often neglected, aspects of interoception are the chemical secretions 
(hormonal, immunological and metabolic) arising from within the ‘internal milieu’ 
(Damasio, 2003), which percolate through the body and modulate brain processes 
(Critchley & Harrison, 2013). Investigation of these neurotransmitters is in its 
infancy but two studies have reported significant findings. Wiebking and colleagues 
report that concentrations of GABA in the left insula, which is a convergence zone 
for interoceptive signals, correlate with BOLD activity during attention to 
interoceptive cues (Wiebking et al., 2013). By contrast, Ernst et al. found that 
glutamate concentrations in the left insula correlated with the participants’ self-
reported internal body awareness (Ernst, Boker et al., 2013). More recently, the 
potential role of oxytocin in the interoceptive system has been highlighted 
(Quattrocki & Friston, 2014). 
 
Interoceptive signalling is often treated as a unitary phenomenon although this 
assumption is not grounded in the physiology (Vaitl, 1996). It is feasible, for 
example, that one person’s behaviour or feelings may be principally influenced by 
changes in their cardiovascular system, while another individual is more affected 
by changes in signals arising within the respiratory or gastrointestinal interoceptive 
systems (Cameron, 2002). A further complication is that one interoceptive system 
might impact on a particular emotion or behaviour (for example, the heart may 
influence anxiety), while another emotion or cognition could depend on a different 
set of signals (e.g. feelings of disgust may depend on signals from the 
gastrointestinal interoceptive system).  It is even possible that someone more 
innately attuned to sensations from their heart could experience some emotions 
(perhaps fear and love) with greater intensity than another individual who has a 
stronger interoceptive representation of the functioning of their stomach (Critchley, 
2009). However, until a variety of tests in different modalities are developed, such 
possibilities remain speculative.  
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1.2 ‘Interoceptive Accuracy’  
Individuals differ in the extent to which they are aware of their internal bodily cues. 
There are, however, a number of potential confusions in defining and measuring 
this trait. The terms ‘interoceptive sensitivity’ and ‘interoceptive awareness’ are 
often used interchangeably to describe how individual differ in terms of 
interoceptive sensation but they are not necessarily synonymous. If an individual 
has high ‘interoceptive sensitivity’ this seems to imply that the person’s cognition, 
feelings and/or behaviour are strongly influenced by signals arising within the body, 
regardless of whether this is accompanied by conscious awareness. ‘Interoceptive 
awareness’, on the other hand, implies reference to the individual’s conscious 
awareness of (at least a part) of their interoceptive cues. The assumption is generally 
made that interoceptive awareness implies interoceptive sensitivity because when 
people are aware of their internal cues (such as breathlessness or a racing heart) it 
is probable that this impacts on their behaviour, feelings and/or cognition. The 
converse may not necessarily be true, in that the emotional reactions of individuals 
might be highly sensitive to their visceral changes without the person having any 
conscious awareness of those internal bodily signals. 
 
Further definitional difficulties are raised by the many self-report body awareness 
measures which have been used either in place of, or in addition to, physiological 
measures of interoceptive awareness/sensitivity (Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, 
Ohman, & Dolan, 2004; Ernst, Boker, et al., 2013; Terasawa, Shibata, Moriguchi, 
& Umeda, 2013). People’s beliefs about how accurately they are aware of their 
internal body signals often do not correlate with their performance on objective tests 
(Cuenen, Van Diest, & Vlaeyen, 2012). For example, experienced meditators, such 
as Buddhist monks, believe themselves to have high internal body awareness but 
are not more accurate than controls in heartbeat perception (Khalsa et al., 2008). 
Similarly, although Mindfulness training (Williams, 2010) raises peoples’ 
confidence in their body awareness, it does not change their scores in cardiac 
awareness tests (Parkin et al., 2013). Recently, Garfinkel and colleagues have 
suggested that ‘interoceptive accuracy’ should be the term for scores on objective 
tests, ‘interoceptive sensibility’ for self-report measures and that ‘interoceptive 
awareness’ should be reserved for metacognitive measures. They report that these 
measures correlate in individuals with above median performance on heartbeat 
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perception tasks but not in people with below median accuracy (Sarah N Garfinkel, 
Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2014). 
 
The term ‘interoceptive accuracy’ has been used throughout this thesis to refer to 
scores on the Mental Tracking Method of heartbeat perception (Schandry, 1981). 
1.2.1 Methods of Assessing Individual Differences in Interoceptive 
Awareness 
Techniques originally pioneered by Pavlov and co-workers to assess this 
‘visceroception’ included highly invasive procedures in animals (and sometimes in 
humans who were undergoing surgery), such as the insertion of inflatable balloons 
into the gut or the direct stimulation of the mucosa of the viscera with saline, or air 
puffs, or by scratching (Ádám, 2010). The use of non-invasive heartbeat perception 
tests became the standard method of measuring awareness of interoceptive 
sensations in humans after a significant correlation was found between an 
individual’s accuracy in heartbeat perception and their awareness of the irrigation 
of their stomach wall with water (Whitehead & Drescher, 1980).  When new tests 
of the awareness of interoceptive sensations are proposed, the acid test of their 
validity is judged to be the extent to which they correlate with accuracy in heartbeat 
perception (Harver, Katkin, & Bloch, 1993; Herbert, Muth, Pollatos, & Herbert, 
2012). It is, however, not clear what people are detecting when they count their 
heartbeats (Verdejo-Garcia, Clark, & Dunn, 2012). It may be auditory cues or 
perhaps blood flow in the aorta or elsewhere in the vasculature (Cameron, 2002). 
Two recent studies have suggested that mechanical sensation in the chest wall 
provides a path of awareness (Couto et al., 2013; Khalsa, Rudrauf, Feinstein, & 
Tranel, 2010). Despite these caveats, research into the cognitive, emotional and 
behavioural effects of the awareness of interoceptive sensation, measured in terms 
of heartbeat perception, has proved surprisingly fruitful (Cameron, 2002).  
 
The research literature is divided between studies that use heartbeat tracking tasks 
(McFarland, 1975; Schandry, 1981), of which the Mental Tracking Method 
pioneered by Schandry (1981) is the most prominent test, and those that employ 
heartbeat discrimination methods (Brener & Jones, 1974; Whitehead & Drescher, 
1980).  
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The Mental Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981) is the most widely used heartbeat 
tracking task. The participant is connected to a pulse recorder and required to sit 
quietly for a few minutes, in order to allow her heart to return to resting rate, thus 
avoiding confounds caused by arousal. The individual is then asked to count her 
heartbeats for several cued, short intervals (typically at least three trials of between 
25s and100s), simply by ‘listening’ to her body, without taking her pulse (Schandry, 
1981). In order to obtain a measure of accuracy for any given trial, the number of 
counted heartbeats is compared with the number of recorded beats using the 
formula 1- (|recorded heartbeats – counted heartbeats|)/recorded heartbeats). 
Averaging across trials produces a single numerical measure for ‘interoceptive 
accuracy’ (IA). This calculation generally produces a score between zero and one, 
with higher values indicating greater accuracy. Most people count too few 
heartbeats but values of IA greater than one are theoretically possible in instances 
where participants greatly overestimate the number of counted beats. 
 
Heartbeat discrimination tasks are generally variants of the Whitehead paradigm 
(Whitehead & Drescher, 1980) in which subjects listens to a series of tones (or, in 
the visual paradigm, see a series of flashes) triggered by their own heartbeat. During 
‘simultaneous’ trials, tones are delivered at the same time as the subject’s own 
pulse, i.e. approximately 200–250ms after the R-wave because the pulse is typically 
felt with a short delay. During ‘non-simultaneous’ trials, tones are delivered 
approximately 500–700ms after the R-wave. Individuals must judge whether the 
tone they hear is simultaneous with their own heart. Responses can be analysed 
using signal detection methods. A non-parametric analogue of d is sometimes 
calculated (where d' = z hit rate – z false alarm rate) but participants are often simply 
divided into ‘good’ and ‘poor’ heartbeat detectors on the basis of whether they score 
above chance. Heartbeat discrimination tasks have the unfortunate disadvantage 
that the majority of people score below chance, so that these tests do not provide a 
sensitive measure of individual differences (Eshkevari, Rieger, Musiat, & Treasure, 
2014). A further important criticism of tests based on the Whitehead paradigm is 
that they require participants to correlate an exteroceptive stimulus (e.g. an auditory 
tone) with an interoceptive signal (the heartbeat). The task may not therefore be 
measuring interoceptive awareness per se because when attention is directed 
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outwards to the tone, exteroception potentially inhibits interoception (Ádám, 2010; 
Pennebaker & Lightner, 1980). Moreover, people may perform well on the 
Whitehead paradigm without conscious awareness of their heartbeats, so that the 
test potentially assesses ‘interoceptive sensitivity’ rather than conscious 
‘interoceptive awareness’ or ‘interoceptive accuracy’. A significant consequence is 
that the two types of methods do not necessarily assess the same ability (Phillips, 
Jones, Rieger, & Snell, 1999; Schulz, Lass-Hennemann, Sütterlin, Schächinger, & 
Vögele, 2013).  
1.2.2 Correlation between the Two Common Heartbeat Perception 
Methods 
The most commonly cited reference for correlation between the Whitehead and 
Schandry methods found an overall coefficient of .59, with better correlation for 
very good and very poor perceivers but less good correlation for those in the middle 
range of accuracy (Knoll & Hodapp, 1992). A recent study of chest pain, suggests 
a smaller but significant correlation (.28) between the two methods but did not 
distinguish between cardiac patients, those with symptoms of somatic origin and 
controls (Schroeder, Gerlach, Achenbach, & Martin, 2014). Garfinkel and 
colleagues recently found a correlation of .32 (Sarah N Garfinkel et al., 2014) but 
other sources have reported that scores on the two methods are largely unrelated 
(Michal et al., 2014; Phillips et al., 1999; Schulz et al., 2013). An additional 
indication that the two tests potentially measure different abilities is provided by 
Schulz and colleagues. They reported that performance on the Whitehead task 
decreased following a socially evaluated cold pressor task, while accuracy in 
Mental Tracking was significantly improved. If the Whitehead task requires 
attention to external auditory or visual stimuli, this attention potentially declines 
when interoceptive signals are made salient by the cold pressor, while if the Mental 
Tracking Method is purely interoceptive then attention to interoceptive cues could 
boost performance (Schulz et al., 2013).  
1.2.3 Correlations with Other Modalities of Interoceptive Awareness 
Although heartbeat perception methods predominate in the literature, a few 
attempts have been made to test awareness of interoceptive sensations in other 
modalities. Ingestion of water during the Water Load test, correlates (r = -.5), with 
interoceptive accuracy measured by the Mental Tracking Method (Herbert, Muth, 
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et al., 2012).  A similar correlation (r = .51) was reported by Whitehead and 
Drescher between patients’ ability to discriminate their heartbeat and their 
awareness of the irrigation of their stomach wall with water (Whitehead & 
Drescher, 1980). However, the ability to detect respiratory resistance, using small 
meshes to occlude breathing, is uncorrelated with heartbeat perception measured by 
the Whitehead method (Harver et al., 1993), perhaps because the Whitehead 
method does not discriminate adequately between individuals.  
1.2.4 Confounds of Heartbeat Perception Tasks 
All heartbeat perception tasks are confounded by cardiovascular variables. People 
with high blood pressure (Koroboki et al., 2010) and/or larger stroke volume of the 
heart have an advantage, as do those with slow resting heart rates and high levels 
of fitness, probably because heart rate and fitness correlate with stoke volume 
(Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007; Knapp-Kline & Kline, 2005; Stevens et al., 2011). 
For example, using the Mental Tracking Method, Schandry reported a correlation 
of .59 between heartbeat perception and stroke volume (Schandry, Bestler, & 
Montoya, 1993). One report suggests that low heart rate variability is associated 
with good heartbeat perception, perhaps because less variable hearts are easier to 
follow (Knapp-Kline & Kline, 2005). Men are thought to perform better (Brener & 
Ring, 1995; Katkin, Blascovich, & Goldband, 1981), potentially because they have 
larger hearts, but this may also be related to body mass index (BMI), because leaner 
people are more accurate (Jones, 1995) and women tend to have more body fat. It 
has also been reported that heartbeat discrimination measured by the Whitehead 
method declines with age (Khalsa, Rudrauf, & Tranel, 2009), although this might 
reflect a decline amongst older people in the ability to integrate auditory and 
interoceptive signals. A serious disadvantage of the Mental Tracking Method is, 
however, that participants may correctly guess the number of heartbeats, based on 
their estimation of the time elapsed. A control for this confound is provided by 
requiring participants to estimate the length of several elapsed intervals and adding 
their accuracy in time estimation into regression equations involving interoceptive 
accuracy (Dunn et al., 2010; Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Ring & Brener, 1996).  
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1.2.5 Test Retest Reliability 
The Mental Tracking Method has good test retest reliability, with published 
correlations coefficients of between .58 (Mussgay, Klinkenberg, & Rüddel, 1999) 
and .80 (Werner, Kerschreiter, Kindermann, & Duschek, 2013). Similar levels of 
test retest reliability have been reported for the Whitehead method (Schneider, 
Ring, & Katkin, 1998). 
 
The Mental Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981) was employed in all the 
experiments presented in this thesis because it is the test that discriminates best 
between individuals. It also requires that participants only attend to their 
interoceptive cues, without attempting to match these against exteroceptive stimuli. 
1.2.6 Interoceptive Accuracy as a Continuous Variable 
Although interoceptive accuracy is a continuous variable, much research using 
heartbeat perception paradigms has concentrated on individuals with high 
interoceptive accuracy. Using the Schandry formula for interoceptive accuracy in 
Mental Tracking (where 1 represents a perfect score in counting one’s heartbeat), it 
has been common to designate people with scores greater than 0.85 as ‘good 
heartbeat perceivers’ (Herbert, Pollatos, & Schandry, 2007; Pollatos, Herbert, 
Matthias, & Schandry, 2007; Pollatos & Schandry, 2008; Werner, Jung, Duschek, 
& Schandry, 2009). This enables comparison with the few people who score above 
chance on the Whitehead task (Eshkevari et al., 2014; Harver et al., 1993; Katkin, 
Wiens, & Ohman, 2001; Khalsa et al., 2008; Wiens, 2005). In many studies, the 
group with interoceptive accuracy above 0.85 is matched for BMI, gender and other 
relevant confounding variables with a group of ‘poor heartbeat perceivers’ and the 
mean behaviour of the two groups is compared on the dimension under test. Such 
studies have reported significant differences between groups with ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
interoceptive accuracy on a range of variables, including autonomic reactivity in 
response to stress, the amplitude of heartbeat-evoked potentials and the ability to 
divide attention (Herbert, Pollatos, Flor, Enck, & Schandry, 2010; Matthias, 
Schandry, Duschek, & Pollatos, 2009; Pollatos & Schandry, 2004). 
 
However, a series of recent experiments using the Mental Tracking Method have 
analysed data using a median split and shown that low interoceptive accuracy is 
also important. In these experiments, it is the participants with below-median 
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interoceptive accuracy who have often responded significantly to the experimental 
condition. For example, people with low interoceptive accuracy experience a 
stronger rubber hand illusion (Tsakiris et al., 2011). Similarly, in the enfacement 
illusion, where people judge another person’s face as significantly more like their 
own after synchronous brushing, it is the people with below median accuracy in 
heartbeat tracking who demonstrate increased electrodermal activity when the other 
face is threatened (Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2013).  
 
Throughout this thesis the full range of individual differences in interoceptive 
accuracy has been considered, in order to investigate the effect of low as well as 
high accuracy. 
1.3 Interoceptive Accuracy as a Trait Variable 
Interoceptive accuracy has generally been regarded as a trait variable because 
attempts to alter heartbeat perception are usually unsuccessful, except where 
arousal is increased. Techniques that involve relaxation and attention to the body, 
for example through Yogic breathing patterns or Mindfulness training, do not alter 
scores on objective tests (Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007; Khalsa et al., 2008; Parkin 
et al., 2013). However, social evaluation can increase the accuracy of heartbeat 
perception. A cold pressor test in the presence of an attractive member of the 
opposite sex (Schulz et al., 2013) or the anticipation of public speaking (Durlik, 
Brown, & Tsakiris, 2013) raises performance on the Schandry task (but see also 
Stevens et al., 2011). Likewise, an early study found that the apparently accidental 
presence of a mirror improved performance on the Whitehead test, although not on 
a heartbeat tracking task (Weisz, Bálazs, & Ádám, 1988). These results suggest that 
attention to higher order aspects of ‘the self’ may improve performance on heartbeat 
perception tests. This echoes the theory of ‘objective self-focus’ (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972) which proposes that enhanced attention to the self is inherently 
aversive. Given these intriguing findings, the possible influences on interoceptive 
accuracy of enhanced self-focus and narrative aspects of the self merit further 
investigation and were therefore the subject of Experiments 1 and 2 of this thesis. 
1.3.1 The Effect of Attending to Interoception  
The importance of attentional processes for the awareness of interoceptive 
sensation has perhaps been insufficiently emphasised (Ádám, 2010; Vaitl, 1996). A 
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study of attention and interoceptive accuracy, using the Mental Tracking Method, 
found that people with high interoceptive accuracy performed better in tests of 
selective and divided attention (Matthias et al., 2009), implying that the ability to 
switch attention potentially underlies good heartbeat perception. The suggestion 
that interoceptive accuracy is a function of attentional mechanisms has considerable 
explanatory power.  
 
According to the ‘competition of cues’ hypothesis (Pennebaker & Lightner, 1980), 
the organism must continually divide its limited attentional resources between 
interoceptive and exteroceptive stimuli, with the urgent survival need of attending 
to exteroceptive cues generally suppressing attention to interoception (Ádám, 
2010). Successful heartbeat perception requires that subjects turn their attention 
inward, to the very best of their ability, while ignoring exteroceptive distractors. 
Several fMRI studies have investigated the neural correlates of switching attention 
between interoceptive and exteroceptive signals and report changes in areas that are 
thought to be associated with self-processing, including the anterior insula and the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Farb, Segal, & Anderson, 2012; Nagai, Critchley, 
Featherstone, Trimble, & Dolan, 2004; Terasawa et al., 2013). 
 
The effects of attention to internal cues can also be seen in experiments that are not 
inherently concerned with the measurement of interoceptive accuracy but which 
nevertheless ask participants to count their heartbeats and compare the effect of this 
manipulation with counting exteroceptive tones. When attention is directed to 
interoceptive cues in this way, it impacts on cognition and behaviour, for example 
by enhancing fear conditioning or the judgement of emotion in faces (Ernst, 
Northoff, Böker, Seifritz, & Grimm, 2013; Raes & De Raedt, 2011). Likewise, 
when people are played their own heartbeats, in contrast to other rhythmic sounds, 
this influences their behaviour in the Ultimatum Game, most probably by enhancing 
attention to interoceptive cues (Lenggenhager, Azevedo, Mancini, & Aglioti, 
2013).  
 
The effect of attention to interoceptive signals is also evident from the study of 
heartbeat-evoked potentials, which appear during EEG as a positive potential shift, 
around 250-600ms after the R-wave. The height of the heartbeat-evoked potential 
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at central scalp locations correlates positively with scores on the Mental Tracking 
Method (Pollatos & Schandry, 2004) and, in common with interoceptive accuracy, 
heartbeat-evoked potentials are influenced by cardiac parameters (Schandry & 
Bestler, 1995). Heartbeat-evoked potentials have sometimes been regarded as a 
proxy for interoceptive representation because they reflect the brain’s increased 
sensitivity to bodily states when assessing emotion (Fukushima, Terasawa, & 
Umeda, 2011). For example, both interoceptive accuracy and heartbeat-evoked 
potentials are reduced in depressed patients (Terhaar, Viola, Bär, & Debener, 2012). 
However, although increased attention to heartbeats increases the amplitude of 
heartbeat-evoked potentials, it does not improve accuracy in heartbeat perception 
(Montoya, Schandry, & Müller, 1993; Schandry & Weitkunat, 1990), suggesting 
that attention to interoception is probably at ceiling in the Schandry task. 
Potentially, therefore, what is being measured by Mental Tracking is the limits of 
the individual’s ability to turn their attention inward. This may be the most useful 
way to characterise the awareness of interoceptive sensation.  
 
A prominent means of conceptualising the self within social psychology is based 
on ‘objective self-awareness’ (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) whereby the individual 
takes a third-person perspective and consider themselves as the object of their own 
and other people’s thoughts. In this tradition it is assumed that turning attention 
onto the self enhances the accuracy with which people make judgments about all 
aspects of self (Silvia & Gendolla, 2001). This ‘perceptual accuracy hypothesis’ has 
rarely been subject to controlled testing. Thus, whether enhanced self-focus can 
improve interoceptive accuracy has not yet been established.  
 
It has also been suggested (Wheeler, Morrison, DeMarree, & Petty, 2008), that a 
tendency to direct attention inwards is correlated with trait ‘private self-
consciousness’ (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). If so, this implies a link with 
interoceptive accuracy. Relationships between body awareness and self-
consciousness have been studied in social psychology, using self-report measures, 
but awareness of interoceptive sensations, assessed by physiological measures such 
as heartbeat perception, have rarely been considered within this research (Mehling 
et al., 2009). 
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1.3.2 Links between Interoceptive and Exteroceptive Awareness 
The competition of cues hypothesis (Pennebaker & Lightner, 1980) predicts that 
there will be negative associations between awareness of interoceptive cues and 
awareness in other sensory modalities. The results of several studies support this 
proposal. Interoceptive accuracy, measured by Mental Tracking, correlates with the 
threshold of olfactory detection, r = .55 in controls and r = .40 in those with acquired 
impairments in olfaction (Krajnik, Kollndorfer, Notter, Mueller, & Schöpf, 2014). 
In patients, disease duration and the threshold of olfaction together explained 35% 
of the variance in interoceptive accuracy, suggesting that as people lose their sense 
of smell they become less able to access interoceptive cues. Perhaps their attention 
becomes increasingly turned outwards as their disease progresses and olfaction 
becomes more effortful, resulting in less available attention for interoception. The 
results of a somatic detection task may be similarly interpreted. Following several 
minutes of counting their pulse, relayed to their fingertips, participants had a more 
liberal criterion for reporting touch (Mirams, Poliakoff, Brown, & Lloyd, 2012). 
The authors concluded that heightened attention to interoception leads to the 
reporting of illusory symptoms but an alternative, competition of cues, 
interpretation would be that a period of attending to interoceptive cues temporarily 
reduced the accuracy of somatosensory perception. Durlik and colleagues found 
that heightening attention to the exteroceptive representation of the participant’s 
body (by use of a video camera), significantly improved hit rate and sensitivity on 
a somatic detection task. This suggests that when people attend exteroceptively 
their accuracy in detecting somatosensory cues improves, however, the expected 
corresponding reduction in interoceptive accuracy was not observed (Durlik, 
Cardini, et al., 2014).  
 
Potential links between pain and interoceptive accuracy have also been studied. 
Pain has somatosensory aspects (Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & Aglioti, 2005), where 
competition of cues would predict a negative association with interoceptive 
accuracy. However, the equally crucial affective dimension of pain (Singer et al., 
2004) will be represented interoceptively, suggesting that high interoceptive 
accuracy could be associated with greater experience of pain. It has been reported 
that thresholds for the somatosensory pain of thermal stimulation do not correlate 
with scores on the Mental Tracking task (Horing, Kugel, Brenner, Zipfel, & Enck, 
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2013; Werner, Duschek, Mattern, & Schandry, 2009) and nor does the visceral pain 
of rectal balloon distension (Horing et al., 2013). However, using cutaneous 
pressure and with heart rate variability analysis to distinguish sympathetic and 
parasympathetic changes, Pollatos and colleagues reported lower thresholds, as 
well as lower pain tolerance, in people with high interoceptive accuracy, measured 
by the Mental Tracking Method (Pollatos, Füstös, & Critchley, 2012).  
In a fascinating new development, heartbeat perception has been compared with 
error monitoring during the Simon task (Sueyoshi, Sugimoto, Katayama, & 
Fukushima, 2014). On trials where the participants made mistakes, accuracy in the 
Mental Tracking task correlated with the amplitude of the error-positivity, which is 
a late component of error-related neural processing, observable under EEG. 
Heartbeat perception was also correlated with the increase in reaction times that 
occurs on trials immediately after an error has been detected. Error related 
components and post-error slowing are thought to originate in the anterior cingulate 
cortex (van Veen & Carter, 2006) and have been linked to measures of empathy 
(Larson, Fair, Good, & Baldwin, 2010) The authors interpret their results as 
indicating that the monitoring of inner bodily states and the monitoring of behaviour 
are related. An alternative explanation is that the affective consequences of making 
errors is greater in people with higher interoceptive accuracy, who generally report 
more emotional arousal as well as more anxiety. Such an explanation relies on the 
well-established links between interoception and emotion. 
1.4 Defining Emotion in terms of Interoception 
1.4.1 Interoceptive Accuracy and Emotion  
Until relatively recently, research into the awareness of interoceptive sensation has 
been almost exclusively concerned with the interoceptive underpinnings of 
emotion, based originally on the James-Lange theory of emotion (James, 1890). 
William James proposed a visceral sensorimotor theory of emotion, tightly linked 
to interoception. Any animal that moves has options and needs action plans which 
can be adapted by learning (Damasio, 2010; Panksepp & Northoff, 2009). Emotions 
provide these action plans through physiological, behavioural and ‘feeling’ 
components (Cameron, 2002; Harrison & Critchley, 2007). In James’s theory, it is 
the conscious readout of the otherwise unconscious interoception that adds the 
‘feelings’ to human emotions. He famously suggested that we see a bear (a percept) 
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and we run (elicited behaviour) but only afterwards do we humans consciously feel 
the fear, which is the readout of the peripheral bodily reactions (James, 1890). 
James’s insight that an emotion is a reflection in the brain of the state of the viscera 
has been highly influential. 
 
The links between interoception, emotion, cognition and behaviour were elaborated 
by Damasio in his ‘somatic marker hypothesis’ (Damasio, 1996). He postulated the 
existence of an evolutionarily ancient mechanism that attaches an emotional 
memory or ‘marker’ to an external stimulus, based on the organism’s bodily 
reactions to the stimulus. It is now accepted that interoception provides the 
mechanism for the crucial links between the individual’s (largely unconscious) 
bodily reactions and the effect that these body signatures have on the judgements 
and choices that the person makes (Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006). The 
somatic marker hypothesis therefore provides a description of the way in which 
interoception affects cognition and behaviour, with or without conscious awareness 
(Cameron, 2002).  
 
The extent to which people’s choices are influenced by their somatic markers 
depends on their interoceptive accuracy (Werner, Jung, et al., 2009). Typical 
analysis compares groups of subjects with high and low interoceptive accuracy. 
However, Dunn and colleagues using the whole range of interoceptive accuracy and 
measured participants’ arousal to emotional pictures both objectively (through heart 
rate change and skin conductance) and subjectively (by self-report). They found 
that interoceptive accuracy (measured by Mental Tracking) moderated the 
relationship between these measures of objective and subjective arousal, such that 
people with high interoceptive accuracy reported higher arousal than people with 
low interoceptive accuracy, despite having identical objective changes in 
physiological variables (Dunn et al., 2010). Importantly, the extent to which 
individuals’ choices in an intuitive decision making task (a variant of the Iowa 
Gambling Task) were then influenced by these ‘somatic marker’ depended on their 
interoceptive accuracy. Individuals with high interoceptive accuracy were inclined 
to follow their intuition (making decisions that were congruent with the changes in 
their heart rate and skin conductance), even when they were in error. Dunn et al.’s 
study importantly demonstrates that what varies between individuals is not actual 
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changes in bodily signals but the extent to which these interoceptive changes impact 
on an individual’s feelings, cognitions and behaviour.  
 
A similar explanation would account for the report that people with high 
interoceptive accuracy are more susceptible to ‘framing effects’ when making risky 
decisions (Sütterlin, Schultz, Stumpf, Pauli, & Vogele, 2013). It is probable that 
interoceptive accuracy indexes the extent to which the emotional/interoceptive 
responses to the frames affect decision making in this task. 
 
There is a wealth of evidence indicating that individuals with higher awareness of 
interoceptive sensation (measured by heartbeat perception) experience more 
emotional arousal than those with lower awareness, despite similar objective 
physiological responses (Dunn et al., 2010; Pollatos, Herbert, et al., 2007; Wiens, 
Mezzacappa, & Katkin, 2000). People with high interoceptive accuracy also 
demonstrate more ‘arousal focus’, using words implying strong activation when 
describing their emotions (Barrett, Quigley, Bliss-Moreau, & Aronson, 2004). 
Similarly, strong P300 waves (a mark of emotional processing), as well as greater 
self-reported arousal, have been reported in people with high interoceptive accuracy 
in response to emotional pictures (Herbert, Pollatos, et al., 2007; Pollatos, Kirsch, 
& Schandry, 2005).  This positive link between interoceptive sensation and 
emotional arousal is in accordance with theories that interoception underpins all 
emotional experience (Craig, 2004; Damasio, 2003a; James, 1890; Seth, 2013). 
Potentially, people who are more aware of interoceptive sensations are therefore 
more powerfully aware of their emotions, thus experiencing greater emotional 
arousal. Generally, no differences in the valence of the emotion are found.   
Further evidence for the role of interoception in emotion is provided by patients 
with peripheral autonomic de-enervation, who are unable to modulate their body 
state through the autonomic system because of degeneration of peripheral ganglion 
cells. They show no changes in heart rate or skin conductance under stress or when 
processing emotion. Such patients have less activity in the insula and amygdala 
during fear conditioning, demonstrating that their lack of interoceptive signals 
directly reduces their experience of fear (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2002).  
 
 28 
Interoceptive accuracy similarly affects emotional memory, presumably because all 
memories have interoceptive content, as implied by the somatic marker hypothesis 
(Pollatos & Schandry, 2008; Werner, Peres, Duschek, & Schandry, 2010). The 
unconscious effect of interoception on emotional memory is powerful evidence for 
the role of interoception in cognition and behaviour, showing that implicit 
emotional learning is moderated by interoceptive accuracy. In a further important 
study, participants were non-consciously fear-conditioned with pictures of snakes 
and spiders, paired with mild electric shocks (Katkin et al., 2001). Individuals 
classed as good heartbeat detectors on the Whitehead task were able to predict, 
above chance, which pictures would be accompanied by shocks, despite being 
unable consciously to detect the images. This type of fear conditioning is also 
enhanced by attention to interoception (Raes & De Raedt, 2011).  
 
Cardiac timing is known to influence perceptual processing. For example, the effect 
on muscle sympathetic nerve activity of mild electrical stimulation differs 
depending on where is it presented relative to the R wave of the heartbeat (Donadio, 
Kallio, Karlsson, Nordin, & Wallin, 2002; Gray, Rylander, Harrison, Wallin, & 
Critchley, 2009). Recent studies have begun to unravel the extent to which this type 
of effect is modulated by heartbeat perception (Garfinkel et al., 2013). 
Baroreceptors are the pressure and stretch receptors in the major arteries emerging 
from the heart, which convey information to the brain about the physiological level 
of arousal. They play a major role in cardiac homeostasis by setting blood pressure 
and modulating autonomic responses (Gray et al., 2009). Garfinkel and colleagues 
showed that emotional words are less well remembered if they are presented when 
the heart is at systole (a state of physiological arousal, when the baroreceptors are 
firing) rather than at diastole. Importantly, this effect is less pronounced in people 
with high interoceptive accuracy (measured by Mental Tracking). Moreover, people 
with high interoceptive accuracy can correctly recall the presented words, despite 
having lower confidence in the accuracy of their recall (Garfinkel et al., 2013). The 
authors suggest that the accuracy of interoceptive representations in good heartbeat 
perceivers mitigates the deleterious effect of physiological arousal on emotional 
memory. 
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An important consequence of the relationship between interoception and emotional 
experience is that interoceptive accuracy has implications for emotional disorders. 
1.4.2 Interoceptive Accuracy in Clinical Disturbances of Emotion 
Research into the links between interoceptive sensation and emotion has been 
fuelled by attempts to relate high awareness of interoceptive sensation to clinical 
conditions - principally to anxiety. A large body of research suggests that high 
awareness of interoception  is associated with anxiety (Domschke, Stevens, 
Pfleiderer, & Gerlach, 2010). However, significant links are generally found only 
in studies which measure interoceptive accuracy using the Mental Tracking 
Method. Panic is an anxiety disorder involving high arousal, where patients often 
catastrophise about normal interoceptive sensations (Clark, 1986). High 
interoceptive accuracy may be a predisposing factor and many researchers have 
investigated this relationship (Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Van der Does, Antony, 
Ehlers, & Barsky, 2000) but with mixed results (Ehlers et al., 1995). Links between 
interoceptive accuracy and depression are even less clear-cut (Critchley et al., 2004; 
Dunn, Lawrence, & Ogilvie, 2007; Terhaar et al., 2012), probably because the 
relationship between interoceptive accuracy and, frequently comorbid, anxiety and 
depression depend on complex interactions (Dunn et al., 2010; Pollatos, Traut-
Mattausch, & Schandry, 2009). 
 
There are, however, advantages to having high interoceptive accuracy. Good 
heartbeat perceivers are better able to down-regulate unpleasant emotion (Füstös, 
Gramann, Herbert, & Pollatos, 2012), exhibit less reaction to social inclusion 
(Werner et al., 2013) and have higher emotional intelligence (Schneider, Lyons, & 
Williams, 2005). People with high interoceptive accuracy are also more able to self-
regulate their behaviour to cope with increased physical load (Herbert, Ulbrich, & 
Schandry, 2007).    
 
Abnormally low interoceptive accuracy is now recognised as equally problematic. 
In patients with alexithymia (defined as difficult in identifying and characterising 
emotional experiences), symptom severity is inversely related to heartbeat 
perception (Herbert, Herbert, & Pollatos, 2011). People with health anxiety 
potentially have low interoceptive accuracy (Krautwurst, Gerlach, Gomille, Hiller, 
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& Witthöft, 2014) as do sufferers from depersonalisation disorder (Sedeño et al., 
2014) and those with personality disorders and psychosomatic complaints 
(Mussgay et al., 1999; Pollatos et al., 2011). However, a recent study of patients 
with cardiac pain of somatic origin found no difference in their heartbeat perception 
compared with controls, although scores on the Mental Tracking Task correlated 
with the distress associated with their pain (Schroeder et al., 2014).  
 
It is possible that many such patients’ symptoms result from misreading of 
interoceptive signals. Both depression and addiction have been linked to insula 
dysfunction, which could indicate deficits in interoception (Naqvi & Bechara, 2009; 
Wiebking & Northoff, 2014). Likewise the blunted autonomic reactivity reported 
in somatoform patients suggests that faulty interoceptive signalling may underlie 
this condition (Pollatos et al., 2011). Sufferers from anorexia nervosa and bulimia, 
as well as obese people, have lower interoceptive accuracy than controls - 
potentially reflecting their inability to accurately perceive the homeostatic 
interoceptive signals that set normal appetite (Herbert & Pollatos, 2014; Klabunde, 
Acheson, Boutelle, Matthews, & Kaye, 2013; Pollatos et al., 2008). By contrast, 
intuitive eating is associated with good interoceptive accuracy (Herbert, Blechert, 
Hautzinger, Matthias, & Herbert, 2013). Current longitudinal research on eating 
behaviour, body weight and interoceptive accuracy in children may, over time, 
elucidate the development of such disorders (Koch & Pollatos, 2014). 
 
Research into links between personality variables and interoception may also throw 
light on both normal and clinically disturbed experience of emotion. It has recently 
been shown that during attention to interoceptive cues (heartbeat counting) BOLD 
activity in the right anterior insula (the principal convergence zone for interoceptive 
signals) is positively related to neuroticism but negatively associated with 
extraversion, agreeableness and openness to experience (Terasawa et al., 2013). 
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1.5 Defining the Self with respect to Interoception 
By contrast with the wealth of studies linking interoceptive accuracy with emotion, 
relatively little empirical attention has been devoted to the role of interoception in 
underpinning feelings of selfhood, although this idea also has a history that can be 
traced to William James (James, 1890). The aim of this thesis was to address aspects 
of this gap in the literature. The shortage of research in this area is particularly 
surprising, given that the purpose of the existence of any organism is to preserve its 
own life, while enhancing its reproductive success (Ádám, 2010; Friston, 2013), 
and that to achieve this it must rely on interoceptive signalling. It is the interoceptive 
state of the body that crucially dictates how an animal will interact with the world, 
as well as the affective significance it will attach to objects, including other 
organisms (Damasio, 2010). Potentially, the sense of self may have evolved in order 
to unify interoceptive consequences - vital to survival - and to link them with the 
actions and perceptions that provoke them (Craig, 2010; Damasio, 2010). As a 
theoretical proposal, this account of the self has been the subject of considerable 
discussion. Several recent definitions have consequently taken as a starting point 
the assumption that the evolution of the self developed out of processes of life 
regulation and homeostasis. Such models propose that the body is the foundation 
of the conscious mind (Craig, 2010; Damasio, 2010; Park & Tallon-Baudry, 2014; 
Seth, 2013) and that interoception provides two crucial linked roles (Damasio, 
2010; Panksepp & Northoff, 2009). Firstly, interoception underpins the 
fundamental feelings that we exist. Secondly, interoception is the basis of all 
emotion (as described in Section 1.3.2). Emotion, however, is itself intrinsically 
self-referencing, being concerned with furthering the survival and success of the 
organism (LeDoux, 2012), so that these two roles of interoception are essentially 
linked. The assumption in which this thesis is grounded, that the self relies on 
interoceptive processing, has been explored in a number of recent theoretical 
models of the self.   
1.5.1 Damasio’s Model of the Self 
Damasio’s conception of a self, based upon interoception, has been extremely 
influential. He hypothesises a taxonomy of a ‘proto self’ - reliant on interoceptive 
maps - which is assembled in the brainstem and provides the organism with the 
feeling that its body exists (Damasio, 2010). The ‘core self’, which is created when 
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this ‘proto-self’ is in interaction with objects, encompasses the organism’s sense of 
the ownership of its own body and its sense of agency. Emotion, which is coded 
interoceptively, is generated within the ‘core self’ during interaction with objects. 
The emotional salience that an organism attaches to any given object is assumed to 
form the basis of attentional processes. Damasio’s ‘proto self’ plus ‘core self’ is 
equivalent to the ‘material me’ first proposed by Sherrington (Sherrington, 1899). 
Damasio’s taxonomy culminates in an ‘autobiographical self’, which gives the 
third-person perspective, enabling humans to perceive themselves as the objects of 
their own thoughts (Damasio, 2010). For Damasio, the remarkable sense humans 
have of the invariance of the self comes about because the brain is continually 
engaged in re-representing the interoceptive state of the body (Damasio, 2003). 
According to this account, it is precisely because the body must be maintained 
within narrow homeostatic parameters that we have feelings of the continuity of our 
selves through time. This model is difficult to subject to rigorous scientific testing 
but has proved a powerful starting point for other theorists (Christoff, Cosmelli, 
Legrand, & Thompson, 2011; Panksepp & Northoff, 2009). 
1.5.2 Craig’s Model of the Self, based on Interoceptive Integration 
Craig’s model of ‘the sentient self’ is similarly based on interoception (Craig, 
2010). Interoceptive afferent information from a wide range of sources within the 
body travels, by way of the thalamus, to the posterior insula cortex bilaterally, 
where it is represented somatotopographically and in a modality-specific manner 
(Björnsdotter, Löken, Olausson, Vallbo, & Wessberg, 2009; Brooks, Zambreanu, 
Godinez, Craig, & Tracey, 2005). According to Craig, this facilitates the re-
mapping and integration, in the mid insula, of all activity related to the body, which 
includes the interoceptive, exteroceptive, vestibular, premotor and homeostatic 
systems. It is proposed that the totality of this afferent information is re-mapped 
into the anterior insula, where all emotional and hedonic signals arising from the 
body are finally integrated and become available to subjective consciousness 
(Craig, 2010).  
 
There are strong similarities between Craig’s and Damasio’s models of the self. 
Both depend upon interoception. Both explicitly assume some form of comparator, 
whereby changes in the state of the self are compared from moment to moment and 
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measured against the desired or ideal state, represented in internal body maps which 
are largely innate. Intriguing reports of individuals who have experienced phantom 
viscera provide evidence that stored body images involve interoception (Cameron, 
2002, p214). Damasio suggests that consciousness is produced in ‘pulses’, while 
Craig refers to ‘global emotional moments’, each lasting about 125ms, which he 
believes make up the stream of consciousness (Craig, 2010). 
 
A fundamental difference between Damasio’s and Craig’s models, however, is the 
localisation of the self. Damasio insists that the self is formed in the medial 
mesencephalic and diencephalic subcortical regions, (Damasio, Damasio, & Tranel, 
2012; Panksepp & Northoff, 2009), only then being remapped and extended in the 
cortex. In defence of this argument, no cortical lesion destroys the sense of self 
unless it also wipes out consciousness and Damasio cites the case of a patient with 
bilateral lesions of insula cortex who continued to have intact, although blunted, 
emotions and retained his sense of self (Damasio et al., 2012; Philippi et al., 2012). 
Craig, by contrast, places all human self-awareness in the insula, notwithstanding 
the involvement of subcortical structures and the potential existence of a second 
pathway for interoceptive cues, involving somatosensory cortex (Couto et al., 2013; 
Khalsa et al., 2010).  
1.6 The Insula in Interoceptive Processing 
Evidence for the importance of the insula in interoception is striking. The anterior 
insula has broad connections across the brain and is multimodal association cortex 
which receives input, via the thalamus, from sensory neurons within the body 
(Cauda et al., 2011; Harrison, Gray, Gianaros, & Critchley, 2010; Medford & 
Critchley, 2010; Naqvi & Bechara, 2009; Nieuwenhuys, 2012). The modalities of 
this interoceptive information include temperature, itch, pain, hunger, thirst, 
visceral fullness, skin flushing, cramping and awareness of being ill, including 
nausea, (Craig, 2010). The insula is reliably activated by a diverse range of feelings, 
including the experience of all emotion (Craig, 2009); decision making under 
uncertainty (Lamm & Singer, 2010); recognition of one’s own face (Devue & 
Brédart, 2011); the sense of agency (Farrer et al., 2003; Sperduti, Delaveau, Fossati, 
& Nadel, 2011); empathy for pain (Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009); 
observing and experiencing disgust (Wicker et al., 2003); olfaction (Gottfried, 
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2010); music (Brown, Martinez, & Parsons, 2004); and the sensual touch involved 
in social bonding (Björnsdotter et al., 2009). The right posterior insula is activated 
by the feeling of body ownership (Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 2007; 
Tsakiris, 2010); by vestibular information (Lopez, Halje, & Blanke, 2008); and by 
estimation of elapsed time (Wittmann, Simmons, Aron, & Paulus, 2010). Moreover, 
attention to heartbeats activates an area of the right anterior insula (Critchley et al., 
2004) that is also engaged when people rate their emotional experience. This 
activity correlates with the reported intensity of the emotion (Critchley & Harrison, 
2013; Critchley & Nagai, 2012; Gu, Hof, Friston, & Fan, 2013; Zaki, Davis, & 
Ochsner, 2012).  
 
The insula, together with the anterior cingulate cortex and medial prefrontal areas, 
with which it is strongly connected, are prominent elements of the set of ‘cortical 
midline structures’, which also include the temporal parietal junction and temporal 
pole (Northoff et al., 2006; van der Meer, Costafreda, Aleman, & David, 2010). 
Related to the ‘default mode’ of brain activity (Raichle et al., 2001), this network 
is activated by self-relevant tasks across a wide domain (Legrand & Ruby, 2009). 
Processes that activate the anterior insula can all be considered highly self-relevant. 
The insula’s role in anxiety (Paulus & Stein, 2006), reward-related risk and 
uncertainty (Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009), as well as in interoception 
(Craig, 2009), supports the theory that it is a cortical convergence zone that 
potentially plays an important role in integrating inner bodily signals with external 
information about the world. A number of fMRI studies also suggest that activity 
in the anterior insula may reflect the switching of attention between interoceptive 
and exteroceptive signals (Farb, Segal, & Anderson, 2012, 2013; Nagai, Critchley, 
Featherstone, Trimble, & Dolan, 2004). Craig has argued that the left insula is 
associated predominantly with parasympathetic activity, and thus with 
nourishment, safety, positive affect, approach behaviour and affiliative emotions, 
while the right insula is associated predominantly with sympathetic activity, 
arousal, danger, negative affect, withdrawal and emotions oriented to the survival 
of the individual (Craig, 2005). Alternatively there may be a degree of lateralisation 
of functional connectivity (Cauda et al., 2011), with the left anterior insula 
predominantly linked to prefrontal cortex, while the right has stronger connections 
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to the anterior cingulate with which it is generally co-active (Medford & Critchley, 
2010).  
1.7 Concepts of the Self Based on Multisensory and Motor 
Integration 
Although models of the self based on interoception are well developed, they 
represent only one strand of thinking (Northoff et al., 2006; Ruby & Legrand, 
2007). An equally important body of research has investigated the self from a 
phenomenological perspective. This describes the basic, pre-conscious sense of 
being the ‘I’ of experience, thought and feelings, that resides in ‘my’ body 
(Gallagher, 2000; Zahavi, 2002), giving rise to the experience of owning ‘my’ body 
(self-identification/body ownership) and the experience of where ‘I’ am in space 
(self-location), as well as the first-person perspective (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009).  
 
While Damasio’s and Craig’s models propose a self based on the integration of 
interoceptive cues, the phenomenological model conceives the self as a 
continuously recreated sensorimotor process (Ruby & Legrand, 2007), which relies 
on the integration of a wide range of multisensory inputs (visual, auditory, 
somatosensory, vestibular) together with motor signals (Aspell, Lenggenhager, & 
Blanke, 2012). The contribution of interoception to this integration is now being 
recognised (Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014; Seth, 2013). Within phenomenology a 
distinction is made between the sense of body ownership (the ‘sensory self’), which 
depends principally on afferent processes, and the sense of agency (the ‘acting 
self’), which relies on the integration of efferent motor signals with exafferent and 
reafferent sensory cues (Gallagher, 2000; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). Multisensory 
integration has been extensively studied with respect to body ownership (Haggard 
& Tsakiris, 2009; Lopez et al., 2008; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008a; Serino et al., 2013; 
Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007) and also with respect to agency 
(Moore, Middleton, Haggard, & Fletcher, 2012; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 
1.7.1 Body Ownership and Interoceptive Accuracy 
The multisensory integration that underpins both body ownership and self-location 
(Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007), can be studied through bodily 
illusions. In the rubber hand illusion, synchronous stroking a visible prosthetic hand 
and the participant’s own hidden hand leads to the sensation of ownership of the 
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rubber hand (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) as well as to a perceived shift in the felt 
location of the real hand in the direction of the prosthesis, showing that vision has 
primacy in this multisensory integration. Until recently it has been assumed that the 
sense of body ownership in the rubber hand illusion, as well as its full body variants 
(Aspell, Lenggenhager, & Blanke, 2009; Ehrsson, 2007), depends on the integration 
of exteroceptive senses alone. However, neither vision nor touch are self-specific 
and some authors have suggested that it is consequently surprising that their 
integration is sufficient to induce body ownership illusions (Ruby & Legrand, 
2007). The important contribution that interoceptive cues provide is that their input 
is uniquely self-specifying because the sensation they convey can only arise from 
within the body of the individual. 
 
Interoception is linked to the rubber hand illusion in several ways. Firstly, the 
rubber hand illusion itself causes interoceptive responses. If the illusion is induced 
and the prosthetic hand is then threatened, this causes physiological responses 
(electrodermal activity) similar to those experienced when the subject’s real hand 
is threatened (Ehrsson, Wiech, Weiskopf, Dolan, & Passingham, 2007). This 
indicates that the false hand elicits emotional responses, with concomitant 
interoceptive signals. Heightened skin conductance responses to threats to an 
avatar’s body have similarly been reported while subjects are experiencing the full 
body-swap illusion (Ehrsson, 2007). Even more strikingly, histamine reactivity 
increases in the ‘rejected’ arm during the rubber hand illusion (Barnsley et al., 
2012), implying that the interoceptive system begins to disown the real hand in 
favour of the prosthetic and recalling Damasio’s definition of ‘the self’ as ‘whatever 
the immune system defines as being part of the body’ (Damasio, 2003). Moreover, 
while an individual is experiencing the rubber hand illusion, their own hand cools 
down, implying that the conscious sense of the bodily self interacts with 
homeostatic regulation of the body (Moseley et al., 2008, but see also Sadibolova 
& Longo, 2014). The effect of body temperature on the rubber hand illusion 
operates in both directions, such that cooling the subject’s real hand during 
stimulation leads to a stronger illusion (Kammers, Rose, & Haggard, 2011).  
 
Moreover, individual differences in interoceptive accuracy modulate the extent to 
which people experience the rubber hand illusion (Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jiménez, & 
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Costantini, 2011). This effect has been observed both behaviourally and 
physiologically, through skin conductance as well as through the extent to which 
the skin temperature of the stimulated hand falls. It is significant only for people 
with below-median interoceptive accuracy, who presumably rely less on 
interoceptive signals of self-identification and self-location and are more likely to 
be subject to body ownership illusions. Similarly, during the enfacement illusion 
(Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard, & Aglioti, 2010), Tajadura-Jiménez and Tsakiris found 
that people with low interoceptive accuracy shifted their recognition of their own 
face more frames towards the face of a stranger when they saw that face stroked 
synchronously and specularly with their own (Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2013).  
 
Suzuki and colleagues, using a novel ‘virtual hand’ paradigm, dispensed altogether 
with a prosthetic hand by filming the subject’s own hand and replaying this film to 
them in real time, in the location where the rubber hand would usually be placed. 
They showed that, if the participant’s filmed hand was made to flush slightly in 
synchrony with the subject’s heartbeat, then the rubber hand illusion was induced 
(Suzuki, Garfinkel, Critchley, & Seth, 2013). Contrary to the results of Tsakiris et 
al. (2011), in this paradigm it was the people with high interoceptive accuracy who 
experienced the greater proprioceptive drift. The important difference between 
these two experimental manipulations is that in the classic rubber hand illusion the 
interoceptive cues of the individuals with good heartbeat perception serve to anchor 
those participants in their own bodies and enable them to resist the illusion. 
However, in Suzuki et al.’s novel method, the salient interoceptive cues are now 
located on the real, filmed hand, predisposing people with high interoceptive 
accuracy to recognise it as their true body part. Similarly, causing an avatar to flash 
in synchrony with the participant’s own heartbeat (to enhance self-identification 
with the avatar’s body) facilitates performance on a task that requires participants 
to judge the perspective of the avatar (Aspell, Heydrich, Marillier, Lavanchy, 
Herbelin, & Blanke,  2013).  
 
It has also recently been demonstrated that respiration can produce a body 
ownership illusion. People who saw an image of their own torso flash in synchrony 
with their respiration experienced a stronger sense of self-location towards the 
virtual body than when the flashing was asynchronous (and also when compared 
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with an inanimate control object), although they reported no sense of ownership of 
the avatar (Adler, Herbelin, Similowski, & Blanke, 2014). 
 
While the modulating influence of heartbeat perception on body ownership is now 
well established, there has been little investigation of the possibility that 
interoception provides a hitherto neglected set of self-specifying inputs to other 
processes that involve multisensory and motor integration. 
1.7.2 Agency 
A key example of such a process is the sense of agency, defined as the feeling that 
we are the authors of our own actions. Agency emerges in our interaction with the 
environment and is fundamental to models of self (Damasio, 2010; Gallagher, 2000; 
Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2011; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008b). It is well 
established that interoceptive accuracy modulates body ownership (Suzuki et al., 
2013; Tsakiris et al., 2011) but potential influences of interoception on agency are 
only now being proposed, but without, as yet, direct empirical support (Gentsch & 
Synofzik, 2014; Seth et al., 2011). This is surprising, given that the ultimate 
evolutionary purpose of all action is to promote the survival and reproductive 
success of the organism and that this depends crucially on the maintenance of 
homeostatic balance (e.g. body temperature) and the pursuit of innate drives (e.g. 
mating), which are signalled interoceptively (Gu & Fitzgerald, 2014). The point is 
well demonstrated by predictive coding accounts of interoceptive processing, where 
homeostatic balance, signalled interoceptively (e.g. low blood sugar), can be 
restored either through autonomic responses (burning fat), or by movement in order 
(in this example) to acquire and ingest food. Interoceptive signalling and action are 
thus reciprocally bound, with movement being both a consequence of, and a 
contributor to, the maintenance of the body within the narrow range of desirable 
states that are compatible with life (K Friston, 2013b).  
 
While the sense of body ownership can be produced by exafferent multisensory 
experience, the sense of agency depends on the integration of re-afferent sensory 
signals with motor cues (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; Moore & Fletcher, 2012). The 
influential comparator model emphasises the predictive aspects of this process, 
arguing that the sense of agency is the result of a temporal and spatial match 
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between the predicted and the actual sensorimotor consequences of an action 
(Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002). An alternative account concludes, however, 
that agency relies on postdictive processes, whereby we attribute an action to 
ourselves simply if it matches our intentions (Wegner, 2003). Synthesis of these 
two views is proposed in the ‘optimal cue integration’ or ‘multifactorial’ account 
(Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Voss, 2013), which suggests that 
predictive and postdictive cues are weighted by their relative salience and 
reliability. In the light of the prominence given to the sense of agency by Seth et 
al.’s recent model of conscious presence (Seth et al., 2011), the possibility that 
interoceptive/emotional cues also impact on agency is ripe for investigation 
(Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014).  
1.7.3 Separating the Self from Other People 
Theories about the origins of the self usually consider the organism as if it were 
surviving and acting in isolation (Sebanz, 2007). This ignores the crucial role in 
human evolution likely to have been played by social interaction (Knoblich & 
Sebanz, 2008). The discovery of mirror neurons in the premotor cortex of the 
macaque (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2005) and in humans (Mukamel, Ekstrom, 
Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010) gave rise to the theory that we engage our own 
motor cortex in order to understand and interpret the actions of others (Gallese, 
2007). While mirroring of action has been the focus of the majority of research, 
many studies have also demonstrated the recruitment of overlapping cortical 
circuits during the observation and the experience of a wide range of other 
phenomena (Keysers & Gazzola, 2009), including pain (Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 
2011), disgust (Jabbi, Bastiaansen, & Keysers, 2008; Wicker et al., 2003) and touch 
(Keysers et al., 2004). Such studies support the proposal that we understand the 
sensations and feelings, as well as the actions, of other people by analogy with the 
cortical representations of our own bodily sensations, emotions and actions (Gallese 
& Sinigaglia, 2011), which enables us to respond to the actions of others in a 
socially appropriate manner (Hamilton, 2013).  
 
However, in the presence of others, individuals must be able to simultaneously 
represent their own precepts and actions, as well as simulating those of the other 
person (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). Thus, when an observer engages a state 
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similar to that of the person observed, by activating her own representation for 
experiencing the observed state, she is said to experience ‘self/other overlap’ 
(Preston & Hofelich, 2012). The ability of people with high interoceptive accuracy 
to resist body ownership illusions suggests that they may be better at distinguishing 
‘self’ from ‘other’, perhaps because interoceptive cues provide the necessary self-
specifying input. Potentially, therefore, interoceptive accuracy may affect several 
outcomes that involve self/other overlap such as the ‘social Simon effect’ (Sebanz 
et al., 2003) and ‘automatic imitation’ (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 
2000). 
1.8 Models of the Self Based on Free Energy  
Further recent models of the self have combined the insights of earlier proposals 
based on interoception, with theories of the self that rely on more general 
multisensory integration (Apps & Tsakiris, 2013; Limanowski & Blankenburg, 
2013; Quattrocki & Friston, 2014; Seth et al., 2011). These models draw on the 
powerful unifying framework of cortical functioning proposed by the free energy 
principle (Friston, 2010), together with predictive coding accounts of cortical 
function, to account for both ‘the sensory’ and ‘the acting self’ (Gallagher, 2000). 
These models take as their starting point the free energy assumption that the role of 
the organism is to maintain itself within a narrow range of desirable states 
compatible with evolutionary success (Karl Friston, 2009), for which interoception 
provides the vital homeostatic maps (Gu & Fitzgerald, 2014).  
 
Seth and colleagues’ innovative, ‘interoceptive predictive coding model’ places the 
self, the sense of agency, conscious emotion and feelings of ‘presence’, which they 
define as ‘the subjective sense of reality of the world and of the self within the 
world’ (Seth et al., 2011), , within a predictive coding account (Karl Friston, 2009). 
They postulate a self based on a component for agency and another for presence. In 
accordance with the comparator model (Blakemore et al., 2002), within Seth et al.’s 
model, feelings of agency arise when the predicted sensory and motor cues from an 
action match the actual signals produced by moving. Presence is likewise achieved 
when interoceptive efference and reafference are reconciled. Importantly, although 
agency in this framework is assumed to rely principally on motor cues and 
exteroception, with presence dependent on interoception, there is vital cross-talk 
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between these components. Sensory information from all modalities, both 
interoceptive and exteroceptive, must accordingly be integrated with motor cues in 
forming both the sense of agency and presence that go to make up the self (Seth et 
al., 2011).  
 
Emotion is an integral part of Seth et al.’s model and is characterised as 
‘interoceptive inference’. The authors propose that conscious emotions arise when 
bottom-up interoceptive sensory signals are reconciled with top-down predictions 
about the interoceptive state of the body. Within the model, ‘interoceptive 
predictions’ about the internal state of the body depend on the integration of a wide 
range of inputs, incorporating the effects of exteroceptive as well as interoceptive 
information, plus higher-level predictions influenced, for example, by assumptions 
about the current social context. These cues are all integrated in a Bayes optimal 
fashion, according to their salience and reliability (their ‘precision’). An example 
put forward by Pezzulo argues that the experience of night terrors may be the result 
of the enhanced weight accorded to interoceptive cues in the dark, when vision 
ceases to be reliable (Pezzulo, 2013).  
 
In Seth et al.’s model it is assumed that interoceptive inference involves inferring 
the causes of changes in the perceived internal state of the body, in exactly the same 
way that our sensation of colour is an interpretation of wavelength-selective 
responses in the visual cortex (Friston, 2013a). This model is therefore related to 
two-stage theories of emotion, which argue that bodily percepts and emotions rely 
on the cognitive inferences that we draw about the internal states of our bodies 
(Pennebaker & Lightner, 1980; Schachter & Singer, 1962). For example, following 
injections of adrenalin, the emotions that people report vary depending on the 
experimental manipulated context (Schachter & Singer, 1962). One-stage models, 
by contrast, seek specific bodily signatures for the various emotions (Harrison, 
Gray, Gianaros, & Critchley, 2010), such as distinct patterns of cardio-respiratory 
activity (Rainville et al., 2006).  
 
Complementing Seth’s model, the ‘free energy self’ is principally concerned with 
self-recognition and body ownership (Apps & Tsakiris, 2013). In this model the self 
is continuously reconstructed as the most likely explanation for all the available 
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sensory and motor data. In accounting for the rubber hand illusion, for example, the 
authors argue that, given an individual’s previously learned predictions that feeling 
of touch and vision of touch generally co-occur, the most parsimonious explanation 
the brain can select, during the synchronous stroking of a fake hand and the person’s 
hidden real hand, is that the rubber hand is truly part of their own body. By a similar 
set of reasoning, Limanowski and Blankenburg argue that the ‘minimal 
phenomenological self’ proposed by Metzinger (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009) is the 
outcome of the hierarchal generative processes involved in predictive coding. 
Consequently, the percept of a self is the brain’s best explanation for all the 
available sensorimotor input (Limanowski & Blankenburg, 2013). 
  
An important contribution of these free energy models is the proposal that the self 
is hierarchically distributed and underpinned by many different types of 
information. Signals and predictions from any modality may thus be brought to bear 
to resolve a conflict between cues in another, including higher-level, abstract and 
amodal assumptions (predictions). That the self is continually constructed through 
a widely distributed neural process would account for the failure to find a specific 
self-module in the brain  
 
Finally, Quattrocki and Friston propose a multimodal generative model of the self, 
formed in early interaction with caregivers, as the emotional affordances of 
interoceptive states are learned by association between interoceptive cues (such as 
hunger) and the relevant exteroceptive signals (that provide relief). In this model, 
the key to separating self and other is assumed to depend on the attenuation of self-
generated interoceptive cues, in order to shift attention outward onto exteroceptive 
cues. The authors suggest that abnormality of the oxytocin system, which they 
argue controls the precision of interoceptive cues, is the basis of the deficits in self-
processing that characterise autism (Quattrocki & Friston, 2014). The model has 
yet to be subjected to rigorous testing and a number of questions remain 
unanswered. For example, the authors propose that theory of mind (cognitive 
empathy) is the result of a successful reduction in the precision (salience and 
reliability) of the individual’s self-generated interoceptive cues, which enables the 
observer to avoid emotion contagion during social interaction and permits her to 
(cognitively) infer the interoceptive state of the other person. However, the 
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literature on empathy (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Preston & de Waal, 2002; 
Singer & Lamm, 2009) is clear that affective empathy involves both the direct 
simulation of observed emotion and the simultaneous realisation that the emotion 
one is experiencing arises from the other person (i.e. self/other distinction). How 
these can be reconciled within Quattrocki and Friston’s model is not immediately 
obvious. The model argues that self/other distinction relies on the sensory 
attenuation of self-generated interoceptive signals. While the difference between an 
exafferent and reafferent sound or touch can be clearly defined, it may be more 
difficult to draw this distinction in interoception, where all signals are internally 
generated and self-specifying. 
1.8.1 Incorporating the Narrative Self into Models of the Self Based 
on Interoception 
In neuroscience, bodily and narrative conceptualisations of the self (Damasio, 2010; 
Gallagher, 2000; James, 1890) have generally been treated as distinct, with the 
narrative self perceived as an abstract and amodal construct (Farmer & Tsakiris, 
2012). However, within the free energy models of self, hierarchies, such as proto 
self, core self and autobiographical/narrative self (Damasio, 2010; James, 1890) 
represent increasing hierarchical levels (K Friston, 2011)within a single construct 
of the self. The nature of such a hierarchy and how it might be represented in the 
brain has not described but a possible model is suggested by Craig (2009). 
Interoceptive signals are carried on cranial nerves to the nucleus of the solitary tract, 
the parabrachical nucleus and hypothalamus; and by lamina 1 afferents to the 
thalamus (Critchley & Harrison, 2013), before being represented by numerous 
mappings of individual modalities in the posterior insula. They are remapped and 
integrated with motivationally salient exteroceptive signals, from all sensory 
channels, in the mid-insula, implying a posterior-to-anterior processing gradient of 
increasing complexity, as a hierarchy would imply. Craig proposes that further 
remapping of these representations in the anterior insula ultimately creates ‘the 
material me’, or bodily self. The insula’s connections with limbic, prefrontal and 
temporal areas (Cauda et al., 2011) potentially provide the necessary further layers 
of the hierarchy where, for example, memories that underpin the narrative self may 
be integrated. This implies that the narrative self is instantiated at a higher 
hierarchical level than the bodily self but that the two are entirely interdependent. 
While interactions between interoceptive accuracy and the bodily self have been 
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investigated in, for example body ownership, the probability that aspects of the 
narrative self also interact with heartbeat perception has been largely ignored. 
1.9 The Motivation for this Thesis  
From the review presented above, it can be concluded that interoception is 
fundamental to the self. Previous research has concentrated on the role of 
interoception in emotion and only recently has it been appreciated that interoception 
provides a set of uniquely self-specifying senses that make an essential contribution 
to the sensorimotor integration that underpins the self. The importance of 
interoception for the self now underpins a variety of well-developed theoretical 
models and has also been demonstrated by a small but growing number of empirical 
studies, principally in body ownership.  Individual differences in interoceptive 
accuracy, assessed by heartbeat perception, have been successfully linked with the 
experience of emotion, as well as with emotional disorders, in an extensive body of 
research.  Heartbeat perception has thus been demonstrated as an empirically valid 
and effective measure, despite its potential limitations. There is consequently scope 
to use this measure as a means to probe the role of interoception in previously 
neglected questions that relate to modern neurocognitive conceptualisation of the 
self and self/other distinction.  
 
The aim of the six experiments presented in this thesis was, therefore, to investigate 
how interoceptive accuracy, measured by heartbeat perception using the Mental 
Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981), modulates aspects of self-processing.  
 
A number of gaps have been identified in the literature where interoceptive 
accuracy may have a bearing. Conceptually the experiments fall into two groups. 
The first three experiments were concerned with how interoceptive accuracy 
interacts with attention to the self.  
 
Heartbeat perception appears to be a trait variable, with individual differences 
dependent on how well people can focus their attention onto interoceptive cues. 
While attempts to improve heartbeat perception are generally unsuccessful, 
experimental manipulations that have had some effect are those that have involved 
enhanced attention to some exteroceptive aspect of the self. There has been some 
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success, for example, with mirror self-observation (Weisz et al., 1988), which is 
generally assumed to enhance attention principally to the bodily self. However, self-
recognition in a mirror involves a cognitive dimension and may equally invoke 
narrative, as well as bodily, aspects of self (Connors & Coltheart, 2011). Social 
evaluation has also been shown to improve interoceptive accuracy (Durlik, Brown, 
et al., 2014; Schulz et al., 2013), again suggesting that enhanced attention to 
narrative aspects of self can improve heartbeat perception. Importantly, free energy 
models of the self imply that the distinction between the bodily and narrative self is 
a false dichotomy.  Hierarchical generative models of the self (Apps & Tsakiris, 
2013; Limanowski & Blankenburg, 2013) indicate that information in any modality 
and at any level in the cortical hierarchy will be used to inform the ultimate precept 
of a self. Consequently, given that interoceptive modalities provide a set of cues 
that underpin the bodily self (Craig, 2010; Damasio, 2010; Seth, 2013), 
interoceptive signalling is likely to interact with narrative aspects of the self, at high 
levels of the cortical hierarchy.  
 
The two experiments presented in Chapter 2 were, therefore, concerned with the 
effects of self-observation on interoceptive accuracy. Experiment 1 was based on 
an early report that the accidental presence of a mirror improved performance on 
one (but not on a second) measure of heartbeat perception (Weisz et al., 1988). By 
contrast with this inconclusive study, mirror self-observation was strictly controlled 
in Experiment 1 and a large and heterogeneous set of participants were tested. 
Experiment 2 built on the results of Experiment 1, to examine the effect of self-
observation off line, using still self-face photographs. Experiment 2 also introduced 
self-relevant words, to test the potential interaction between interoceptive accuracy 
and narrative, as well as bodily, aspects of the self.  
 
Phenomenological models of the self argue that the first-person perspective - the 
perspective from which ‘I’ perceive the world – is an element of ‘minimal selfhood’ 
(Blanke & Metzinger, 2009). However, an essential aspect of human self-
awareness, invoked by self-focus, is perception of the ‘self as object’. This 
underpins the remarkable human ability to perceive oneself as the object of one’s 
own and other people’s perception (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Given that 
interoception provides a set of senses that contribute to awareness of the body from 
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within, Experiment 3 tested whether the tendency, in women, to prioritise 
awareness of their bodies from a third-person, ‘objectified’, perspective was 
negatively related to interoceptive accuracy.  
 
The second strand of experiments presented in this thesis was concerned with the 
contribution of interoception to multisensory integration and self/other distinction.  
While interoceptive accuracy is known to interact with ‘the sensory self’ through 
body ownership (Aspell et al., 2013; Suzuki et al., 2013; Tsakiris et al., 2011), its 
potential impact on ‘the acting self’ (Gallagher, 2000) has previously been ignored. 
Three classic paradigms were used to investigate this. In Experiment 4, a ‘social 
Simon task’ was employed to examine whether interoceptive accuracy interacts 
with the tendency to represent the actions of a confederate, when performing a joint 
task. Experiment 5 employed a well-known test of ‘automatic imitation’, predicting 
that people with high interoceptive accuracy would be better able to separate self 
and other and would thus inhibit the tendency to imitate an observed task-irrelevant 
action. Experiment 6 investigated the potential contribution of interoceptive cues to 
the multisensory integration involved in the sense of agency, using Libet’s classic 
clock paradigm (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983) and taking ‘intentional 
binding’ (Haggard, 2005) as a measure of the sense of agency.  
 
Most research into interoception has been within the tradition of the James-Lange 
theory of emotion, which treats interoceptive signals as peripheral feedback from 
the body (for example, as heart rate and electrodermal activity). This has tended to 
divert attention from the work of physiologists (Ádám, 2010; Cameron, 2002; Vaitl, 
1996) which established that interoception is an additional set of senses, with its 
own specific sets of receptors, operating at the borders of awareness. Characterising 
interoception as sensory input rather than as peripheral output is potentially more 
useful in identifying how and where, in the course of sensorimotor integration, it is 
likely to impact on behaviour, cognition and feelings. 
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Chapter 2. The Effect of Enhanced Self-focus on 
Interoceptive Accuracy 
2.1 General Introduction to Experiments 1 and 2 
Although theoretical analyses have previously treated interoceptive and 
exteroceptive aspects of the self as separate sensory systems, recent research 
demonstrates that they interact. Body ownership illusions (Aspell, Walker, Bruno, 
Heydrich, & Blanke, 2013; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008) 
rely on the learned assumption that touch and vision-of-touch generally co-occur. 
However, importantly, neither vision nor touch is self-specific and it is potentially 
surprising that their combination is sufficient to cause these illusion (Ruby & 
Legrand, 2007). The interoceptive senses, conversely, provide uniquely self-
specifying input because they can only originate from within the body (Ádám, 
2010; Cameron, 2002; Vaitl, 1996). Potentially, therefore, the eerie phenomenology 
of the rubber hand illusion depends upon interoceptive processes in the autonomic 
nervous system (Ehrsson et al., 2007). As the illusion takes hold, histamine 
reactivity in the concealed hand rises (Barnsley, et al., 2012) and the skin 
temperature of the hidden hand falls, as if the exteroceptive stimulation was causing 
the autonomic nervous system to stop treating the hand as fully part of the body 
(Moseley, et al., 2008; but see also Sadibolova & Longo, 2014). That interoceptive 
and exteroceptive processes interact is further demonstrated by studies of body 
ownership, where people with high interoceptive accuracy are less prone to both 
the rubber hand illusion (Tsakiris et al., 2011) and the comparable enfacement 
illusion (Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, Coleman, & Tsakiris, 2012; Tajadura-Jiménez 
& Tsakiris, 2013). A potential explanation is that individuals with high 
interoceptive accuracy have a habit of attending to their internal signals, perhaps 
because heartbeats and/or other interoceptive signals are innately more salient, and 
this heightens the self-specifying input that enables them to resist these illusions.  
 
The motivation for the two experiments presented in this chapter was to further 
investigate how interoceptive and exteroceptive inputs to the self interact, by using 
a paradigm borrowed from social psychology. It was anticipated that heightening 
attention to exteroceptive aspects of the self (enhanced self-focus) might have the 
effect of enhancing interoceptive self-representations and thus would improve 
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heartbeat perception. Although heartbeat perception has generally been considered 
a robust trait variable, two partly successful attempts to alter it potentially owe their 
effect to enhanced attention to the self as perceived exteroceptively, by oneself or 
by other people (Durlik et al., 2013; Weisz et al., 1988). 
 
Previous unsuccessful experimental attempts to alter interoceptive accuracy have 
included manipulations designed to increase attention to the body. For example, a 
study of people with at least fifteen years intensive experience of daily meditation 
(designed to increase bodily self-awareness) found that the meditators were no more 
accurate in heartbeat perception than controls (Khalsa et al., 2008). Mindfulness 
training (Williams, 2010) similarly does not improve objective measures of 
heartbeat perception, although it boosts self-reported confidence that the participant 
is aware of bodily sensations (Parkin et al., 2013). 
 
While stressors have been shown to improve interoceptive accuracy, they generally 
alter physiological variables that affect arousal, which is a known confound of 
heartbeat perception (Cameron, 2002; Jones, 1995). For example, twenty four hours 
of food deprivation successfully raised the Mental Tracking scores of young women 
(Herbert, Herbert, et al., 2012) but this manipulation is likely to have altered other 
affective or sensory variables, in that hunger, for example, lowers pain thresholds 
(Pollatos, Herbert, et al., 2012). Injections of isoprotenerol reliably raise the 
awareness of interoceptive sensation but as this drug elevates heart rate and general 
physiological arousal the results are confounded (Khalsa, Rudrauf, Sandesara, 
Olshansky, & Tranel, 2009). One study found that performance on the Whitehead 
task, surprisingly, declined for women (but not men) after a stressful Maths test 
(Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007) but this may be confounded by distraction. There 
are, however, two studies that have reported some success in temporarily changing 
‘state interoceptive accuracy’. Both involved heightening attention to the self as 
perceived exteroceptively. The anticipation of making a public speech enhanced 
interoceptive accuracy measured by the Schandry method (Durlik et al., 2013) and 
this change was correlated with fear of negative evaluation (but see also Stevens et 
al., 2011). Likewise, an early experiment was partly successfully in raising 
heartbeat perception by the presence of a mirror (Weisz et al., 1988). 
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A further significant point about previously unsuccessful attempts to manipulate 
interoceptive accuracy is that they have generally compared changes in the mean 
score of the whole groups of participants between experimental conditions. They 
have not investigated whether the extent of change for individuals under the 
experimental manipulation might have been influenced by baseline individual 
differences in heartbeat perception (e.g. high vs. low scores). The aim of 
Experiments 1 and 2 was therefore to investigate whether heightening attention to 
exteroceptive perception of the self would impact on performance in heartbeat 
perception and to examine how any such effect might differ between initially good 
and poor heartbeat perceivers.  
2.2 Experiment 1. Changes in Interoceptive Accuracy during 
Mirror Self-observation 1 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Studies in social psychology have typically found that mirror self-observation 
successfully increases ‘self-focus’, which is attention to the self (Fejfar & Hoyle, 
2000). Studies in this tradition have found, for example, that self-reported arousal 
is less influenced by experimenter suggestion when participants are exposed to a 
mirror (Scheier, Carver, & Gibbons, 1979). Similarly, when given mirror access, 
participants report fewer illusory symptoms in response to a placebo (Gibbons, 
Carver, & Scheier, 1979). An early study in interoception (Weisz et al., 1988) 
attempted to manipulate heartbeat perception using the (apparently accidental) 
presence of a mirror to increase self-focus, during two different heartbeat 
perception tasks. The results, however, were inconclusive. Participants had to tap 
with their index finger immediately after each heartbeat (a form of heartbeat 
tracking) or detect discrepancies between the rhythm of their own heartbeat and the 
rhythm of presented tones (a variant of the Whitehead ‘discrimination’ method). 
The mere presence of a mirror improved performance in the discrimination task but 
not in the tapping task. However, there was no control in this study for whether 
participants actually looked at themselves in the mirror, nor did the experiment 
investigate the potentially differential effects on individuals with high or low 
interoceptive accuracy. The heartbeat tracking method used, moreover, is no longer 
                                                 
1 This experiment was published as: Ainley, Tajadura-Jimenez, Fotopoulou, & Tsakiris. (2012). 
Looking into myself: Changes in interoceptive sensitivity during mirror self-observation. 
Psychophysiology, 49(11), 1672-1676. 
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standard because it is open to confounds created by the participant’s own movement 
(McFarland, 1975). 
 
Experiment 1 therefore aimed to investigate the interaction of exteroceptive and 
interoceptive perceptions of the self by studying the effect of mirror self-
observation on accuracy in heartbeat perception. It was hypothesised that the 
heightened attention to exteroceptive aspects of the self involved in mirror self-
observation would enhance awareness of interoceptive representation of the self 
and therefore improve heartbeat perception. Given that people with high 
interoceptive accuracy potentially perform at ceiling on heartbeat perception tasks, 
it was anticipated that improvement would be concentrated amongst participants 
with low interoceptive accuracy in the baseline, as has been demonstrated in the 
modulating effect of interoceptive accuracy on body ownership (Tsakiris et al., 
2011). In contrast to Weisz et al. (1988), in Experiment 1 mirror self-observation 
was instructed and controlled and heartbeat perception was measured using the 
Mental Tracking Task (Schandry, 1981), which is well-validated and sensitive to 
individual differences (Domschke et al., 2010; Dunn et al., 2010; Ehlers et al., 
1995). Self-observation versus non-self-observation were contrasted by requiring 
participants to look into a mirror or at a non-reflective black screen. Gender, heart 
rate, age, body mass index (BMI), and the participant’s self-reported level of 
habitual exercise (as a proxy for physical fitness) were recorded as potential 
confounds of heartbeat perception tasks (Cameron, 2001).  
2.2.2 Methods  
2.2.2.1 Participants 
153 visitors to the ‘Who am I?’ Gallery at the Science Museum, London, 
volunteered to take part in the experiment. Data for 129 was analysed (59 male, 84 
female, aged 10 to 74 years), after excluding 10 for not following the instructions 
and 14 for incomplete data (Table 2.1). The experiment was approved by the 
Department of Psychology Ethics Committee, Royal Holloway University of 
London. All participants gave written informed consent, were free to withdraw from 
the experiment at will and were debriefed after participation. Written parental 
consent was mandatory for all participants under 18 years of age. 
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2.2.2.2 Procedure 
Participants typed into the computer their gender, age, height, weight and their level 
of habitual exercise (in hours per week). Body mass index (BMI) was calculated 
using the standard formula. 
 
Interoceptive accuracy was measured twice using the Mental Tracking Method. 
After one training interval (15s), each condition consisted of a block of three 
intervals (25s, 35s and 45s) presented in random order. In the baseline condition 
participants were required to gaze at a black screen (30cm by 50cm) placed on an 
easel at eye level and at a distance of 40cm. In the mirror condition they were 
explicitly instructed to gaze at the reflection of their own face in a similarly sized, 
and positioned, mirror (Figure 2.1). The two conditions (mirror vs. blank screen) 
were presented in counterbalanced order.  
 
Figure 2.1 Experimental Conditions. Left Baseline, Right Mirror Self-focus
 
2.2.2.3 The Mental Tracking Method of Heartbeat Perception  
Participants were seated in a comfortable chair and allowed to relax for several 
minutes. Instructions were presented over noise-attenuating headphones. The onset 
and offset of each heartbeat counting trial were cued by the words ‘go’ and ‘stop’. 
Results are sensitive to the instructions given (Ehlers et al., 1995) so a standard 
instruction was used, whereby participants were asked to concentrate and try to 
silently count their own heartbeats, simply by ‘listening’ to their bodies, without 
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taking their pulse. Participants were prompted at the start of each trial to keep their 
eyes on the screen while they were counting their heartbeats. Heartbeat signals were 
acquired with a piezo-electric pulse transducer, fitted to the participant’s left index 
finger and connected to a physiological data unit (26T PowerLab, AD Instruments), 
sampling at 1 kHz, which recorded the derived electrical signal onto a second PC 
running LabChart6 software (AD Instruments). After one training interval of 15s, 
the three counting trials were presented in random order within each condition. No 
feedback was given. 
2.2.2.4 Data Reduction 
LabChart6 was employed to identify and count the number of R-wave peaks on the 
heart trace recorded for each participant in each trial, as well as to calculate the 
average heart rates for each trial (Jennings et al., 1981). Every heart trace was 
visually inspected for artefacts and the number of R-wave peaks was recounted 
manually if necessary. Participants were excluded where artefacts created 
uncertainty about the number of recorded beats. Interoceptive accuracy was 
calculated as {1/3 Σ [1 - (|recorded heartbeats – counted heartbeats| /recorded 
heartbeats)]} (Schandry, 1981). Participants typically underestimate the number of 
beats. Higher scores indicate higher interoceptive accuracy.  
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2.2.3 Results  
2.2.3.1 Analysis of Interoceptive Accuracy 
 
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics for all Recorded Variables 
 
 
A median split analysis of the interoceptive accuracy scores (median = 0.66) was 
performed, in order to directly contrast performance of the groups with low and 
high interoceptive accuracy (IA) in the baseline (Table 2.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All participants 
(n = 129) 
Above 
median IA 
(n = 65) 
Below 
median IA 
(n = 64) 
Mean interoceptive accuracy 
baseline (SD) 
0.64 (0.19) 
skewness = -.35, 
kurtosis = -.27 
0.80 (0.10) 0.49 (0.13) 
Mean interoceptive accuracy 
mirror (SD) 
0.66 (0.19) 
skewness = -.25, 
kurtosis = -.53 
0.79 (0.12) 0.52 (0.15) 
Mean heart rate baseline (SD) 75.8 (10.5) 72.0 (9.7) 79.6 (10) 
Mean heart rate mirror (SD) 75.6 (10.8) 71.9 (10.2) 79.4 (10.1) 
% Baseline performed first 52% 49% 55% 
% Male 43% 48% 38% 
Mean age years (SD) 28.7 (13.5) 29.6 (13.5) 27.8 (13.6) 
Mean BMI (SD)  23.1 (4.3)  
(n  =119) 
23.6 (4.0)  
(n = 59) 
22.5 (4.5)  
(n = 60) 
Mean exercise hrs/wk (SD) 3.4 (4.3) 3.7 (3.8) 3.1 (4.8) 
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Figure 2.2 Mean Interoceptive Accuracy (IA) across Conditions for the High 
and Low Groups (error bars represent SEM) 
 
**significant at the 1% level 
 
Data was analysed by a mixed-design ANOVA, with the experimental condition 
(baseline vs. mirror) as the within-subjects factor and the order of presentation of 
the two conditions, gender, and IA group (above vs. below median) as between-
subjects factors. The change in heart rate between conditions, age, level of habitual 
exercise and BMI for each individual, were entered as covariates. Levene’s test of 
equality of error variances and Box’s test of equality of covariance matrices were 
nonsignificant. The main effect of condition (baseline vs. mirror) on interoceptive 
accuracy was not significant, F(1, 107) = 0. 02, p = .88. However, the interaction 
of experimental condition by IA group was significant, F(1, 107) = 6.76, p = .01, 
2  = 0.06, (Figure 2.1), indicating that self-observation significantly improved 
interoceptive accuracy for the group with below-median IA, t(63) = 3.46, p = .001, 
but not for the high interoceptive accuracy group, t(64) = 0.65, p = .52. There were 
no significant interactions between the experimental condition and gender, F(1, 
107) = 1.67, p = .20; order of presentation of the two conditions, F(1, 107) = 0.75, 
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p = .39; change in heart rate between conditions, F(1, 107) = 0.18, p = .68; age, F(1, 
107) = 0.01, p = .91; level of exercise, F(1, 107) = 0.35, p = .55; or BMI, F(1, 107) 
= 0.15, p = .68. The main effects of gender, F(1, 107) = 0.30, p = .59; and of order 
of conditions, F(1, 107) = 3.63, p = .06, were not significant. The difference 
between interoceptive accuracy in the mirror and in the baseline conditions 
correlated with interoceptive accuracy in the baseline, r = -.30, p = .001, indicating 
that the lower the baseline the greater the improvement in heartbeat perception in 
the self-focus condition. The relationship followed the equation, (IA mirror) = .11 
+ .85 (IA baseline). If the relationship between IA mirror and IA baseline had been 
non-systematic, then the slope of the regressions line would have approximated to 
1, with an intercept of zero. However, the slope (.85) differed significantly from 1, 
t(128) = 3.52, indicating that IA mirror was higher for lower values of IA baseline, 
as also shown in the median split analysis. 
2.2.3.2 Analysis of Heart Rate Data 
To investigate possible differences in arousal between the baseline and mirror 
conditions, which would potentially confound the results, the same ANOVA design 
(minus the change in heart rate) was used with mean heart rate as the dependent 
variable. Levene’s test of equality of error variances and Box’s test of equality of 
covariance matrices were nonsignificant. The main effect of condition on heart rate 
was nonsignificant, F(1, 108) = 0.11, p = .75, showing that heart rates did not 
change significantly between the two conditions. There were no significant 
interactions of condition with interoceptive accuracy group, F(1, 108) = 0.51, p = 
.48; gender, F(1, 108) = 0.19, p = .67; order of conditions, F(1, 108) = 0.92, p = 
.34; exercise, F(1, 108) = 0.06, p = 0.81; BMI, F(1, 108) = 0.10, p = .75; or age, 
F(1, 108) = 3.12, p = .08. The main effects of gender, F(1, 108) = 0.91, p = .34, and 
order of conditions, F(1, 108) = 2.30, p = .13, were also both nonsignificant. As 
expected, a main effect of interoceptive accuracy group was observed, F(1, 108) = 
21.20, p < .001, 2 = .1 Mean heart rate was significantly lower in the high 
interoceptive accuracy group because heart rate was negatively correlated with 
interoceptive accuracy in the baseline, r = -.28, p = .001. This result has frequently 
been reported previously (Cameron, 2001; Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007; Knapp-
Kline & Kline, 2005; Stevens et al., 2011).  
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2.2.4 Discussion 
Interoceptive accuracy measured during mirror self-observation was compared with 
interoceptive accuracy in the baseline condition of looking at a black screen. 
Individuals with above-median interoceptive accuracy in the baseline showed no 
improvement while looking into a mirror but those with lower scores showed a 
significant improvement in interoceptive accuracy during self-observation. The 
effect was independent of gender, age, BMI, the order in which the conditions were 
presented, the participant’s habitual level of exercise and change in heart rate 
between the two conditions. This result contrasts with that of Weisz et al. (1988) 
who found a learning effect between conditions. Given that self-focus decreases 
available processing resources (Panayiotou & Vrana, 2004), it seems improbable 
that the improvement found during mirror self-observation can be explained by 
reduced task demands. The result is also unlikely to be attributable to higher arousal 
in the mirror condition (Van der Does, Van Dyk, & Spinhoven, 1997) because heart 
rates did not change significantly, for either group, between the two conditions.  
 
The analysis in Experiment 1 appears to uncover an effect that was not identified 
in previous studies. Past research has focused on the impact of experimental 
treatments on the mean interoceptive accuracy of the particular populations tested, 
without considering the potentially different effects of the experimental 
manipulation on participants with high and low interoceptive accuracy. For 
example, attempts to enhance bodily self-focus, e.g. using a yogic breathing pattern 
(Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007; Khalsa et al., 2008) or a mirror (Weisz et al., 1988) 
reported interoceptive accuracy means for the whole group of participants but not 
did not examine differential effects for individuals with low or high interoceptive 
accuracy at baseline. In common with Weisz et al. (1988), no significant effect of 
the mirror vs. baseline condition was found in heartbeat tracking for the participants 
in Experiment 1 when taken as a whole. However, a significant effect of self-
observation was demonstrated for those participants with low baseline interoceptive 
accuracy. The result emphasises the potential importance of low interoceptive 
accuracy, which has recently been recognised in clinical conditions such as eating 
disorders (Klabunde et al., 2013), alexithymia (Herbert et al., 2011) and 
depersonalisation disorder (Sedeño et al., 2014). 
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The experiment indicates that the exteroceptive perception of the self, when 
viewing one’s own face in the mirror, interacts with interoceptive representations 
and thus extends recent results showing that interoceptive accuracy plays an active 
modulatory role in weighting and integrating exteroceptive percepts relating to the 
body in body ownership illusions (Tsakiris et al., 2011). In this study, mirror self-
observation, which relies on exteroception, enhanced low interoceptive accuracy.  
 
Experiment 1 had a number of limitations. Participants were members of the public 
and were not screened for anxiety (Domschke et al., 2010) or for medical conditions 
such as hypertension (Koroboki et al., 2010) that are known to affect interoceptive 
accuracy (Cameron, 2001). No account was taken of participants’ possible use of 
time-estimation strategies that might have enabled them to correctly guess their 
heartbeats (Dunn et al., 2010; Ehlers et al., 1995). However, it is unlikely that these 
confounds could account for a change in heartbeat perception between conditions, 
as they would apply equally in both. It was not clear from Experiment 1 what aspect 
of the mirror image participants might (consciously or unconsciously) be depending 
on, for example, whether they relied on some aspect of the mirror image, such as 
flushing of the skin or a visible pulse (Suzuki et al., 2013). Further research was 
therefore required to establish whether the effect would generalise to other self-
relevant stimuli. 
2.2.5 Conclusion of Experiment 1 
The results of Experiment 1 reinforce the proposal that the self is a complex result 
of interoceptive and exteroceptive representations, acting upon and reinforcing 
each other (Craig, 2010).  In a relatively large and heterogeneous sample, they 
show that enhanced attention to an exteroceptive representation of the self can 
improve interoceptive self-representation, as indexed by the ability to perceive 
one’s heartbeat. Potential explanations are explored in the General Discussion. 
How this effect might generalise to other aspects of heightened self-focus was the 
subject of Experiment 2. 
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2.3 Experiment 2. Enhancing Interoceptive Accuracy by 
Heightened Attention to a Self-face Photograph and Self-
relevant Words 2  
2.3.1 Introduction 
In Experiment 1, the use of a mirror enhanced interoceptive accuracy in people for 
whom this was originally low. However, it was not known whether this effect would 
be restricted to live, real time, self-observation or, indeed, what other self-relevant 
stimuli might have a similar impact on heartbeat perception. Experiment 2 was 
therefore designed to clarify this question.  
 
In the first experimental condition of Experiment 2, the use of a still photograph of 
the participant’s face was employed, in place of a mirror image, in order to establish 
whether the effect in Experiment 1 depended on some aspect of the living self-
image, such as a visible pulse. However, within self-focus research, ‘the perceptual 
accuracy hypothesis’ (Silvia & Gendolla, 2001) has suggested that any type of 
enhanced self-focused attention will improve an individual’s accuracy in judging 
not only somatic but also cognitive aspects of the self. This strong claim potentially 
encompasses a wide range of potential self-relevant stimuli that could be contrasted 
with the enhanced attention to the body that is involved in viewing one’s own face. 
A second experimental manipulation was therefore introduced in Experiment 2, 
designed to test the effect on heartbeat perception of stimuli that enhance attention 
to narrative aspects of the self. 
 
Although there has been a lack of consensus on definitions and means of 
operationalising the self within philosophy, psychology and neuroscience 
(Gallagher, 2000; Neisser, 2006; Strawson, 1999), the distinction between a bodily 
and a narrative self, first proposed by William James, continues to structure the 
debate (James, 1890). The narrative or autobiographical self is defined as 
encompassing stored knowledge of the individual’s past experience and anticipated 
future and has generally been treated within psychology as if it were an amodal, 
abstract symbolic structure (Farmer & Tsakiris, 2012; Gallagher, 2000). Damasio’s 
                                                 
2 This experiment was published as: Ainley, Maister, Brokfeld, Farmer, & Tsakiris. (2013). More of 
myself: Manipulating interoceptive awareness by attention to bodily and narrative aspects of the 
self. Consciousness and Cognition, 22(4), 1232-1238. 
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taxonomy, however, proposes that the narrative self cannot be regarded as 
independent of the body but is instead grounded in bodily self-processes acting 
upon autobiographical memories (Damasio, 2010). Moreover, free energy models 
of the self conclude that the bodily and narrative selves are interdependent, although 
instantiated at different levels of the cortical hierarchy (Apps & Tsakiris, 2013). 
Experiment 2 therefore investigated whether the processing of self-related narrative 
information could bring about improvements in people’s conscious awareness of 
their internal bodily selves, analogous to the improvements in interoceptive 
accuracy that were induced by the processing of physical representations of the 
bodily self with a mirror (Experiment 1). It also tested whether the effect of a mirror 
in Experiment 1 could be replicated with a still, self-face photograph. 
 
The perceptual accuracy hypothesis suggests that any self-relevant information will 
improve interoceptive accuracy. However, much of the evidence for this hypothesis 
has been criticised on methodological grounds (Silvia & Gendolla, 2001). In a 
critical review of the literature Silvia and Gendolla stipulated that a valid test (for 
example, with regard to interoception) must compare self-reported internal 
perception (e.g. counted heartbeats) against an objective standard (i.e. recorded 
heartbeats), without introducing confounding changes in physiological variables, 
such as heart rate (Silvia & Gendolla, 2001).  
 
Experiment 2 was therefore designed to fulfil these requirements, using two 
contrasting experimental manipulations of self-focus, with stimuli that have been 
frequently employed in self-focus research (Fejfar & Hoyle, 2000). The 
experimental condition in which participants gazed at a photograph of their own 
face (‘the self-face condition’) was compared with another in which they looked at 
a set of self-relevant words (‘the self-relevant words condition’). As in Experiment 
1, the baseline (control) condition was gazing at a blank screen. Interoceptive 
accuracy was measured using the Mental Tracking Task (Schandry, 1981). Gender 
and change in heart rate were recorded, as commonly reported confounds of cardiac 
awareness tasks (Knapp-Kline & Kline, 2005; Ring & Brener, 1992). Participants 
were students, which avoided introducing any confound of age (Khalsa, Rudrauf, 
& Tranel, 2009).  
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It was hypothesised that interoceptive accuracy would be increased by observation 
of the participant’s own photographed face, given that recognition of one’s face in 
a mirror and in a still photograph employs similar cortical networks (Butler, 
Mattingley, Cunnington, & Suddendorf, 2012). It was also anticipated that self-
relevant words, which enhance attention to narrative aspects of the self, would have 
a similar but perhaps a smaller effect. It was expected, as in Experiment 1, that 
significant effects would be concentrated amongst participants who had low 
interoceptive accuracy in the baseline condition.  
2.3.2 Methods 
2.3.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 45 students at Royal Holloway University of London who 
volunteered to take part. The data for four was excluded because of artefacts in the 
heart rate data. Of the remaining 41 (20 male), the mean age was 21.7 years (SD = 
2.0). The experiment was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology 
Department, Royal Holloway University of London. 
2.3.2.2 Procedure 
Participants gave their gender, age and height and weight. All had body mass 
index (BMI) within the normal range. Interoceptive accuracy was measured in 
three conditions.   
2.3.2.3 Stimuli 
A digital photograph (11cm by 13cm) was taken of the participant’s face, with a 
neutral expression. This picture was mirror-reversed and used as the stimulus in the 
self-face condition. Each participant was then required to generate six self-relevant 
words, comprising their first name, their hometown, the school they most recently 
attended, their university course, the name of their best friend and the name of the 
most important person in their life. These words constituted the stimulus in the self-
relevant words condition. They were presented in white font, arranged in a 
hexagonal pattern around the centre of a black computer screen, occupying the same 
area of screen as the self-face photograph. The stimulus for the baseline condition 
was a black screen with a small white fixation cross 1cm x 1cm (Figure 2.3).  
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Figure 2.3 Examples of Stimuli for the Three Experimental Conditions 
 
2.3.2.4 The Mental Tracking Method of Heartbeat Perception  
Interoceptive accuracy was measured using the Mental Tracking Method 
(Schandry, 1981), with all stimuli presented on a standard PC, as described in 
Experiment 1 (section 2.2.2.3). After one brief training trial (15s), there were nine 
trials in total, consisting of three trials in each of the three conditions – baseline, 
self-face and self-relevant words. The total duration of the three trials in each 
condition summed to 105s, with each individual trial lasting between 20s and 55s. 
Within these constraints, the order and duration of the nine trials was fully 
randomised. Heartbeat data was extracted as in Experiment 1 (section 2.2.2.4) 
2.3.3 Results 
A median split of interoceptive accuracy (IA) scores in the baseline condition 
(median = 0.56) was performed, to divide the participants into a high IA (above 
median) and a low IA (below median) group, as in Experiment 1. There were equal 
numbers of men and women in the two groups.  
 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with experimental condition 
(baseline, self-face and self-relevant words) as the within-subjects factor and with 
both the interoceptive accuracy group (high IA and low IA) and the participant’s 
gender as between-subject factors. Gender effects were checked because men 
supposedly have higher interoceptive accuracy (Cameron, 2002). Bonferroni 
corrections were made for multiple comparisons. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was 
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nonsignificant. The main effect of gender was nonsignificant, F(1, 37) = 1.04, p = 
.32, and there was no interaction between gender and experimental condition, F(2, 
74) = 0.40, p = .68. There was a main effect of experimental condition on 
interoceptive accuracy, F(2, 74) = 5.58, p =  .01, 2 = .13 (Figure 2.2). Paired 
sample t tests showed that both experimental manipulations significantly improved 
interoceptive accuracy, compared with the baseline; for the self-face condition, 
t(40) = 2.51, p = .02, and for the self-relevant words, t(40) = 2.77, p = .01. The 
difference in interoceptive accuracy between the self-face and the self-relevant 
words conditions was nonsignificant, t(40) = 0.26, p = .79.  
 
Finally, the interaction of interoceptive accuracy group and experimental condition 
was nonsignificant, F(2, 74) = 0.63, p = .54. Thus, overall, the results show that 
both manipulations of self-focus resulted in improved interoceptive accuracy and 
that this improvement was independent of the participant’s baseline interoceptive 
accuracy.  
 
Figure 2.4 Interoceptive Accuracy in Each of the Three Experimental 
Conditions (error bars represent SEM) 
 
**significant at the 1% level  *significant at the 5% level 
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To test whether the effects of the experimental manipulation on interoceptive 
accuracy were influenced by differences in levels of arousal between the three 
conditions, the ANOVA analysis was repeated using heart rate as the dependent 
variable. The three conditions were the within-subjects factor. Interoceptive 
accuracy group and participant’s gender were the two between-subjects factors. 
Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was nonsignificant. There was no main effect of 
experimental condition on heart rate, F(2, 74) = 2.10, p = .13. The main effect of 
gender was nonsignificant, F(1, 37) = 0.81, p = .38, and there was no interaction of 
gender with experimental condition, F(2, 74) = 1.61, p = .21. There was no 
interaction of experimental condition and interoceptive accuracy group, F(2, 74) = 
2.94, p = .06. However, there was a significant main effect of interoceptive accuracy 
group on heart rate, F(1, 37) = 6.86, p = .01, 2 = .16, because, as frequently 
reported in the literature, individuals with low interoceptive accuracy generally 
have slower heart rates (Cameron, 2001; Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007; Knapp-
Kline & Kline, 2005; Stevens et al., 2011). This main effect did not interact with 
the experimental conditions, which therefore rules out the possibility that the 
observed changes in interoceptive accuracy can be accounted for by individual 
differences in average heart rate/arousal. Change in heart rate and change in 
interoceptive accuracy were not correlated, either between the self-face condition 
and baseline, r = -.06, p = .70, or between the self-relevant words condition and the 
baseline, r = -.16, p = .33.  
 
Because the median in Experiment 2 was relatively low (.56), participants were also 
divided into two alternative groups depending on whether their interoceptive 
accuracy was above or below .66, which was the median reported in Experiment 1. 
There was a significant effect of both self-focus conditions only in the group with 
interoceptive accuracy less than .66, (n = 28). In this lower-IA group, paired 
samples t tests showed that the difference between interoceptive accuracy in the 
self-face and baseline conditions was significant, t(27) = 2.08, p = .045. The 
difference between interoceptive accuracy in the self-relevant words condition and 
in baseline was also significant t(27) = 2.18, p = .04. In the higher-IA group (IA  > 
.66) the results were not significant, t(12) = 1.36, p = .20, for self-face vs. baseline, 
nor for self-relevant words vs. baseline, t(12) = 1.64, p = .13. However, the small 
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number of participants (n = 13) in the group with IA > .66 renders these latter 
figures unreliable. 
2.3.4 Discussion 
Attention to the self was heightened in Experiment 2, using two manipulations 
which  are employed in self-focus research. In the self-face condition participants 
looked at a still photograph of their own face and in the self-relevant words 
condition they gazed at self-generated, autobiographical words. The effect of these 
two manipulations on interoceptive accuracy was measured using the Mental 
Tracking Method of heartbeat perception (Schandry, 1981). Interoceptive accuracy 
was significantly enhanced in both of these heightened self-awareness conditions, 
compared to the baseline of looking at a blank screen. These findings extend those 
of Experiment 1, which showed that mirror self-observation significantly improved 
heartbeat perception for participants with below-median interoceptive accuracy in 
the baseline. Experiment 2 indicated that improvement in interoceptive accuracy is 
elicited by a still, self-face photograph and similarly by attention to the narrative 
aspects of the self, such as one’s own name or the names of significant others. 
Experiment 2 therefore adds to converging evidence that interoception interacts 
with representations of the self as perceived exteroceptively (Maister & Tsakiris, 
2014; Tsakiris et al., 2011).  
 
It had been anticipated in Experiment 2 that improvements in heartbeat perception 
during heightened self-focus would be confined to the below-median interoceptive 
accuracy group (as in Experiment 1, where median interoceptive accuracy was .66, 
as well as in Maister and Tsakiris (2014) where the median was .64). In Experiment 
2, however, whether the participants had above or below-median interoceptive 
accuracy made no significant difference to the effect of the experimental 
manipulations. This may be explained by the relatively low mean and median 
interoceptive accuracy scores recorded in Experiment 2, which can be attributed to 
normal sampling variation. Task instructions (Ehlers et al., 1995) and experimental 
paradigm were similar in all three of these studies. Means as low as .5 (Sütterlin et 
al., 2013) and as high as .84 (Werner et al., 2010) have been reported for samples 
of participants tested using the Mental Tracking Method. In Experiment 1, the 
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relatively large (n = 129) and heterogeneous sample (aged 10-74yrs) would account 
for median interoceptive accuracy close to middle of the published range.  
 
In Experiment 1 the effect of mirror self-observation on interoceptive accuracy was 
open to the potential confound that participants might have been using some aspect 
of their own reflection, such as a visible pulse, to improve their heartbeat 
perception. Experiment 2 shows that the result does not depend on a living, moving 
image or on facial expression, because participants viewed static pictures of their 
face. Morever, the changes in interoceptive accuracy in Experiment 2 cannot be the 
result of learning effects, or of regression to the mean, because the nine trials were 
fully randomised, such that a trial in any one experimental condition was followed 
by another that was likely to be in a different condition.  
 
A potential limitation of Experiment 2, however, is that it does not directly establish 
whether the effect in the self-face condition depends of looking at one’s own face 
or could be achieved by gazing at any face. However, Maister and Tsakiris, 
compared a self-face photograph condition (identical to that of Experiment 2) with 
another in which participants gazed at a similar photograph of a stranger, matched 
for age and gender. Heartbeat perception improved (for individuals who had below-
median interoceptive accuracy in the baseline condition) only when participants 
looked at their own faces (Maister & Tsakiris, 2014).  
 
Enhanced self-focus has been reported to increase arousal (Denson, Creswell, & 
Granville-Smith, 2012) which, in turn, may improve heartbeat perception (Van der 
Does et al., 1997). This is unlikely to have been the cause of the increased 
interoceptive accuracy observed in Experiment 2, because average heart rate did 
not change significantly between conditions. Moreover, in neither of the heightened 
self-focus conditions was the improvement in interoceptive accuracy correlated 
with resting heart rate or with change in heart rate. Self-focus is known to decrease 
available processing resources (Panayiotou & Vrana, 2004), so the improvements 
observed in heartbeat perception during heightened self-focus cannot be explained 
by reduced task demands.  
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A potential confound is that the complexity of the stimuli in Experiment 2 differed 
between the three conditions. In his ‘competition of cues’ hypothesis, Pennebaker 
(1980) argued that additional demands on exteroceptive perception reduces 
participants’ ability to concentrate on their interoceptive sensations. It might 
therefore be expected that interoceptive accuracy would fall in both the enhanced 
self-focus conditions, which involve more cognitive load than the baseline. Maister 
and Tsakiris, however, showed that looking at a self-photograph raised the 
interoceptive accuracy of participants with below-median interoceptive accuracy in 
the baseline, whereas similar attention to the face of a stranger did not (Maister & 
Tsakiris, 2014). Their two experimental conditions were very similar in cognitive 
load and processing demands, differing only in self-focus. This reinforces the 
conclusions that the changes detected in Experiment 2 depend on increased self-
focus rather than differences in stimulus complexity. Moreover, Maister and 
Tsakiris found no change in interoceptive accuracy, between the baseline and 
stranger’s face condition, which indicates that differences in complexity of the 
stimuli cannot account for the changes in interoceptive accuracy observed in the 
Experiment 2. 
 
Further limitations of Experiment 2 are similar to those of Experiment 1. 
Participants were not screened for anxiety (Domschke et al., 2010) or for clinical 
conditions that may impact on interoceptive accuracy. No allowance was made for 
the potential use of time-estimation strategies (Dunn, Galton, et al., 2010). 
However, these confounds would apply equally in each of the three experimental 
conditions and are therefore unlikely to account for the improvements observed 
between the two heightened self-focus conditions and the baseline.  
2.3.5 Conclusion of Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 2 show that enhanced attention to the self as perceived 
exteroceptively (through vision of one’s own face or self-relevant words) enhances 
perception of internal interoceptive processes. Both experimental manipulations 
were equally successful, although they act at different levels of the hierarchical 
representation of the self. This demonstrates that aspects of the bodily and narrative 
self are interdependent because enhanced attention to either has similar effects in 
improving the accuracy of internal perception – a result that is in accordance with 
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predictive coding accounts of the self (Apps & Tsakiris, 2013) and provides support 
for the perceptual accuracy hypothesis (Silvia & Gendolla, 2001). 
2.4 General Discussion of Experiments 1 and 2 
Experiments 1 and 2 add to a growing literature indicating that interoceptive and 
exteroceptive perception interact in forming the sense of self and the results are 
consistent with the proposal that individual differences in interoceptive accuracy 
reflect differences in the tendency to attend to interoceptive cues.  
 
The results can be explained in terms of free energy models of the self and, 
behaviourally, by the perceptual accuracy hypothesis. Potentially the most 
important aspect of the results of Experiments 1 and 2 is that they provide support 
for models proposing that the self is distributed across multiple hierachical layers 
of the brain, such that incoming information, in any modality and at any level of the 
hierarchy, will prime self-representations at all other levels (Apps & Tsakiris, 
2013). This implies that the traditional distinction between a bodily self and an 
amodal, narrative self is essentially false (Farmer & Tsakiris, 2012). Experiment 1 
showed that attention of a bodily aspect of the self (the mirror image) enhanced the 
accuracy of participants’ interoceptive self-representations (in people for whom this 
was low). Experiment 2 expanded on this, showing that although cues that enhance 
attention to the bodily and narrative selves act at different levels of the cortical 
hierarchy that instantiates the self, they have similar effects in enhancing attention 
to interoceptive representation. These temporarily reach awareness, boosting the 
heartbeat perception of people with low trait interoceptive accuracy, while people 
with high interoceptive accuracy are presumably already at ceiling.  
 
Behaviourally, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 provide support for the 
‘perceptual accuracy hypothesis’ (Silvia & Gendolla, 2001), which proposes that 
any type of enhanced self-focus will improve the accuracy of self-perception. 
Previous evidence suggesting that increased self-focus enhances interoceptive 
accuracy has been marred by methodological issues. In their ‘sceptical review’ of 
the literature on interoception and self-focus, Silvia and Gendolla point out that 
most published studies have relied on questionnaire measures of trait self-focus and 
on self-reported interoceptive sensations. Many have also failed control for arousal 
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(for example they have used exercise or caffeine as experimental manipulations). 
This necessarily undermines any conclusions that can be drawn from previous 
research. The design of Experiments 1 and 2 meets these objections by fulfilling 
the conditions that Silvia and Gendolla stipulate for an adequate test of the 
perceptual accuracy hypothesis (Silvia & Gendolla, 2001). They recommend the 
use of an objective physiological test for the awareness of interoceptive sensation 
and require that changes in potential confounding variables, such as arousal, be 
ruled out. Furthermore, Experiments 1 and 2 used within-participants designs and 
experimental manipulations of self-focus, whereas many previous studies have 
relied on self-report psychometric measures to identify groups of people with low 
and high trait self-awareness. Silvia and Gendolla also proposed that ‘consistency 
seeking’ could account for the result of many flawed studies that have previously 
been used to support the perceptual accuracy hypothesis (Silvia & Gendolla, 2001). 
When attention is focused on the self, people are motivated to make consistent 
judgments and to meet task standards. Consistency seeking is particularly likely 
where participants are aware of a standard that they are expected to meet. In both 
Experiments 1 and 2 there was no apparent standard and no feedback and the task 
was of similar difficulty in each condition. Consistency seeking would have tended 
to remove differences in interoceptive accuracy across the various experimental 
conditions and cannot account for the findings.  
 
The mechanism that is assumed to drive the perceptual accuracy hypothesis 
depends on the effects of directing attention inward. The results of Experiments 1 
and 2 therefore are in accord with the proposal that interoceptive accuracy reflects 
an individual’s ability to attend to internally. Pennebaker, in his ‘competition of 
cues hypothesis’, proposed that the ability to accurately detect internal bodily 
signals is proportional to the amount of available ‘internal information’ and is 
therefore inversely related to the presence of competing ‘external information’ 
(Pennebaker, 1982). It follows that more accurate self-perception reflects the ability 
to concentrate on internal cues, while disregarding distracting external information. 
In Experiments 1 and 2 the self-focus manipulations can be assumed to have 
enhanced the accuracy of self-perception by shifting attention from the external 
environment to internal aspects of self-processing. A probable explanation is that 
people with high interoceptive accuracy already have an innately stronger tendency 
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to attend to internal cues, compared to individuals with low interoceptive accuracy. 
The latter would therefore be likely to benefit more from these experimental 
manipulations. 
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Chapter 3: Interoceptive Accuracy and the ‘Self as Object’ 
3.1 Experiment 3. Interoceptive Accuracy and Self-
objectification in Young Women 3 
3.1.1 Introduction 
Self-awareness from a first-person perspective, as the lived experience of the body, 
is assumed to be based on interoception (Craig, 2010; Damasio, 2010). However, 
humans also have the remarkable ability to consider themselves from a third-person 
perspective, as if they were spectators standing outside themselves, adopting an 
exteroceptive representation of the body and experiencing themselves as the objects 
of their own thoughts (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; Keenan, Wheeler, Gallup, & 
Pascal-Leone, 2000; Rochat & Zahavi, 2011).  
 
A notable aspect of the improvements in interoceptive accuracy observed in 
Experiments 1 and 2 is that they relied on temporarily heightening participants’ 
awareness of their bodies as the objects of their own perception and thought. A 
related finding, from the psychology of women, is that those individuals who are 
generally preoccupied with how their bodies appear from such a third-person 
perspective are vulnerable to a number of mental health conditions, including eating 
disorders, depression and sexual dysfunction (Moradi & Huang, 2008). 
Furthermore, sufferers from anorexia nervosa, which is associated with a distorted 
sense of the body as seen from a third-person perspective (Garner, Garfinkel, 
Stancer, & Moldofsky, 1976), have lower interoceptive accuracy than controls 
(Klabunde et al., 2013; Pollatos et al., 2008). Likewise, psychosomatic complaints 
have been associated with low awareness of interoceptive sensations (Mussgay et 
al., 1999). The blunted autonomic reactivity reported in such patients suggests that 
inaccuracy in the perception of interoceptive signals may underlie their condition 
(Pollatos et al., 2011). 
 
Taken together, studies of the interaction between the body perceived 
interoceptively and exteroceptively suggest that the degree to which people are 
aware of internal sensory states (i.e. their trait interoceptive accuracy) may be 
                                                 
3 This experiment was published as: Ainley & Tsakiris. (2013). Body conscious? Interoceptive 
awareness, measured by heartbeat perception, is negatively correlated with self-objectification. PloS 
One, 8(2), e5568. 
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related to their sensory perception of their bodies from a third-person perspective. 
Experiment 3 aimed to investigate this. 
 
Neurocognitive research has considered awareness of self in terms of interoception 
(Craig, 2009; Critchley et al., 2004). Within social psychology, by contrast, self-
awareness is generally assessed by self-report. The purpose of Experiment 3 was to 
compare measures of self-awareness from within these two traditions, specifically 
to assess the relationship of interoceptive accuracy to several instruments that 
purport to measure an individual’s preoccupation with the self as perceived 
exteroceptively.   
 
In social psychology, self-awareness has been studied as ‘objective self-focus’, 
which was developed as part of a model of self-regulation and affect (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972) whereby, when the individual's attention is focused inward, the 
self becomes the object of its own thoughts and perceptions (Silvia & Gendolla, 
2001). An important assumption of this model is that people compare the self they 
perceive against some salient ideal and then attempt to reduce the discrepancy 
between the two (Carver & Scheier, 1998). Self-focus is therefore thought to be 
inherently aversive because the real and desired self are seldom perfectly congruent. 
Theories of self-focus distinguish between ‘private self-consciousness’, which is 
the tendency to reflect continually on inner thoughts, sensation and feelings, and 
‘public self-consciousness’, in which the individual is concerned with how his/her 
self is perceived by others (Carver & Scheier, 1998). The most commonly used self-
report measure of self-focus is the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 
1975).  
 
Within the self-focus tradition, Fredrickson and Roberts proposed ‘objectification 
theory’ (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). They hypothesised that cultural attitudes 
that treat women’s bodies as objects for men’s gratification predispose women to 
value their bodies in terms of physical attractiveness, while men by contrast esteem 
their own bodies for physical effectiveness. Women may come to internalise this 
objectification and consequently adopt an observer’s perspective as the primary 
view of their physical selves. This ‘self-objectification’ is proposed as an important 
causal factor in women’s mental ill-health, leading to body shame, anxiety and 
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eating disorders, as well as being a potential precursor to depression and sexual 
dysfunction (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997).  
 
Women who ‘self-objectify’ persistently attend to and monitor the outward 
appearance of their bodies. Given that interoceptive accuracy measures the 
tendency to attend to internal signals and potentially indexes the strength of 
interoceptive self-representations, an inverse relationship between self-
objectification and interoceptive accuracy is predicted by the objectification 
literature. It has frequently (though not invariably) been reported that interoceptive 
accuracy is lower in women than in men (Blascovich et al., 1992; Harver et al., 
1993; Jones, 1995). The inferior performance of women has previously been 
studied in terms of known physiological confounds of interoceptive accuracy, such 
as women’s higher body fat, their generally lower physical fitness and differing 
cardiovascular variables, including smaller stroke volume of the heart (Cameron, 
2001; Jones, 1995). Fredrickson and Roberts, however, proposed instead that the 
reported gender difference in interoceptive accuracy is a direct result of self-
objectification, which focuses attentional resources on the body as perceived from 
the outside, at the expense of the relative insensitivity of women to their own 
internal bodily cues. It appears that this strikingly novel prediction has never been 
tested within heartbeat perception research. The principal aim of Experiment 3 was 
therefore to investigate this, as an aspect of the interaction of interoceptive and 
exteroceptive aspects of the self. 
 
To measure trait self-objectification, Fredrickson and colleagues developed the 
Self-objectification Questionnaire (Fredrickson, Roberts, Noll, Quinn, & Twenge, 
1998). They originally operationalised state self-objectification by requiring 
participants to wear either a swimsuit (high state objectification) or a loose sweater 
(low state objectification). Participants in the swimsuit condition were observed to 
eat smaller amounts of the cookies that they were invited to sample during the 
experiment (Fredrickson et al., 1998). The authors argued that further research 
would find links between self-objectification and eating disorders, mediated either 
by body shame (McKinley & Hyde, 1996) or by a lack of attention to ‘internal 
bodily states’ (in other words, low interoceptive accuracy). A number of studies 
have confirmed the first part of this hypothesis, establishing that the relationship is 
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mediating by body shame (Moradi & Huang, 2008). In self-objectification research, 
however, finding valid and reliable measures for the ‘awareness of internal bodily 
states’ has proved problematic. The Body Consciousness Questionnaire (Miller, 
Murphy, & Buss, 1981) and in particular its Private Body Consciousness subscale, 
has been widely used as a measure of inner bodily awareness in this field. However, 
a review of the objectification literature (Moradi & Huang, 2008) found little 
evidence for its role in mediating between self-objectification and cognition, eating 
disorders, negative affect or depression (Szymanski & Henning, 2006; Tiggemann 
& Kuring, 2004; Tiggemann & Slater, 2001). Some authors have concluded that 
internal body awareness has been widely mismeasured and misconceptualised in 
the objectification literature (Myers & Crowther, 2008). A review of commonly 
used body awareness questionnaires underlines this lack of consensus on how body 
awareness should be assessed (Mehling et al., 2009). 
 
A further motivation for Experiment 3 was that surprisingly few studies in 
objectification research have attempted to employ non-questionnaire-based 
measures of body awareness, such as behavioural or neurophysiological measures. 
A notable exception is an experiment by Eshkevari and colleagues who used the 
rubber hand illusion as a psychophysiological measure of body awareness 
(Eshkevari, Rieger, Longo, Haggard, & Treasure, 2011). Scores on the Self-
objectification Questionnaire significantly predicted the extent to which 
participants experienced this illusion and thus the potential malleability of their 
sense of bodily self. Individuals who are susceptible to the rubber hand illusion 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) are also more likely to have eating disorders (Mussap 
& Salton, 2006), suggesting a possible link from self-objectification to disordered 
eating, through the mediating effect of body awareness, as measured by the rubber 
hand illusion. Given the importance of body awareness to self-objectification 
research and the mixed results obtained with various questionnaire measures, it is 
surprising that heartbeat perception has not been tested as a measure of internal 
body awareness within self-objectification research. 
 
Experiment 3 was intended to remedy this deficiency, by studying the links between 
interoceptive accuracy and those commonly used self-report measures that are 
designed to assess awareness of the body, as perceived exteroceptively and/or 
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interoceptively. Participants were young women, so as to avoid introducing other 
confounding gender effects. Interoceptive accuracy was measured using the Mental 
Tracking Method and compared with the participants’ scores on the Self-
objectification Questionnaire (Fredrickson et al., 1998), the Self-consciousness 
Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) and the Body Consciousness Questionnaire (Miller, 
Murphy, & Buss, 1981). 
 
The principal hypothesis was that self-objectification would be linked to 
interoceptive accuracy, reinforcing the results of Experiments 1 and 2 which found 
interaction between interoceptive and exteroceptive aspects of the self. It was 
expected that the relationship would be negative, such that a tendency to attend to 
the body as perceived interoceptively (high interoceptive accuracy) would 
effectively inhibit excessive attention to exteroceptive aspects of the self (high self-
objectification). It was similarly anticipated that scores on the Public Self-
consciousness and Public Body Consciousness scales would interact with 
interoceptive accuracy and potentially with Self-objectification scores. Both these 
scales, which are frequently used in self-focus research, refer to the self as perceived 
from a third-person perceptive and have apparent similarities to self-objectification 
(Miner-Rubino, Twenge, & Fredrickson, 2002). Although Frederickson and Robert 
proposed that lower interoceptive accuracy in women is a result of self-
objectification, it was hypothesised in this experiment that interoceptive accuracy 
would predict Self-objectification scores, because the former is a trait variable, 
while the latter is supposedly acquired by enculturation.  
 
A final aim in Experiment 3 was to test whether Private Body Consciousness 
correlates with interoceptive accuracy because Private Body Consciousness is 
frequently proposed as a measure of the tendency to attend inwardly (Wheeler et 
al., 2008). Miller and colleagues, for example, found that both men and women high 
in Private Body Consciousness reported more bodily changes when they were 
secretly given caffeine, compared to those who were low in Private Body 
Consciousness and also compared to participants who were high in Private Body 
Consciousness but had received a placebo (Miller et al., 1981). Their findings imply 
that Private Body Consciousness is a good indicator of interoceptive accuracy. 
Consequently, this scale has frequently been used as a measure of body awareness 
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in the self-objectification literature but with very limited success (Muehlenkamp & 
Saris-Baglama, 2002; Szymanski & Henning, 2006; Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004; 
Tiggemann & Slater, 2001).  
3.2.2 Method 
3.2.2.1 Participants  
Participants were 50 female students at Royal Holloway University of London, who 
volunteered to take part. They were aged 19-26 years, (mean = 21.0 years, SD = 
1.3). Three participants were excluded for artefacts on their heartbeat traces and one 
for failing to comply with the instructions on the Self-objectification Questionnaire. 
The experiment was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology 
Department, Royal Holloway University of London. 
3.2.2.2 Procedure 
Participants reported their gender, age, height and weight. All had body mass index 
(BMI) within the normal range. Interoceptive accuracy was measured using the 
Mental Tracking Method, as described in Experiment 2 (section 2.2.2.3). There 
were three trial intervals, fully counterbalanced and always summing to 105s, which 
were selected from a set of intervals ranging from 20s to 55s. Interoceptive accuracy 
was calculated as described in section 2.2.2.4. Participants then completed the Self-
objectification Questionnaire, the Self-consciousness Scale and the Body 
Consciousness Questionnaire.  
3.2.2.3 Questionnaires 
 
The Self-objectification Questionnaire (SOQ)  
The Self-objectification Questionnaire (Fredrickson et al., 1998) measures the 
extent to which individuals view their bodies in observable, appearance-based (i.e. 
objectified) terms, versus non-observable competence-based terms. Participants are 
required to rank ten body attributes by how important each is to their own physical 
self-concept, from 0 (for least impact) to 9 (greatest impact). Self-objectification 
scores are calculated by subtracting the summed ranks given to the five 
competence-based attributes (e.g., health, or energy) from the summed ranks of the 
five appearance-based attributes (e.g., physical attractiveness, or body 
measurements). Scores range from -25 to +25, with higher scores indicating greater 
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emphasis on appearance, which is interpreted as greater self-objectification. The 
SOQ has good test-retest reliability (.92, cited in Miner-Rubino et al., 2002). 
 
The Self-consciousness Scale (SCS)  
The Self-consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) consists of three subscales, 
designed to measure self-focused attention. The Private Self-consciousness 
subscale is made up of ten items to assess the extent to which individuals focus on 
internal thought, sensations and feelings (e.g. ‘I’m always trying to figure myself 
out’). Public Self-consciousness is measured by seven questions referring to 
focusing on oneself as an object of an observer’s scrutiny (e.g. ‘I usually worry 
about making a good impression’). There are six questions on the Social Anxiety 
subscale, which measures distress caused by interacting with other people (e.g. ‘I 
have trouble working when someone is watching me’). Participants respond on a 5-
point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (extremely uncharacteristic of me) to 4 
(extremely characteristic). Higher scores indicate greater self-consciousness/social 
anxiety. The three sub-scales appear to be relatively independent (Fenigstein et al., 
1975). The SCS has fairly good reliability, with Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .73 
to .84 (Mor & Winquist, 2002). 
 
The Body Consciousness Questionnaire (BCQ)  
The Body-Consciousness Questionnaire (Miller et al., 1981) extends the concept of 
self-consciousness to awareness of the body. There are three subscales, which are 
Public Body Consciousness, Private Body Consciousness and Body Competence. 
The Private Body Consciousness subscale consists of five items designed to 
measure the tendency to focus on internal body sensations (e.g. ‘I am sensitive to 
internal body tensions’). Public Body Consciousness contains six questions to 
assess consciousness of the body as perceived by an observer (e.g. ‘I am very aware 
of my best and worst facial features’). Body Competence includes five items, which 
measure the individual’s sense of body effectiveness. These Body Competence 
questions are somewhat similar to the competence-based questions in the Self-
objectification Questionnaire (e.g. ‘I’m better coordinated than most people’). 
Participants respond on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (extremely 
uncharacteristic) to 4 (extremely characteristic). Higher scores represent greater 
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body awareness/body competence. In a review of body awareness measures, the 
BCQ had high reliability and validity compared with other scales (Mehling et al., 
2009). 
3.2.3 Results   
Recorded values of the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all measures were 
similar to the values previously published by the authors of the various scales (Table 
3.1). Distributions for all measures were close to Gaussian, fulfilling an essential 
precondition for the use of multiple regression. In addition to using Private Self-
consciousness as a single measure, it was split it into subscales of Self-
reflectiveness and Internal State Awareness (Anderson, Bohon, & Berrigan, 1996).  
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for IA and all Self-report Measures 
 Min Max Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Interoceptive 
Accuracy 
.22 .85 .59 .16 -.40 -.24 
Self-
objectification 
-25 25 -1.65  
c1.09 
13.80  
c14.42 
.39 -.66 
Private Self-
consciousness 
14 36 24.83  
a26.6 
4.79  
a5.1 
-.12 -.10 
Public Self-
consciousness 
10 27 19.09 
 a19.3 
3.75 
a4.0 
-.01 -.26 
Social 
Anxiety 
4 23 13.04  
a12.8 
4.57 
a4.5 
.01 -.38 
Private Body 
Consciousness 
8 19 12.7 
b12.0 
2.56  
b3.3 
.02 -.29 
Public Body 
Consciousness 
9 22 16.41  
b17.1 
3.0  
b3.3 
-.02 -.25 
Body 
Competence 
3 14 8.78  
b10.0 
2.56  
b2.5 
-.16 -.52 
a Mean published values, n = 253 (Fenigstein et al., 1975) 
b Mean published values, n = 353 (Miller et al., 1981) 
c Mean published values, n = 421 (Miller et al., 1981) 
 
There were significant inter-correlations amongst several of the measures used 
(Table 3.2). With two exceptions these were close to the inter-correlations 
previously reported by the authors of the various scales. However, unlike Miller 
and colleagues, in this group of participants no significant correlation was found 
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between Public Self-consciousness and Private Body Consciousness, nor between 
Private Self-consciousness and Body Competence (Miller et al., 1981).  
It had been hypothesised that Self-objectification scores would be predicted by 
interoceptive accuracy together with Public Self-consciousness and Public Body 
Consciousness. Multiple regression (entry method), with Self-objectification as the 
dependent variable and all other measures entered as independent variables, showed 
that interoceptive accuracy, Public Body Consciousness, and Private Body 
Consciousness together explained 31% of the variance in the self-objectification 
scores (Table 3.3). Neither Public Self-consciousness, nor any of the other 
questionnaire measures, made any significant contribution as a predictor. BMI and 
the interaction of BMI with all three significant regressors added nothing to the 
explanatory power of the model. The three significant predictors were not inter-
correlated (Table 3.2), indicating an absence of multicollinearity within the model. 
No outlier analysis was performed. 
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Table 3.2. Correlations between the Measures 
  Self-Objectification 
Questionnaire 
IA Private 
SCS 
Public 
SCS 
Social 
Anxiety 
Private 
BCQ 
Public 
BCQ 
BC 
Interoceptive 
Accuracy (IA) 
Correl. 
Sig. 
-.31* 
.03 
       
Private Self-
consciousness 
Correl.  
Sig. 
.17 
.26 
-.29 
.05 
      
Public Self-
consciousness 
Correl. 
Sig. 
Published correl. 
.28 
.06 
-.24 
.11 
.36* 
.01 
b.23** 
     
Social Anxiety Correl. 
Sig. 
Published correl. 
.26 
.08 
-.26 
.09 
.10 
.53 
b.11 
.30* 
.04 
b.21** 
    
Private Body 
consciousness 
Correl. 
Sig. 
Published correl. 
-.18 
.23 
-.04 
.80 
.31* 
.04 
a.45** 
-.08 
.60 
a.28** 
-.24 
.10 
a.12 
   
Public Body 
consciousness 
Correl. 
Sig.  
Published correl. 
.47** 
<.001 
-.07 
.63 
.28 
.06 
a.33** 
.59** 
<.001 
a.66** 
.08 
.59 
a.12 
.09 
.55 
c.37 
  
Body Competence 
(BC) 
Correl.  
Sig. 
Published correl. 
-.14 
.36 
.37* 
.01 
<.001 
.98 
a.31** 
-.15 
.32 
a.09 
-.45** 
<.001 
a -.20 
-.35* 
.02 
c.21 
.05 
.72 
c.21 
 
d Self reflectiveness Correl. 
Sig. 
.17 
.26 
-.28 
.06 
 .36* 
.01 
.21 
.16 
.25 
.09 
.30* 
.05 
-.13 
.40 
d Internal State 
Awareness 
Correl. 
Sig. 
.02 
.88 
-.11 
.48 
 .22 
14 
-.11 
.48 
.31* 
.04 
.15 
.39 
.16 
.27 
                                              a Correlations, with levels of significance, reported for women, n = 353 (Miller et al., 1981) 
                                              b Correlations, with levels of significance, reported for combined genders, n = 452 (Fenigstein et al., 1975) 
                                              c Correlations, with no p values given, reported for combined genders, n = 628 (Miller et al., 1981) 
  d Sub-division of Private Self-consciousness (Anderson et al., 1996) 
                             *significant at the 5% level  **significant at the 1% level 
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Table 3.3 Multiple Regression (entry method) with Self-objectification as the 
Dependent Variable 
Predictor Adjusted R2  R2  
Step 1 
   Interoceptive Accuracy 
   (Sig.) 
 
 
 
.08 
(.03*) 
  
-.31 
(.03*) 
Step 2 
   Interoceptive Accuracy  
   (Sig.) 
   Public Body Consciousness 
   (Sig.) 
 
 
 
 
 
.27 
(.00**) 
 
 
 
 
 
.19 
 
-.28 
(.03*) 
.45 
(.00**) 
Step 3 
   Interoceptive Accuracy 
   (Sig.) 
   Public Body Consciousness 
   (Sig.) 
   Private Body Consciousness 
   (Sig.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.31 
(.00**) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.04 
 
-.28 
(.03*) 
.47 
(.00**) 
-.23 
(.07) 
*significant at the 5% level 
**significant at the 1% level 
Participants’ average heart rates were recorded over the three heartbeat perception 
trials, as a proxy for physical arousal. Average heart rate was significantly 
correlated with Social Anxiety, r = .34, p = .02, and also with Body Competence, r 
= -.36, p = .02. However, there were no significant correlations between heart rate 
and the variables in the multiple regression (Self-objectification, r = .12, p = .43; 
interoceptive accuracy, r = -.16, p = .28; Public Body Consciousness, r = -.05, p = 
.73; and Private Body Consciousness, r = .14, p = .35), indicating that participants’ 
physical arousal is unlikely to have influenced the findings.   
 
Average heart rate and the interaction of heart rate with interoceptive accuracy were 
added to the multiple regression as potential confounding variables but were 
nonsignificant and added nothing to the explanatory power of the model. 
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3.2.4 Discussion 
In their theory of self-objectification, Fredrickson and Roberts made the previously 
untested claim that gender differences in interoceptive accuracy are the direct result 
of women’s tendency to self-objectify (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). This is the 
first study to investigate that prediction using a heartbeat perception method. 
Interoceptive accuracy in women students was compared with scores on the Self-
objectification Questionnaire (Fredrickson et al., 1998), the Self-consciousness 
Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) and the Body Consciousness Scale (Miller et al., 
1981). Interoceptive accuracy was significantly negatively correlated with Self-
objectification scores, as expected. Self-objectification in women was significantly 
predicted by a combination of interoceptive accuracy, Public Body Consciousness 
and Private Body Consciousness, which together explained 31% of the variance in 
the Self-objectification scores. It is not clear from this experiment why some 
women are more liable to self-objectify than others. However, the results indicate 
that low interoceptive accuracy is a predisposing factor, rather than an outcome, of 
high self-objectification, as hypothesised in this experiment but contrary to 
Fredrickson and Roberts’ original suggestion. In confirming this prediction, 
Experiment 3 adds to the research linking interoceptive and exteroceptive 
representations of the body.  
 
The results support an interpretation of interoceptive accuracy in terms of the 
capacity for attending to internal bodily signals. Potentially, women for whom 
interoceptive stimuli are experienced as less salient have a greater tendency to direct 
their attention to their bodies from an exteroceptive, third-person perspective and 
are therefore vulnerable to self-objectification. Fredrickson and Roberts’ 
explanation of the link they expected would exist between self-objectification and 
interoceptive accuracy was that women who self-objectify are using up limited 
attentional resources on their bodies as perceived from a third-person perspective 
and so have less attention available for interoceptive signals (Fredrickson & 
Roberts, 1997). Pennebaker, in his ‘competition of cues’ hypothesis, similarly 
argued that when both internal and external sources of information are available, 
attention paid to one reduces attention paid to the other (Pennebaker, 1982). He 
made the crucial point that individuals direct their attention in accordance with their 
judgment of the salience and importance of internal or external stimuli (Pennebaker 
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& Lightner, 1980). The implication is that women who self-objectify judge external 
aspects of the self (e.g. the body as perceived by a real or imagined audience) as 
more salient than their interoceptive cues. This can be explained within a theory 
that the self is the product of the optimal integration of all self-relevant cues - 
interoceptive, exteroceptive and narrative (Apps & Tsakiris, 2013). If people with 
low interoceptive accuracy are characterised as having less reliable and salient 
interoceptive cues, it follows that they will accord more weight to exteroceptive 
cues. Cultural attitudes to women’s bodies may then render such women 
particularly vulnerable to self-objectification and body shame. 
 
The observed relation between low interoceptive accuracy and high Self-
objectification has potential significance for emotional experience and resonates 
with reports of low interoceptive accuracy in disorders involving negative affect. 
High Self-objectification is linked to negative affect (Miner-Rubino et al., 2002) 
and to depressive symptoms (Peat & Muehlenkamp, 2011; Szymanski & Henning, 
2006; Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004). Similarly, low interoceptive accuracy is 
associated with moderate depression (Dunn et al., 2007) and has been reported in a 
number of clinical conditions, such as anorexia (Pollatos et al., 2008), alexithymia 
(Herbert et al., 2011) and depersonalisation disorder (Sedeño et al., 2014). There is 
a wealth of evidence to suggest that individuals with high interoceptive accuracy 
experience more emotional arousal, for the same objective bodily arousal, than 
people with low interoceptive accuracy (Barrett & Bar, 2009; Herbert, Pollatos, et 
al., 2007; Wiens, 2005). The results of Experiment 3 imply that women who self-
objectify are those who are relatively unaware of the interoceptive cues which are 
related to their emotions and who may also therefore experience emotion less 
intensely (Myers & Crowther, 2008). Such women may be vulnerable to clinical 
conditions associated with poor interoceptive accuracy, such as anorexia, 
alexithymia and somatoform disorders. For example, poor emotional awareness, as 
measured by the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994), 
mediates between Self-objectification and eating disorders, (Muehlenkamp & 
Saris-Baglama, 2002). 
 
Interoceptive accuracy cannot capture potentially important aspects of body 
awareness that are measured by self-report instruments, such as the individual’s 
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feelings about bodily signals or her tendency to ruminate on such sensations. 
However, the use of a heartbeat perception measure of body awareness could 
potentially be successful within objectification research, in view of the measure’s 
applicability and validity in a wide range of research into interoception, emotional 
experience and disordered experience of the self. 
 
Public Body Consciousness, which was the second predictor of Self-objectification 
in Experiment 3, may also be a factor in the link between Self-objectification and 
negative affect. In women, Public Body Consciousness correlates with negative 
emotionality (Miller et al., 1981) which is the tendency to get angry, upset or 
frightened, as measured by the emotionality subscale of the Emotionality, Activity, 
Sociability, Impulsivity, Temperament Scale (Buss & Plomin, 1975). As a predictor 
of Self-objectification, Public Body Consciousness may represent a measure of the 
tendency to experience negative affect. 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the third significant predictor of Self-objectification in the 
regression equation was Private Body Consciousness. Private Body Consciousness 
predicted Self-objectification independently of interoceptive accuracy and the two 
measures did not correlate. This suggests that while Private Body Consciousness is 
significantly correlated with Self-objectification, it is measuring something other 
than awareness of the inner body. Support for this idea is provided by the many 
studies that have attempted to use Private Body Consciousness as a measure of 
internal body awareness in mediating between Self-objectification and negative 
affect or eating disorders (Myers & Crowther, 2008). Success depends on the choice 
of instrument with which body awareness is measured. Studies using Private Body 
Consciousness generally report no effect (Muehlenkamp & Saris-Baglama, 2002; 
Szymanski & Henning, 2006; Tiggemann & Slater, 2001). One successful study 
(Myers & Crowther, 2008) used the Interoceptive Awareness scale of the Eating 
Disorders Inventory (Garner, Olmstead, & Polivy, 1983). This scale is made up of 
items that assess awareness of emotions e.g. ‘When I am upset, I don’t know if I 
am sad, frightened, or angry’ and others that assess feelings of hunger and satiety 
e.g. ‘I get confused as to whether or not I’m hungry’. It was reported that the 
questions specific to hunger accounted for this instrument’s success as a mediating 
variable (Myers & Crowther, 2008). In the light of the many nonsignificant results 
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obtained with most questionnaire measures of internal body awareness, it is 
surprising that physiological measures of internal body awareness have so rarely 
been used in objectification research.   
 
Experiment 3 also explicitly tested the assumption, frequently made in the self-
objectification literature, that Self-objectification is related to Public Self-
consciousness and Public Body Consciousness. These two scales are designed to 
measure the individual’s awareness of herself as perceived from a third-person 
perspective (Miner-Rubino et al., 2002). Public Self-consciousness is a measure of 
an individual’s thoughts and feelings about how other people perceive her (e.g. ‘I 
am concerned about what other people think of me’), whereas public body 
consciousness is specifically related to body awareness (e.g. ‘I’m concerned about 
my posture’). It therefore seemed probable that the Public Self-consciousness 
would be linked to Self-objectification, which is defined as the tendency to perceive 
and judge one’s body from a third-person perspective. As expected, the results show 
that 27% of the variance in Self-objectification scores was predicted by 
interoceptive accuracy and Public Body Consciousness taken together but that 
Public Self-consciousness was not significantly correlated with either interoceptive 
accuracy or Self-objectification in this study and did not contribute to the regression 
model.  
 
Private Body Consciousness has frequently been used in self-objectification 
research as a proxy for body awareness but in this experiment it was not 
significantly correlated with interoceptive accuracy. Not only were interoceptive 
accuracy and Private Body Consciousness uncorrelated here but they were also 
independent predictors of Self-objectification (with low Private Body 
Consciousness scores and low interoceptive accuracy both predicting high Self-
objectification). This implies that the two measures tap into different, but perhaps 
complementary, aspects of internal body awareness. It may explain why many 
studies in the self-focus literature that have attempted to find paths from Self-
objectification to eating disorders and other negative outcomes, through the 
mediating effect of Private Body Consciousness (as a measure of body awareness), 
have reported nonsignificant results (Myers & Crowther, 2008). 
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Experiment 3 had several limitations. Participants were well-educated young 
women, whose habitual tendencies to self-focus may not be typical of a broader 
population. However, the various self-report measures (and their inter-correlations) 
fell within the range of values previously published for these instruments and 
therefore appear representative. The primary purpose of the study was to investigate 
interactions between interoceptive and exteroceptive representations of the body, 
by testing Fredrickson and Robert’s claim that self-objectification is linked to 
heartbeat perception in women (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). The experiment 
therefore used only the Self-objectification Questionnaire (Fredrickson et al., 
1998), Self-consciousness Scales (Fenigstein et al., 1975) and Body Consciousness 
Questionnaire (Miller et al., 1981), which have all been widely used to study self-
focus. To establish the potential value of using heartbeat perception as a mediating 
variable between Self-objectification and disordered eating it would necessitate the 
use of measures such as Body Shame, and Body Surveillance (McKinley & Hyde, 
1996) and the Eating Disorders Inventory (Garner et al., 1983) which were not 
included in this experiment. Future research is required to address two further 
limitations of this study. Firstly, male participants were not tested, who may present 
a different pattern of relationships. Secondly, participants were not screened for the 
possible presence of eating disorders, which are prevalent in young women (Peat & 
Muehlenkamp, 2011). These would have had a mediating effect (Baron & Kenny, 
1986) on the relationship found here between self-objectification and interoceptive 
accuracy because people with eating disorders tend to have relatively low heartbeat 
perception (Pollatos et al., 2008) but are also more prone to self-objectify 
(Calogero, Davis, & Thompson, 2005).  
3.2.5 Conclusion 
This study is the first to test Fredrickson and Robert’s claim that interoceptive 
accuracy in women, as measured by heartbeat perception, is negatively correlated 
with self-objectification. Interoceptive accuracy, together with Public Body 
Consciousness and Private Body Consciousness, accounted for 31% of the variance 
in scores on the Self-objectification Questionnaire. The experiment extends the 
growing literature on interaction between interoceptive and exteroceptive 
representation of the self and supports the proposal that interoceptive accuracy 
measures attention to interoceptive representations of the body. The strength and 
 86 
salience of these, in women with high interoceptive accuracy, potentially serve to 
protect the individual against a tendency to self-objectify.  
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Chapter 4. Interoceptive Accuracy and Self/Other 
Distinction in Action 
4.1 General Introduction 
Despite recent investigation of the effect of interoceptive accuracy in multisensory 
contexts and self-processing (Aspell et al., 2013; Suzuki et al., 2013), little is known 
about the potential role of interoception in the action system. This lack of empirical 
research is striking, given that human actions are thought to be driven by the goal 
of homeostatic control, which is signalled interoceptively (Craig, 2010; Damasio, 
2010; Seth, 2013). Theoretical accounts of the neural basis of perception and action 
stress their inter-connectedness, proposing that action is coded in terms of its 
sensory consequences (Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2009; Karl Friston, 2009; 
Hommel, 2009; Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). It has previously been assumed 
that the sensory consequences of an action are primarily exteroceptive. However, 
empathy for pain (Avenanti et al., 2005; Singer et al., 2004) and overlapping 
cortical activation during the experience, observation or imagination of disgust 
(Wicker et al., 2003) can only be explained if actions also involve a representation 
of their interoceptive sensory consequences (Heyes & Bird, 2007).  
 
The evidence suggests that people with low interoceptive accuracy experience 
greater ‘self/other overlap’ in multisensory contexts, for example in identifying 
their own hand during the rubber hand illusion (Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2013; 
Tsakiris et al., 2011). Self/other overlap has been defined as ‘any phenomenon 
whereby an observer engages a state similar to that of the target, via activation of 
the observer’s personal representations for experiencing the observed state, whether 
through direct perception or simulation’ (Preston & Hofelich, 2012). Experiments 
4 and 5 were therefore concerned with the potential effect of interoceptive accuracy 
in two experimental paradigms that are assumed to engage shared representations 
in the motor domain.  
 
Experiment 4 employed ‘the social Simon task’ (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003), 
hypothesising that people with low interoceptive accuracy, who potentially 
experience more self/other overlap in multisensory contexts, would have a greater 
tendency to represent the actions of a coactor, as indexed by the social Simon effect.  
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Experiment 5 examined whether interoceptive accuracy is related to ‘automatic 
imitation’ (Heyes, 2011), which depends on an observer’s tendency to imitate an 
observed, task-irrelevant action. Automatic imitation is similarly assumed to 
involve self/other overlap and, intriguingly, the tendency to imitate is reduced when 
self-focus is enhanced using either a mirror or self-relevant narrative information 
(Spengler, Brass, Kühn, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2010), It was hypothesised that people 
with low interoceptive accuracy would have greater difficulty resisting automatic 
imitation.  
4.2 Experiment 4. Interoceptive Accuracy and the ‘Social Simon 
Effect’: Representing the Actions of Other People. 
4.2.1 Introduction  
Theories about the origins of the self have tended to ignore the role of social 
interaction in human evolution. However, early hominids may have gained a sense 
of ‘self in action’ by engaging in joint action and imitation with their fellows 
(Sebanz, 2007). An important aspect of any joint action is that individuals must be 
able to represent their own precepts and actions, as well as simulating those of the 
other people involved, in order to coordinate their different movements. This is 
essential if they are to arrive at an outcome that is more than the sum of its parts, 
for example, during a cooperative hunt (Sebanz, 2007). According to embodied 
simulation accounts, we understand the actions and emotions of other people by 
activating our own cortical representations for the same behaviour or affect, using 
our bodies by way of analogy (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011). These shared 
representations result in self/other overlap, which is assumed to account for ‘the 
social Simon effect’.   
 
In a classic Simon task (Simon & Rudell, 1967) participants are required to respond 
to a nonspatial physical feature (such as a colour or a shape) by, for example, 
pressing a left or right key while ignoring the location (left or right) in which the 
stimulus is presented. ‘The Simon effect’ refers to the robust finding that responses 
are faster when the stimulus location and the required response occur in the same 
location (are congruent) than when they are incongruent. This difference in mean 
reaction times is known as the ‘congruency effect’ (Hommel, 2011). 
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Sebanz, Knoblich and Prinz (2003), developed a ‘social’ variant of the Simon task 
to demonstrate the effects of joint action with a partner. They used a go-nogo task 
that required the participant to make a left or right button press in response to a go 
stimulus (the red or green colour of a finger ring), while simultaneously inhibiting 
responses to a neutral cue (the nogo stimulus), which was the direction in which the 
finger was pointing. The task was performed in three conditions. In the ‘two-choice 
condition’ participants were told to respond to both colours (e.g. to press the left 
button when the finger ring was green and the right button when it was red). In the 
‘individual condition’ the participants were required to respond only to one colour 
cue (e.g. to press the left button when the ring was green but not to respond to red 
cues). In the ‘social condition’ they sat alongside a coactor (the experimenter) and 
once more responded to only one colour cue, while the experimenter responded to 
the other (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). 
 
People generally show a reliable spatial compatibility (Simon) effect in the two-
choice condition, i.e. they respond faster in the ‘congruent condition’, when the 
finger points towards the button they are required to press and they have slower 
RTs when the trial is ‘incongruent’. However, in the individual condition, when 
people respond to one colour only, the effect of congruency disappears. The crucial 
finding in Sebanz et al.’s (2003) original experiment was that the congruency effect 
reappeared in the social condition. They attributed this to the participant mentally 
representing the coactor’s task, which then conflicts with their own task. The 
congruency effect in the social Simon condition has consequently been taken as an 
index of the degree to which people co-represent the actions of a coactor (Hommel, 
2009; Sebanz et al., 2003). If this explanation is correct and participants represent 
the actions of the coactor, they must then separate their representation of their own 
action from their representation of the other person’s action. Assuming that 
interoceptive accuracy affects the ability to make self/other distinctions in the 
sensory domain, potentially it is similarly linked to the ability to separate self and 
other in the motor domain.  
 
However, the social Simon effect is modulated by top-down social influences that 
might act as confounds, by influencing the desire to cooperate with the coactor (and 
thus to represent their actions). The effect can disappear completely if the coactor 
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is intimidating or competitive (Hommel, Colzato, & Wildenberg, 2009). 
Conversely, it may be enhanced by priming participants with pronouns that produce 
a sense of self-other integration (Colzato, van den Wildenberg, & Hommel, 2013). 
Similarly, priming with instances of an interdependent versus independent self-
construal increases the social Simon effect (Colzato, de Bruijn, & Hommel, 2012). 
As checks on two of the most obvious of these potential top-down effects, the 
Revised Self-monitoring Scale (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984) and the Interpersonal 
Orientation Scale (Swap & Rubin, 1983) were administered to all participants. 
Individuals who are high in self-monitoring (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984) find social 
aspects of the environment particularly salient. It is therefore possible that such 
people would have a greater tendency to represent the actions of a coactor in the 
social Simon task. Similarly, people with high interpersonal orientation are more 
likely to attend preferentially to the actions of a partner and thus to mentally 
represent their actions (Swap & Rubin, 1983).  
 
In Experiment 4, two sets of visual stimuli were employed for the Simon task 
(Figure 4.1), which were tested for all participants in all three conditions (two-
choice, individual and social). The pictures of pointing hands were kindly provided 
by Professor. Natalie Sebanz, (Sebanz, Rebbechi, Knoblich, Prinz, & Frith, 2007; 
Sebanz et al., 2003). The Simon effect is typically investigated using coloured 
geometric shapes that appear either on the left or the right of the screen (Hommel 
et al., 2009). The ‘social Simon effect’, by contrast, was first demonstrated with the 
pointing hand stimuli shown in Figure 4.1 (Sebanz et al., 2003). These differ from 
the more typical geometric stimuli in (i) appearing centrally and therefore relying 
on pointing, rather than screen position, to give directional cues; and (ii) having a 
social connotation. Given that the social Simon effect is assumed to involve 
mentally representing the actions of the experimental partner, pointing hand stimuli 
potentially introduce the hand actions of yet a third actor. For comparison, 
therefore, in Experiment 4 participants were also tested using directional arrows, 
which have no social/human connotation. 
 
 Congruency effects were calculated as the difference between mean reaction times 
on congruent and incongruent cues. These were compared with interoceptive 
accuracy, assessed using the Mental Tracking Method. Gender, body mass index 
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(BMI), and resting heart rate were recorded, as possible confounds of the heartbeat 
perception task (Cameron, 2002). All participants completed the Revised Self-
monitoring Scale (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984) and the Interpersonal Orientation Scale 
(Swap & Rubin, 1983). A criticism of the Mental Tracking Method is that 
participants may estimate the elapsed time interval to guess the correct number of 
heartbeats. Therefore individuals were also asked to estimate the length of three, 
randomly presented, intervals (Dunn et al., 2010).  
 
The principal hypothesis of Experiment 4 was that people with low interoceptive 
accuracy would demonstrate a larger congruency effect in the social Simon 
condition, compared with good heartbeat perceivers. It was reasoned that all 
participants would, to some extent, form a motor representation of the coactor’s 
action. However, if poor heartbeat perceivers are less good at making self/other 
distinctions, then these representations would be more likely to interfere with their 
performance of their own task, resulting in a larger social Simon effect.  
 
A second hypothesis proposed that individuals high in self-monitoring and in 
interpersonal orientation would exhibit greater congruency effects in the social 
Simon condition but not on the two-choice or individual conditions. Good heartbeat 
perceivers are better able to down-regulate affect (Füstös et al., 2012), which might 
imply that they would score higher on self-monitoring scales. Moreover, high 
interoceptive accuracy has been linked to empathy (Ernst, Northoff, et al., 2013; 
Fukushima et al., 2011), which is potentially associated with interpersonal 
orientation. A third hypothesis therefore anticipated that scores on these two scales 
might mediate the link that the experiment anticipated would be found between 
interoceptive accuracy and the social Simon effect. 
4.2.2 Method  
4.2.2.1 Participants 
49 students at Royal Holloway participated for course credit. One was excluded for 
failing to comply with the instructions and two for making more than 15% errors in 
the two-choice condition. Of the remaining 46 participants (10 male), the mean age 
was 21.0yrs, (SD = 3.1). All declared themselves right-handed. The experiment 
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received approval from the Ethics Committee of the Psychology Department, Royal 
Holloway University of London. 
4.2.2.2 Procedure 
Participants were asked to report their age, gender, weight and height. Body mass 
index (BMI) was calculated in the usual way. Participants first completed the 
Mental Tracking task. They then performed the Simon task (section 4.2.2.6) in all 
three blocked conditions, the order of which was randomised. Finally they 
completed the two questionnaires. 
4.2.2.3 Interoceptive Accuracy and the ‘Time Modulus’ Measure 
Interoceptive accuracy (IA) was measured using the Mental Tracking Method 
(Schandry, 1981), as described in Experiment 2 (sections 2.2.2.3 and 2.2.2.4). 
Participants were also asked to estimate the length of three randomly presented 
intervals (19s, 37s and 49s). A measure of accuracy in estimating elapsed time (the 
‘time modulus’) was calculated from these three estimates, using the formula {1/3 
Σ [1 - (|true length of interval – reported length of interval | /true length of interval)]} 
(Dunn et al., 2010). This variable was for use as an extra regressor in any regression 
analyses involving interoceptive accuracy.  
 
Figure 4.1 Examples of the Stimuli 
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4.2.2.4 Stimuli 
Participants were required to respond to two sets of cues (Figure 4.1). The ‘arrow’ 
stimuli were a red or green arrow pointing either to the left or the right (at an angle 
of 45% to the horizontal). The ‘hand’ stimuli were pictures of a right hand, wearing 
either a red or a green coloured ring on the index finger, which was pointing either 
to the left or the right (similarly at an angle of about 45%). The length of the arrow 
was matched to the length of the finger (3cm). The stimuli appeared on a blue 
background (14cm x 17 cm), which was presented in the centre of a black screen. 
4.2.2.5 The Simon Task  
All stimuli were presented on a standard PC. In the individual and two-choice 
conditions of the Simon task the participant sat centrally at the computer, 
approximately 60cm from the screen, while the experimenter sat on the 
participant’s left, at a distance of about 1.5m. In the social condition the participant 
sat right of centre, about 60cm from the coactor/experimenter, who sat on their left 
(Figure 4.2) The experimenter was present in the lab during all three of the 
conditions, sitting 2m behind and to the left of the participant, except in the joint 
condition which was shared with the participant. All instructions were delivered, 
and behavioural responses recorded, using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral 
Systems, Albany, CA) on a standard desktop PC.  
 
All participants completed all three blocked conditions, which were presented in 
random order. In the individual and social conditions the participants responded 
with their right hand only, by pressing the ‘L’ key on the computer keyboard. Even-
numbered participants were required to respond to green cues (with the right hand) 
and odd-numbered participants to red cues. 
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Figure 4.2 Examples of the three Experimental Conditions 
 
 
Each trial lasted 1.7s, consisting of a blank screen for 200ms, stimulus presentation 
for 500ms, followed by a blank screen for 1000ms. After eight practice trials, each 
of the eight stimuli (arrow/hand, green/red, pointing to left/right) was presented 32 
times, in fully randomised order. In the two-choice condition, the participants 
responded to all 256 trials by pressing the ‘L’ key on the computer keyboard with 
the right hand and the ‘A’ key with the left hand. In the social and individual 
conditions, they responded with their right hand only using the ‘L’ key, to half the 
presented stimuli (i.e. to one colour only, on 128 trials). Participants were told that 
the task was a test of speed and accuracy and were instructed to work as fast as 
possible without making mistakes.  
4.2.2.6 Questionnaires 
 
The Revised Self-monitoring Scale  
The Revised Self-monitoring Scale (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984) is made up of 13 items 
and is divided into two subscales: (a) The Ability to Modulate Self-presentation, 
for example, ‘Once I know what the situation calls for, it's easy for me to regulate 
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my actions accordingly’; and (b) Sensitivity to the Expressive Behaviour of Others, 
for example, ‘In conversations, I am sensitive to even the slightest change in the 
facial expression of the person I'm conversing with’.  
 
The Interpersonal Orientation Scale   
The Interpersonal Orientation Scale (Swap & Rubin, 1983) consists of 29 questions, 
for example, ‘I am interested in knowing what makes people tick’ and ‘When 
someone does me a favour I don't usually feel compelled to return it’. Question 29 
(‘I find myself wondering what telephone operators are really like’) was omitted as 
outdated. 
 
On both questionnaires, participants were asked to rate how true (how descriptive) 
each statement was for them. Responses were recorded on a 5-point Likert scale, 
with 1 being ‘not at all true’ and 5 ‘completely true’. 
4.2.3 Results 
4.2.3.1 Interoceptive Accuracy and Confounds 
The ‘time modulus’ measure (of participants’ ability to estimate the length of an 
elapsed interval) was correlated with interoceptive accuracy, r = .30, p = .05. Major 
critics of the Mental Tracking Method have reported that the participants can 
perform well on the task if they are good at estimating elapsed time and are not 
reporting counted heartbeats but simply counting seconds (Ring & Brener, 1996). 
The positive correlation between the time modulus measure and interoceptive 
accuracy was therefore noted as a potential confound of any significant findings in 
this experiment. 
 
As reported elsewhere (Cameron, 2001; Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007; Knapp-
Kline & Kline, 2005; Stevens et al., 2011), people with high interoceptive accuracy 
tend to have slower heart rates but in this experiment this did not reach significance, 
r = .27, p = .07. Body mass index (BMI) has been shown to influence heartbeat 
perception (Cameron, 2001) but all participants had BMI within the normal range 
and BMI was not correlated with interoceptive accuracy, r =.15, p = .32. 
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4.2.3.2 Reaction Time Analysis of the Simon Task 
In every condition, errors were omitted from the analysis. There were two sources 
of errors. Firstly, any trial was removed where the participant pressed the incorrect 
button. Secondly, reaction time (RT) outliers of less than 200ms or more than 
900ms were also omitted (Sebanz, Knoblich, Stumpf, & Prinz, 2005). The data for 
two participants was excluded from the analysis because they made excessive 
numbers of errors (more than 15% in the two-choice condition). The average rate 
of errors for the remaining participants was 2.8% in the two-choice condition and 
1.2% in the individual condition. These error rates as well as mean RTs (Figure 4.2) 
are close to the values reported by Sebanz et al. (2003). 
 
Figure 4.3 Mean Reaction Times by Stimulus and Condition (error bars 
represent SEM 
 
 
Participants were divided into a high IA group (above median) and a low IA group 
(below median), using a median split (median IA = .6). Repeated measures 
ANOVA was performed with the three conditions (two-choice, individual or 
social), congruence (congruent vs. incongruent trials) and the nature of the stimulus 
(arrows vs. hands) as within-subjects variables. Interoceptive accuracy group (high 
vs. low), gender and the colour to which the participant responded (with their right 
hand) were between-subjects variables. Mauchley’s test of Sphericity was 
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nonsignificant. There were the anticipated main effects of condition, F(2, 88) = 
87.0, p < .001, and of whether trials were congruent or incongruent, F(1, 44) = 68.4, 
p < .001, confirming the existence of Simon effects. There was also a main effect 
of stimulus type F(1, 44) = 45.8, p < .001, indicating that the arrow and hand stimuli 
elicited different reaction times. There was no interaction of IA group with 
condition, F(2, 88) = 1.92 p = .16; or with congruency F(1, 44) = 0.23, p = .88; or 
with stimulus type F(1, 44) = 0.10, p = .75, implying that IA group had no effect 
within the analysis. There was the expected interaction of condition and congruency 
(whether the trials were congruent or incongruent), F(2, 88) = 17.0, p < .001. There 
was also an interaction of condition and stimulus type, F(2, 88) = 4.12, p = .01, 
indicating that the arrow and hand stimuli had different effects depending on the 
condition. No other interactions were significant. There was no main effect of IA 
group, F(1, 38) = 0.10, p = 75; gender, F(1, 38) = 0.8, p = .37; or the colour to which 
the participant responded, F(1, 38) = 1.2, p = .28. 
 
To explore this further, repeated measures ANOVA was performed in each 
condition separately, for the stimulus type (arrow vs. hand) separately, with mean 
RTs (congruent vs. incongruent trials) as within-subjects variable. Between-
subjects variables were: gender; interoceptive accuracy group (high vs. low); the 
colour to which the subject responded with their right hand (red vs. green); and the 
order in which the particular condition was presented (first, second or third). 
 
Two-choice Condition 
Mauchley’s test of Sphericity was nonsignificant. For both the arrow and hand 
stimuli, there were the expected congruency effects, i.e. longer RTs for incongruent 
than congruent stimuli (Table 4.1). There were no interactions of congruency effect 
with IA group. There was likewise no effect of the order (first, second or third) in 
which the two-choice condition was presented. There was no correlation between 
interoceptive accuracy and the congruency effect, for either the hand stimuli, r = 
.07, p = .64, or the arrow stimuli, r = -.12, p = .45, nor was there a correlation 
between interoceptive accuracy and any mean RT, p > .48.  
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Paired samples t tests showed that participants responded significantly faster to the 
arrow than to the hand stimuli, when these were congruent, t(45) = 8.14, p < .001, 
but not when they were the incongruent t(45) = .31, p = .76. 
 
Table 4.1. Two-choice condition. Results of ANOVA 
Two-choice condition Arrow Hand 
Congruency effect F(1, 29) = 106.54 
p < .001** 
F(1, 29) = 8.4 
p = .01* 
Interaction of the congruency effect 
with IA group 
F(1, 29) = 0.48 
p = .50 
F(1, 29) < .001 
p = .98 
Interaction of the congruency effect 
and gender 
F(1, 29) = 2.93 
p = .10 
F(1, 29) = 2.38 
p = .14 
Interaction of the congruency effect 
with the colour responded to with 
the right hand 
F(1, 29) = 0.39 
p = .54 
F(1, 29) = 0.58 
p = .46 
Interaction of the congruency effect 
with the order of presentation of the 
two-choice condition 
F(2, 29) = 2.36 
p = .12 
F(2, 29) = 0.21 
p = .82 
 
*significant at the 5% level 
**significant at the 1% level 
 
Individual Condition 
For the arrow stimuli, as expected, there was no congruency effect. However, 
unexpectedly, for the hand stimuli there was a significant congruency effect (Table 
4.2). There were no interactions with interoceptive accuracy group for either the 
arrow or hand stimuli.). The ten men had significantly shorter RTs than the women 
to the arrow but not to the hand stimuli. The colour to which the participant 
responded with the right hand had no effect. There was also no effect of the order 
in which the individual condition was presented (Table 4.2). Interoceptive accuracy 
was not correlated with either of the congruency effects, nor with any of the mean 
RTs in the individual condition, p > .19. Paired samples t tests show that participants 
were significantly faster when responding to the arrow compared to the hand 
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stimuli, in both incongruent trials, t(45) = 5.35, p < .001, and congruent trials, t(45) 
= 2.52, p = .02. 
 
Table 4.2 Individual condition. Results of ANOVA 
Individual Condition Arrow Hand 
Congruency effect F(1, 29) = 2.63 
p = .12 
F(1, 29) = 6.16 
p = .02* 
Interaction of the congruency 
effect with IA group 
F(1, 29) = 2.79 
p = .11 
F(1, 29) = 1.56 
p = .23 
Interaction of the congruency 
effect with gender 
F(1, 29) = 5.60 
p = .03* 
F(1, 29) < 0.001 
p = .96 
Interaction of the congruency 
effect with colour responded 
to with the right hand 
F(1, 29) = 0.79 
p = .39 
F(1, 29) < 0.001 
p = .96 
Interaction of the congruency 
effect with the order of 
presentation of the individual 
condition 
F(2, 29) = 0.04 
p = .96 
F(2, 29) = 0.23 
p = .80 
 
*significant at the 5% level 
 
Social Condition  
For both the arrow and the hand stimuli, as expected, there were significant 
congruency effects (Table 4.3). However, there were no interactions with 
interoceptive accuracy group). The main hypothesis of Experiment 4 was thus not 
confirmed. People with low interoceptive accuracy did not exhibit larger 
congruency effects (social Simon effects). Gender, the colour to which the 
participant responded with their right hand and the order in which the social 
condition was presented all had no significant effect. 
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Table 4.3 Social Condition. Results of ANOVA 
Social Condition Arrow Hand 
Congruency effect F(1, 29) = 16.32 
p = .001** 
F(1, 29) = 16.40 
p = .001** 
Interaction of the congruency effect 
with IA group 
F(1, 29) = 0.11 
p = .74 
F(1, 29) = 1.84 
p = .19 
Interaction of the congruency effect 
with gender 
F(1, 29) = 1.79 
p = .20 
F(1, 29) < 0.001 
p = .95 
Interaction of the congruency effect 
with colour responded to with Right 
hand 
F(1, 29) = 0.03 
p = .88 
F(1, 29) = 2.16 
p = .16 
Interaction of the congruency effect 
with the order of presentation of the 
social condition 
F(2, 29) = 2.04 
p = .16 
F(2, 29) = 1.34 
p = .28 
 
*significant at the 5% level 
**significant at the 1% level 
 
Paired samples t tests showed that participants were again significantly faster in 
their response to the arrow stimuli than to the hands, on both the incongruent, t(45) 
= 7.03, p < .001, and congruent trials, t(45) = 8.00, p < .001. Interoceptive accuracy 
was not correlated with the congruency effects, nor with any of the mean RTs in 
the social condition, p > .53. 
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    Table 4.4 Social Condition. Correlations of the Questionnaire Measures with IA, Mean RTs and the Congruency Effects 
 Revised Self-
monitoring Scale 
(a) Ability to Modify 
Self-presentation 
(b) Sensitivity to the 
Expressive Behaviour 
of Others 
Interpersonal 
Orientation Scale 
Interoceptive Accuracy r = -.17 
p = .27 
r = -.09 
p = .57 
r = -.16 
p = .28 
r = -.06 
p = .68 
Arrow stimuli  
Mean RT on incongruent 
trials 
r = .33 
p = .02* 
r = .27  
p = .07† 
r  = .21 
p = .17 
r = -.09 
p = .55 
Arrow stimuli  
Mean RT on congruent 
trials 
r = .35  
p = .02* 
r = .36 
p = .01* 
r = .14 
p = .37 
r = -.08  
p = .61 
Arrow stimuli  
Congruency effect 
r = -.07 
p = .65 
r = -.25 
p = .05† 
r = .18 
p = .22 
r = -.03 
p = .81 
Hand stimuli 
Mean RT on incongruent 
trials 
r = .36  
p = .02* 
r = .33 
p =.02* 
r = .18  
p =.24 
r = -.14 
p = .35 
Hand stimuli 
Mean RT on congruent 
trials 
r = .33  
p = .03* 
r = .29 
p = .05† 
r = .18 
p = .22 
r = -.22 
p = .14 
Hand stimuli  
Congruency effect 
r = .13 
p = .41 
r = .17 
p = .27 
r = .01 
p = .96 
r = .22 
p = .15 
 
                    *significant at the 5% level   †significant at the 10% level 
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4.2.3.3 Questionnaire Measures 
Scores on the Revised Self-monitoring Scale (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984) were 
correlated with mean RTs in the social condition, partly confirming the second 
hypothesis of this experiment (Table 4.4). This was largely accounted for by the 
Ability to Modify Self-presentation subscale, indicating that people who were 
inclined to modify their self-presentation had slower overall mean reaction times to 
all the stimuli. However, these correlation would not survive Bonferroni corrections 
for multiple comparison (with a significance level of .002). The congruency effect 
for the arrow stimuli (but not the hands) was close to being significantly correlated 
with this scale. As expected, this was seen only in the social condition. In the two-
choice and individual conditions, Ability to Modify Self-presentation was not 
correlated with any mean reaction time measure. Scores on the Interpersonal 
Orientation Scale (Swap & Rubin, 1983) were not significantly correlated with any 
mean reaction time, or congruency measure, in any of the three conditions. Contrary 
to the third hypothesis, there were also no significant relationships between any of 
the questionnaire measures and interoceptive accuracy. 
4.2.4 Discussion 
Using a within-subjects design, interoceptive accuracy was compared with the 
congruency effect in the Simon task in each of three conditions, comprising two-
choice, individual and social conditions (Sebanz et al., 2003). Stimuli in the Simon 
task were of two types, which were directional arrows and pictures of a pointing 
right hand. In each case, the participant’s task was to respond to the colour (red or 
green) of the arrow, or of a ring on the index finger of the hand, while ignoring the 
irrelevant cue, which was the direction in which the stimulus was pointing. In the 
two-choice condition participants responded on all trials with a right button press 
for one colour and a left button press for the other colour. In the individual condition 
they responded with a right button press to only one colour, while ignoring the 
other. In the social condition they shared the task with a coactor (the experimenter) 
who responded to one colour while they responded to the other. It was hypothesised 
that people with high interoceptive accuracy would show a smaller congruency 
effect on the social Simon task because they are assumed to make better self/other 
distinctions. This was not supported by the data.  
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Results showed the expected congruency effect in the two-choice and the social 
conditions, for both hand and arrow stimuli. In the individual condition, where no 
congruency effects are predicted, there was an unexpected congruency effect for 
the hands, which might indicate that the effects were at least partly driven by some 
undetected spatial aspect of the experimental set up, to which the presence of the 
experimenter may have contributed, thereby confounding the experiment. The 
participants were divided by median split into a high interoceptive accuracy group 
and a low interoceptive accuracy group. There was no interaction of interoceptive 
accuracy group with any congruency effect in any condition, for either set of 
stimuli. There were no significant correlations between interoceptive accuracy and 
any of the congruency effects, nor mean reaction times in any condition. The order 
in which the three conditions were presented and the colour the participant 
responded to (with their right hand) had no significant effect. Men were faster in 
the individual condition (for arrows) but the small number of male participants 
makes gender effects unreliable. In all three conditions, participants were 
significantly faster in reacting to arrows than to hand stimuli. Potentially the arrows 
were more obviously directional and incorporated a greater area of colour, making 
them more salient.  
 
The second hypothesis in this experiment was partly supported. There were 
significant correlations between scores on the Revised Self-monitoring Scale and 
reaction times in the social Simon condition. High self-monitors had slower 
reaction times, on both congruent and incongruent trials, when they performed the 
task with a coactor i.e. in the social condition (but not when they performed alone 
in the two-choice and individual conditions). Such individuals appeared to have a 
greater tendency to mentally represent the actions of the coactor, resulting in a 
larger congruency effect, for the arrow stimuli only, that nearly reached 
significance. However, these correlations do not survive Bonferroni correction and, 
contrary to the third hypothesis, self-monitoring was not related to interoceptive 
accuracy and could not account for the observed lack of association between 
interoceptive accuracy and the social Simon effect.  
 
The congruency effect in the social Simon task has been taken as an index of the 
degree to which people co-represent the actions of a coactor (Hommel, 2009; 
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Sebanz et al., 2003). EEG, for example, reveals more response inhibition on 
incongruent trials of the social Simon condition than during the individual 
condition, manifesting as larger amplitude of the P300 component and a greater 
negative deflection of the lateralised readiness potential on incongruent trials 
(Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006; Tsai, Kuo, Jing, Hung, & Tzeng, 2006). 
However, interpretation of the social Simon effect has been hotly debated. For 
example, whether it is the result of the ‘mere presence’ of another person (Sebanz 
et al., 2003; Tsai et al., 2006) or requires that the coactor is human and takes an 
active role  (Tsai & Brass, 2007; Tsai, Kuo, Hung, & Tzeng, 2008; Vlainic, Liepelt, 
Colzato, Prinz, & Hommel, 2010); or only happens if the coactor is in the 
participant’s peripersonal space (Guagnano, Rusconi, & Umiltà, 2010).  
 
In a major critique of the social Simon effect, Dolk and colleagues (2011) conducted 
a series of experiment to show that a congruency effect can be produced in the 
individual condition of the Simon task by any salient (human or non-human) 
stimulus that provides a spatial reference frame which encourages the coding of the 
participant’s actions as ‘left’ or ‘right’. For example, a waving model cat, or even a 
silent metronome, is capable of producing a congruency effect, which cannot be 
attributable to a mental presentation of a coactor’s actions because there is no 
coactor in the individual condition (Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & Liepelt, 2013; Dolk et 
al., 2011). The unexpected congruency effect observed in Experiment 4 for the hand 
stimuli in the individual condition might be attributable to some similar spatial 
effect, such as the presence of the experimenter, which was a major design flaw and 
confound of the experiment.  
 
None of these experiments conclusively resolves the question of whether, and to 
what extent, the social Simon effect involves the participant mentally representing 
the coactor’s actions, but they imply that the causes of the social Simon effect are 
not as clear-cut as originally suggested (Dolk et al., 2011). If the effect relies on 
spatial attention then no interaction with interoceptive accuracy can be expected. 
 
A final possibility is that, while the task does involve the participant forming a 
motor representation of the coactor’s movement, individual differences in self/other 
distinction at the preconscious level of motor plans are outweighed by top-down 
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contextual influences, such as how much the participant liked, or wished to 
cooperate with, the coactor (Hommel, 2011). The experiment was thus confounded 
by both spatial and social effects, which could not be controlled and are likely to 
have undermined the results. 
4.2.5 Conclusion 
The results of Experiment 4 indicate that interoceptive accuracy does not interact 
with the social Simon effect. There are a number of possible interpretations. The 
assumption that participants in the social Simon task mentally represent their 
coactor’s task may be incorrect. There is much cogent criticism and empirical 
evidence to suggest that the task is flawed and that the effect can be accounted for 
by any salient stimulus (such as a coactor seated on their left) that biases the 
participants’ attention, so that their own task becomes coded in spatial terms of 
left/right. Further research was warranted with another paradigm that is not 
confounded in this manner. 
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4.3 Experiment 5. Self/Other Distinction in Automatic Imitation4 
4.3.1 Introduction  
Experiment 4 assessed whether interoceptive accuracy modulates the extent to 
which people represent the actions of a confederate during joint action and found 
no link. However, the social Simon task is potentially confounded by the salience 
of the coactor, whose presence may cause the participants to code their actions 
spatially. A well-validated tool for measuring how effectively the self can be 
distinguished from other in the domain of action is provided by ‘automatic 
imitation’ (Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2009). Experiment 5 therefore 
investigated whether the ability to inhibit imitation is modulated by interoceptive 
accuracy. 
 
Automatic imitation refers to the human tendency to involuntarily imitate actions 
that we observe. Thus when an individual is required to perform a given action, 
observing another person perform an identical action typically facilitates 
performance, whereas observing a different action generally interferes with it, even 
when the observed action is entirely task-irrelevant (Heyes, 2011). Although the 
term ‘automatic imitation’ is commonly used, the phenomenon rarely involves true 
imitation, in that people seldom perform the wrong action. They must, however, 
resist a tendency to copy the action they observe. The ability to inhibit imitation is 
measured by the congruency effect, which is the difference between the slower 
mean reaction times (RTs) typically found when the required and observed actions 
are incongruent (i.e. different) and the faster mean RTs when the desired and 
observed actions are congruent, compared with the baseline condition of no 
observed action (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001).  
 
According to the Theory of Event Coding, automatic imitation occurs because 
actions are coded in terms of their goals and thus their sensory consequences. The 
distinction between perception and action is thus a false dichotomy (Hommel, 
Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). The Associative Sequence Learning 
(ASL) theory (Catmur et al., 2009) suggests that visual and motor components of 
                                                 
4  This study was published as: Ainley, Brass, & Tsakiris. (2014). Heartfelt imitation: High 
interoceptive awareness is linked to greater automatic imitation. Neuropsychologia, 60, 21-28. 
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actions are linked by long-term stimulus response (SR) bonds, such that the 
activation of a visual representation necessarily predicts a motor representation 
(Heyes, 2011). In support of this is has been shown that observing an action causes 
sub-threshold activation of an imitative response, which can be recorded in the 
peripheral motor system (Luciano Fadiga, Craighero, & Olivier, 2005). Automatic 
imitation is specific to the particular action and to the body part observed 
(Gillmeister, Catmur, Brass, & Heyes, 2008; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007) and 
is enhanced when the observed action is seen from a first-person perspective. More 
recently, the theory of predictive coding links perception and action within a unified 
framework that may, in future, elucidate the neural mechanisms behind automatic 
imitation (Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2012; K Friston, 2010). 
 
Automatic imitation is therefore another example of a process that involves 
self/other overlap (Preston & Hofelich, 2012), whereby observers activate their own 
bodily representations of, for example, an action or an emotion, analogously to the 
state they observe in the other person (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011). These shared 
representations occur at a very early, preconscious processing stage. Thus, seeing 
hand movements increases cortico-spinal excitability and decreases the threshold at 
which transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) elicits motor evoked potentials 
(MEPs) from the specific muscles involved in that movement (Fadiga, Fogassi, 
Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995). Moreover, priming participants with examples of 
interdependent self-construal increases the amplitude of MEPs elicited by TMS 
(Obhi, Hogeveen, & Pascual-Leone, 2011), indicating that these top-down 
influences act on cortical excitability in the motor areas that produce imitation. 
Furthermore, observing an action has the effect of increasing the amplitude of 
MEPs if that action is attributed to another individual but reduces cortico-spinal 
excitability when the action is illusorily attributed to the self (Schütz-Bosbach, 
Mancini, Aglioti, & Haggard, 2006). The ability to inhibit imitation thus requires 
that the individual distinguishes between internally generated motor representations 
consequent on the preparation of her own action and those that are triggered by 
observing the other person’s action (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009), in a manner 
not unlike the proposed basis of the social Simon effect in Experiment 4. 
Successfully inhibiting the tendency to imitate activates cortical areas, such as the 
temporal-parietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex (Wang, Ramsey, & 
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Hamilton, 2011), which are related to perspective-taking, the sense of agency and 
theory of mind (Gonzalez-Liencres, Shamay-Tsoory, & Brune, 2013), as well as to 
discriminating between self and other (Brass, Derrfuss, & von Cramon, 2005; Brass 
et al., 2009; Brass & Heyes, 2005). Greater activation in medial prefrontal areas 
correlates with smaller congruency effects during automatic imitation, which 
implies better self/other distinction (Spengler et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
experimentally increasing self-focus, through mirror self-observation, reduces the 
congruency effect, by reducing RTs on incongruent trials (Spengler et al., 2010), 
suggesting that there may be a link with interoceptive accuracy, which is similarly 
enhanced by mirror self-observation (Experiment 1).  
 
However, ‘automatic imitation’ rarely involves imitation and neither is it truly 
‘automatic’ because it is not immune to interference by other processes. According 
to the ASL model (Catmur et al., 2009), these processes can be divided into ‘input 
modulation’, which alters the extent to which the relevant long-term SR bond is 
activated, and ‘output modulation’, where social factors inhibit the involuntary 
imitation (Heyes, 2011). Selective attention to one’s own actions is an example of 
input modulation, which reduces imitation (Bortoletto, Mattingley, & Cunnington, 
2013; Chong, Cunnington, Williams, & Mattingley, 2009). It was anticipated that 
high interoceptive accuracy might be accompanied by heightened attention to one’s 
own actions. Automatic imitation can also can be reduced by modest amounts of 
training (Cook, Press, Dickinson, & Heyes, 2010; Gillmeister et al., 2008; Heyes, 
Bird, Johnson, & Haggard, 2005; Heyes & Bird, 2007), which reverses the muscle 
specificity of the MEPs produced by TMS (Catmur et al., 2009). Although 
automatic imitation is generally elicited more strongly by observation of biological 
than robotic action, presumably because the SR bonds are stronger (Kilner, 
Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Liepelt & Brass, 2010; Liepelt & Prinz, 2011), 
training can eliminate this animacy bias (Press, Gillmeister, & Heyes, 2007).  
 
Output modulation, by contrast, depends on the top-down influence of participants’ 
traits and social attitudes. For example, eye contact, or priming with pro-social cues, 
enhances the congruency effect (Leighton, Bird, Orsini, & Heyes, 2010; Wang & 
Hamilton, 2012; Wang, Newport, & Hamilton, 2011). Similarly, a desire to affiliate 
to the person observed increases automatic imitation in both experimental settings 
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and social interaction (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). People 
scoring high in ‘self-monitoring’ (Snyder, 1974), or who have an ‘interdependent 
self-construal’, have a greater tendency to mimic others, possibly as an unconscious 
affiliation strategy (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; Obhi et al., 2011).  
 
The ability to inhibit automatic imitation thus appears to index better self/other 
distinction at the level of visual and motor representation and people with high 
interoceptive accuracy appear more reliably able to distinguish their own bodies 
from those of others at a multisensory level. It was, therefore hypothesised, that in 
an automatic imitation paradigm, individuals with high interoceptive accuracy 
would successfully inhibit the tendency to imitate, whereas those with low 
interoceptive accuracy would exhibit less self/other distinction and would have a 
greater tendency to automatic imitation. 
 
In Experiment 5, automatic imitation was assessed using the inhibition imitation 
paradigm developed by Brass and colleagues (Brass et al., 2005; Spengler et al., 
2009). The reaction time results were compared with interoceptive accuracy, 
assessed by the Mental Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981). Gender, BMI, and 
resting heart rate were recorded, as possible confounds of the heartbeat perception 
task (Cameron, 2002). It was hypothesised that people who performed accurately 
in heartbeat perception would also be more accurate during the automatic attention 
task (would show a smaller congruency effect). However, both these variables 
might be affected by participants’ general willingness and ability to attend to the 
tests. Attention is a possible source of input modulation in automatic imitation 
(Heyes, 2011). Moreover, it has also been reported that interoceptive accuracy is 
linked to scores on the d2 test, which measures individual differences in motivation 
and attention (Matthias et al., 2009). The d2 test was accordingly administered as a 
check for this potential confound.  
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4.3.2 Method  
4.3.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 45 students at Royal Holloway University of London who 
participated for course credit. All declared themselves right handed and had normal 
or corrected to normal vision. The data for two participants was excluded for 
excessive numbers of errors (more than 10%, i.e. 3SD above the mean) in the action 
imitation task, indicating a failure to concentrate and follow the instructions. Of the 
remaining 43 participants, mean age = 19.6 (SD = 4.9), nine were male. The 
experiment was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology Department, 
Royal Holloway University of London. 
4.3.2.2 Procedure 
Participants’ gender, age, height and weight were recorded. They then performed 
the Mental Tracking Task, followed by the test of automatic imitation and finally 
completed the d2 test. 
4.3.2.3 Interoceptive Accuracy and the ‘Time Modulus’ Measure 
Interoceptive accuracy was measured with three trials of 25s, 35s and 45s, presented 
in random order, as described in Experiment 2 (section 2.2.2.3). Participants were 
also asked to estimate the length of three, randomly presented, intervals (19s, 37s, 
49s, as in section 4.2.2.3) (Dunn et al., 2010).  
4.3.2.4 Stimuli 
The stimuli consisted of sequences of five frames kindly provided by Marcel Brass 
(Brass et al., 2005; Spengler et al., 2009). Each video stared with a frame showing 
the hand, which mirrored the right hand of the subject, in the starting position, for 
2s. The next two frames, each lasting 34ms, presented a numeral (either 1 or 2) and 
simultaneously showed the finger movement (if any). The fourth frame showed the 
finger in the end position, for 1.3s, with the numeral (1 or 2) superimposed. Between 
trials, the screen turned black for 2.7s. Each video trial was thus 6s duration. The 
video hand was presented on a blue rectangular background, measuring 22 x 12cm. 
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Figure 4.4 Example of the Video Stimuli for the Index Finger 
 
There were six possible video sequences, consisting of each of the two fingers 
(index or middle) in each of three conditions (baseline, congruent or incongruent). 
Participants were required to lift either the index (1) or middle (2) finger in response 
to a numeral appearing on the screen. The three possible conditions (for the index 
finger) are shown in Figure 4.3. Thus in the baseline condition, simultaneous with 
the appearance of the numeral, the video hand remained static. In the congruent 
condition the video hand lifted the finger that corresponded to the numeral shown 
(i.e. the index finger was lifted when the number 1 appeared). In the incongruent 
condition the video hand lifted the ‘wrong’ finger (i.e. the middle finger was lifted 
when the numeral 1 appeared).  
4.3.2.5 Automatic Imitation 
The stimuli were viewed on a standard PC, using Presentation software 
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA). Participants were seated about 60 cm in 
front of the screen and were instructed to execute their movements as quickly and 
accurately as possible. Participants placed the index and middle fingers of their right 
hand on a serial response box which was linked to another PC which recorded the 
times of all finger movements, using Spike2 software (Cambridge Electronic 
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Design, Cambridge UK). This recorded the onset of the visible stimulus on screen 
(i.e. the numeral 1 or 2, which coincided with the onset of movement of the video 
hand). It also recorded whenever the participant lifted an index or middle finger. 
Following six practice trials, 150 experimental trials were presented in three blocks 
of 5mins, with obligatory rests of at least 2mins between blocks. The order of the 
presentation of the trials was fully randomised and comprised 25 trials in each of 
the six conditions.  
4.3.2.6 The d2 Test of Attention 
The d2 test (Brickenkamp & Zilmer, 1998) is a widely used measure of selective 
visual attention. The test items consist of the letters d and p with up to four dashes, 
arranged either individually or in pairs, above and/or below each letter. The subject 
is given 20s to scan across each of the 14 closely printed test lines, during which 
they must identify and cross out every letter d that has exactly two dashes, while 
ignoring all other distractor letters. The d2 test produces several norm-referenced 
scores, of which the most commonly reported are the total number of items 
processed (TN) regardless of whether these are correct or incorrect (this is a 
measure of processing speed), the percentage of errors made (E%) and the total 
number of items processed correctly (TN-E). This final score is designed to provide 
a measure of the person’s capacity to selectively orient to relevant aspects of the 
task, while screening out irrelevant ones. 
4.3.3 Results 
4.3.3.1 Data Reduction 
Data for automatic imitation was extracted using Matlab (mathworks.com) and 
analysed with Microsoft Excel. The mean reaction time (RT) was calculated for 
each of the six conditions (congruent, incongruent and baseline, for each of the two 
fingers). The ‘congruency effect’ was calculated by subtracting the mean RT for 
congruent trials from the mean RT for incongruent trials.  
4.3.3.2 Error Analysis 
Reaction time errors were removed before analysis. There were two possible 
sources of errors. Firstly, participants occasionally lifted the wrong finger. 
Secondly, in common with most reaction time analyses, some response times were 
omitted as outliers (Miller & Diego, 1991). Thus RTs less than 80ms or greater than 
800ms were excluded from the RT analysis (Brass et al., 2001). The rate for all 
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errors was 2.3% of trials. Two participants were excluded for making more than 
10% total errors, i.e. 3SD above the mean. The distribution of errors was thereafter 
approximately Normal, skewness = .64, kurtosis = -.16.  
 
Paired sample t tests (with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons and a 
significance level of 0.017) showed that there were significantly more errors in the 
incongruent condition than in the baseline, t(42) = 5.07, p < .001, but no significant 
difference between the numbers of errors in the congruent condition and baseline, 
t(42) = 0.82, p = .42,  replicating the finding of Brass et al. (2005). 
4.3.3.3 Reaction Time (RT) Analysis 
Repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with both the finger (index vs. middle) 
and the condition (congruent, incongruent and baseline) as within-subjects 
variables. Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was significant, therefore Greenhouse 
Geisser corrections were applied. There was a main effect of condition (RTs in the 
incongruent conditions were slower), F(2, 84) = 186.4, p < .001. This indicates 
significant automatic imitation i.e. slower mean RTs in the incongruent than 
congruent condition, for both fingers (Brass et al., 2000, 2005). There was a main 
effect of finger, F(1, 42) = 13.2, p = .001 (reaction times were generally faster for 
the middle finger), as shown in Figure 4.4. The interaction of finger and condition 
was also significant, F(2, 84) = 8.9, p < .001. Paired samples t tests (with Bonferroni 
correction and a significance level of 0.008) showed that, compared with RTs in the 
baseline, RTs in the incongruent condition were significantly longer when 
participants were required to lift their index finger rather than their middle finger, 
t(42) = 3.32, p = .002. However, there was no significant difference between the 
two fingers for RTs in the congruent condition, compared with the baseline, t(42) 
= .57, p = .57. Despite the significantly shorter RTs for the middle finger, 
particularly in the incongruent condition, the relationships between interoceptive 
accuracy and the various reaction time measures in this study were very similar for 
the two fingers. For the remaining analysis, data for the index and middle fingers 
were collapsed to give a single measure of average RT in each condition.  
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Figure 4.5 Mean Reaction Times (RTs) by Condition and Finger (error bars 
represent SEM) 
 
**significant at the 1% level 
 
To investigate the relationship between interoceptive accuracy and the congruency 
effect, the latter was calculated in the standard way (as the mean RT in the 
incongruent condition minus the mean RT in the congruent condition), for the 
average of the two fingers for each participant. Correlations between interoceptive 
accuracy and differences in RTs between conditions are shown in Table 4.5.  
 
Interoceptive accuracy was positively correlated with the congruency effect (Figure 
4.5) and this was wholly accounted for by RTs in the incongruent condition. 
Interoceptive accuracy was significantly correlated with the difference between 
mean RTs in the incongruent condition and the baseline but not with the difference 
between mean RTs in the congruent and baseline conditions. 
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Table 4.5 Correlations between IA and Reaction Time Measures 
IA & ‘the congruency effect’ (mean RT in incongruent condition 
minus the congruent condition) 
 
r = .41 
p = .006** 
IA & mean RT in the incongruent condition minus the baseline r = .45 
p = .002** 
 
IA & mean RT in the congruent condition minus the baseline r = -.04 
p = .73 
 
**significant at the 1% level 
 
Figure 4.6 Scatter Diagram of the Average Congruency Effect against 
Interoceptive Accuracy
 
The wide range of mean RTs amongst the participants (318ms - 513ms, median 
398ms) might have affected the results. The percentage difference in RTs between 
the incongruent and congruent conditions was calculated using the formula [{(mean 
RT incongruent - mean RT congruent)/mean RT baseline} x 100]. This statistic was 
also significantly positively correlated with IA, r = .40, p = .01. 
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In this experiment a number of confounding variables known to impact on 
interoceptive accuracy were recorded which were gender, body mass index (BMI), 
resting heart rate, and a measure designed to assess possible guessing on the Mental 
Tracking Task (i.e. the ‘time modulus’ measure of the participant’s ability to 
estimate elapsed time). An independent samples t test (with equal variances not 
assumed) showed no effect of gender on interoceptive accuracy, t(41) = 1.32, p = 
.24. Likewise the correlation of interoceptive accuracy and BMI was not significant, 
r = -.20, p = .21. Although people with slower hearts are often better heartbeat 
perceivers (Cameron, 2001; Knapp-Kline & Kline, 2005), in this sample the 
correlation of interoceptive accuracy and average heart rate did not reach 
significance r = -.22, p = .16.  
  
Given previous correlations in the literature between interoceptive accuracy and 
both participants’ average heart rates and the ‘time modulus’ measure (Cameron, 
2002; Dunn et al., 2010), a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed 
with the average congruency effect as the dependent variable and independent 
variables comprising interoceptive accuracy, average heart rate, the ‘time modulus’ 
measure, and their interactions. The ‘time modulus’ was correlated with 
interoceptive accuracy, r = .35, p = .02, but only interoceptive accuracy was a 
significant predictor of the congruency effect (Table 4.6). 
 
Results of the d2 test of attention were analysed in terms of the total number of 
items processed (TN), total number correct (TN-E) and percentage of errors (E%). 
Compared with published norms, d2 scores for the participants (mean TN = 516, 
mean (TN-E) = 493) were at the 70th percentile for students. Previous research 
(Matthias et al., 2009) found significant correlation between IA and TN but in this 
experiment none of the d2 measures was correlated with interoceptive accuracy: for 
TN r = .03, p = .87; for (TN-E) r = .04, p = .82; and for (E%) r = -.02, p = .92. To 
replicate the analysis of Matthias et al. (2009), the data was split using their cut off 
at IA = .85 but found no significant difference in any d2 measures between ‘good’ 
(IA > .85, n = 5) and ‘poor’ (IA < .85, n = 38) heartbeat perceivers (e.g. for TN, 
F(1, 41) = .46, p = .50)). There were likewise no significant correlations between 
any of the d2 measures and the average congruency effect: for TN r = .18, p = .24; 
for (TN-E) r = .11, p = .47; and for (E%) r = .15, p = .32. 
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                Table 4.6 Hierarchical Multiple Regression with the Average Congruency Effect as the Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*significant at the 5% level  **significant at the 1% level 
 Step 1 
 
Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 
Independent variables Beta (p) 
Interoceptive Accuracy (IA) 
 
1.74 
(p = .36) 
1.96 
(p = .16) 
1.90 
(p =.16) 
.52 
(p = .14) 
0.40 ** 
(p = .009) 
0.41** 
(p = .006)  
Average heart rate (HR) 0.22 
(p = .82) 
0.26 
(p = .78) 
    
‘Time modulus’ 
 
-0.76 
(p = .64) 
-0.66 
(p = .66) 
-0.10  
(p = .29) 
 
  
  
Interaction of IA & ‘time modulus’ 0.19 
(p = .86) 
     
Interaction of IA & HR 
 
-1.47 
(p = .31) 
-1.55 
(p = .25) 
-1.49 
(p = .26) 
-.15 
(p = .69) 
  
Interaction of ‘time modulus’ & HR 
 
0.86 
(p = .62) 
0.85 
(p = .62) 
1.22 
(p = .23) 
.15 
(p = .40) 
.11 
(p = .45) 
 
Adjusted R2  
(p) 
.08 
(p = .18) 
.10  
(p = .11) 
.13 
(p = .06) 
.12* 
(p = .05) 
.14** 
(p = .02) 
.15** 
(p = .006) 
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4.3.4 Discussion 
The relationship between interoceptive accuracy and automatic imitation was 
investigated, measuring interoceptive accuracy by means of the Mental Tracking 
Method (Schandry, 1981) and automatic imitation by a widely used finger-lifting 
paradigm (Brass et al., 2005). The expected ‘congruency effect’ was obtained, i.e. 
mean reaction times were slower when the observed and required actions were 
incongruent and were faster when they were congruent (compared with the baseline 
of no observed movement). Interoceptive accuracy was significantly positively 
correlated with the congruency effect. This was fully accounted for by the 
difference between reaction times in the incongruent condition and the baseline. 
There were no significant effects of interoceptive accuracy on reaction time 
difference between the congruent and the baseline. The relationship observed 
therefore depended on reaction times the incongruent condition and thus on 
interference between the observed and required action (Blakemore & Frith, 2005), 
indicating that people with high interoceptive accuracy had greater difficulty 
inhibiting the tendency to automatically imitate. Had there been a motor facilitation 
effect it would have taken the form of shorter reaction times on congruent trials. 
Reaction times in the incongruent condition were significantly slower for the index 
finger than for the middle finger, probably because lifting an index finger is a more 
familiar experience than the isolated lifting of a middle finger, with a consequently 
stronger learned associative bond. 
 
The results obtained were contrary to the original hypothesis. Experiments in 
multisensory integration have been interpreted to mean that people with high 
interoceptive accuracy are better at making self/other distinctions in body 
ownership (Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2013; Tsakiris et al., 2011). It had been 
hypothesised that this effect would translate into the motor domain. The ability to 
inhibit imitation is assumed to index better self/other distinction (Spengler et al., 
2010) and it was therefore predicted that people with high interoceptive accuracy 
would more successfully inhibit the tendency to imitate. Moreover, in an identical 
task, Spengler and colleagues demonstrated that enhanced self-focus reduces mean 
reaction times on incongruent trials (Spengler et al., 2010). As Experiments 1 and 
2 found, enhanced self-focus increases interoceptive accuracy. It was therefore 
anticipated that high interoceptive accuracy in Experiment 5 would be associated 
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with shorter reaction times on incongruent trials and a smaller congruency effect. 
The results show that, on the contrary, they were more inclined to imitate, 
potentially implying greater self/other overlap. 
 
A fundamental difference between self/other distinction in the automatic imitation 
task and self/other distinction in the rubber hand illusion is that, while the rubber 
hand illusion relies on integrating exafferent information, the confusion in the 
automatic imitation task is at a representational level and at a point in time before 
participants have any reafferent sensory information about their own movements. 
Automatic imitation is subject to both ‘input modulation’, by intentionally-driven 
changes in attention and ‘output modulation’ by inhibitory processes (Heyes, 2011). 
The effect in Experiment 5 was driven by slower reaction times on incongruent 
trials, indicating that it depended on the inhibitory effects of observing the potential 
sensory consequences of the action. It was therefore a result of output modulation 
by higher-order social processes.  
 
A source of output modulation might be the sensitivity of people with high 
interoceptive accuracy to social influences, such as social anxiety or empathy. High 
interoceptive accuracy has been linked to anxiety (Domschke et al., 2010) and 
particularly to social anxiety (Terasawa et al., 2013). Trait anxiety was not assessed 
in this experiment but if the participants with high interoceptive accuracy were 
more socially anxious they might have had a greater desire to affiliate, which could 
have enhanced their tendency to imitate (Wang & Hamilton, 2012). 
 
Alternatively, individual differences in empathy might have affected the results. 
Affective empathy has been defined as shared representations between one’s own 
emotional state and that of another individual, plus the ability to separate self and 
other (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Iacoboni, 2009; Preston & Hofelich, 2012; Zaki, 
Weber, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2009). People with high interoceptive accuracy are 
thought to experience greater empathy (Ernst, Northoff, et al., 2013; Fukushima et 
al., 2011) because they are assumed to have a stronger representation of the 
interoceptive consequences of an action, for example, they are more sensitive to 
masked fear conditioning (Katkin et al., 2001). Scores on the Empathic Concern 
scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983) correlate with the 
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amplitude of heartbeat evoked potentials (Fukushima et al., 2011), which are larger 
in people with high interoceptive accuracy (Pollatos & Schandry, 2004). Empathy 
has, in turn, been linked to action observation. People trained to inhibit imitation 
subsequently perform better on a perspective taking task (Santiesteban et al., 2012). 
Moreover, when participants observe another individual reaching for a cup, inferior 
frontal mirror activity is greater in those people who have higher scores on the 
Empathic Concern subscale (Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006). Such motor activity in 
response to action observation is linked to a greater tendency to imitate (Catmur, 
Walsh, & Heyes, 2007; Obhi et al., 2011; Schütz-Bosbach et al., 2006). Empathy is 
inversely correlated with narcissism (Raskin & Terry, 1988) and it has recently been 
shown that individuals who are high in trait narcissism - thus displaying a lack of 
empathy and concern for others - have a greater ability to inhibit automatic imitation 
(Obhi, Hogeveen, Giacomin, & Jordan, 2013). Potentially, high interoceptive 
accuracy might have involved stronger interoceptive representations of the 
consequences of an action, implying higher empathy, greater mirror neuron activity 
in response to observed action and hence a greater tendency to imitate. However, 
these links are indirect and speculative. A direct link between interoceptive 
accuracy and empathy has yet to be established. 
 
A final possibility is that good heartbeat perceivers may be more averse to making 
errors. A recent novel EEG study by Sueyoshi and colleagues reports that 
performance of the Mental Tracking Method correlates with post-error slowing in 
reaction times on the Simon task, as well as with the amplitude of the error-
positivity, which is a late component of the neural response to making an error 
(Sueyoshi et al., 2014). While the meaning of the error positivity is not fully 
understood, it is thought to reflect awareness of making a mistake (Endrass, Reuter, 
& Kathmann, 2007). Its amplitude is modulated by the salience of the error 
(Ullsperger, Harsay, Wessel, & Ridderinkhof, 2010) and the signal originates in 
anterior cingulate cortex (van Veen & Carter, 2006), which is generally coactive 
with the anterior insula (Craig, 2009). Activity in the anterior insula is closely 
linked to the autonomic responses that occur when a person is aware of having made 
an error, (Ullsperger et al., 2010), which reflects the insula’s role in risk monitoring 
(Preuschoff, Quartz, & Bossaerts, 2008).  Moreover, a study by Band and 
colleagues suggests that it is not necessary to make an error in order to experience 
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error related responses. They found that error-related potentials are evoked by 
action effects that violate expectations, even when these are task-irrelevant (Band, 
van Steenbergen, Ridderinkhof, Falkenstein, & Hommel, 2009).  
 
Taken together, these results may be explained if people with high interoceptive 
accuracy experience stronger negative affect and greater autonomic reactivity when 
they are aware of having made a mistake. The amplitude of the error-positivity 
correlates with the Personal Distress subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(Davis, 1983) (Larson et al., 2010), which similarly implies a heightened aversive 
response. If good heartbeat perceivers experience higher salience of errors and 
greater negative affect, as well as greater insula and anterior cingulate activity when 
making errors, then avoiding errors during automatic imitation could lead to more 
insula engagement and greater response conflict, which would slow their reactions.  
 
Experiment 5 had several limitations. Trait variables such as empathy and social 
anxiety were not measured, which might have been a source of output modulation 
that could mediate between interoceptive accuracy and imitation inhibition. 
Automatic imitation using finger-lifting paradigms is open to the criticism that the 
effect is at least partially driven by spatial compatibility (Cooper, Catmur, & Heyes, 
2012), although an elegant experiment has shown that automatic imitation persists 
even when the observed hand is flipped, such that the spatial aspect of the 
movement is no longer driving the effect (Brass et al., 2001). The results presented 
here might be explained if people with high interoceptive accuracy have greater 
susceptible to spatial compatibility effects, however, no such effect was observed 
in Experiment 4, using the Simon effect. 
4.3.5 Conclusion 
Interoceptive accuracy modulates self/other distinction in multisensory contexts. 
Here it was demonstrated for the first time that interoceptive accuracy also impacts 
on shared representations in the motor domain, such that people with high 
interoceptive accuracy have greater difficulty in inhibiting the tendency to imitate, 
in a standard automatic imitation paradigm. The result, however, was concentrated 
in incongruent trials, indicating that it is the result of output modulation, through 
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some unidentified top-down social effect and was not due to the influence of 
interoception on the representation of the action.  
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Chapter 5. ‘The Acting Self’: Interoceptive Accuracy and 
the Sense of Agency. 
5.1 Experiment 6. Interoceptive Accuracy and Intentional 
Binding 
5.1.1 Introduction  
In Experiments 4 and 5 the participant’s action was cued. Experiment 6, by contrast, 
investigated the effect of interoceptive accuracy during voluntary action, examining 
whether interoceptive accuracy modulates the sense of agency (Moore & Obhi, 
2012). Agency is an essential component of models of the self, suggesting a 
possible link with interoception. Damasio, for example, proposes that the sense of 
agency emerges when the ‘core self’ is engaged with objects (Damasio, 2010), 
while Gallagher defines a ‘minimal self’ as comprising feelings of body ownership 
and the sense that we are the agents of our own actions (Gallagher, 2000). 
Abnormalities in the sense of agency compromise the integrity of the self, for 
example, in delusions of control (Blakemore et al., 2002). In Experiment 6, the 
sense of agency was measured by ‘intentional binding’ (Haggard, Clark, & 
Kalogeras, 2002), using the classic Libet clock paradigm (Libet et al., 1983).  
 
Within the contexts of Experiments 4 and 5, no evidence was found linking 
interoceptive accuracy to action. In Experiment 4 there was no effect of 
interoceptive accuracy on the participant’s tendency to form a mental representation 
of the partner’s action during the social Simon task. In Experiment 5 interoceptive 
accuracy was linked to output modulation during automatic imitation but there was 
no effect on input modulation, suggesting that interoceptive accuracy did not affect 
the preparation of, or attention to, the action. An important strength of the 
intentional binding paradigm, however, is that this method allows separate analysis 
of the potential effect of interoceptive accuracy on the preparation of an action and 
on the sensory consequences of that action. Moreover, it provides both behavioural 
and EEG measures with which to assess these potential influences.  
 
Agency depends on the intention to act, as well as execution of the action, and thus 
relies on efferent motor representations combined with reafferent sensory feedback 
(Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). According to both the Theory of Event Coding 
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(Hommel, 2009) and predictive coding accounts of action (Adams et al., 2012), 
movements are represented in terms of their sensory consequences. The influential 
comparator model of motor control (Blakemore et al., 2002; Frith, 2012) proposes 
that feelings of agency arise when there is a match between the predicted 
consequences of a movement and the sensory feedback. However, agency has also 
been characterised as post hoc confabulation, resulting from our intentions to act 
(Wegner, 2003). A synthesis of these ideas proposes that agency depends on a 
combination of predictive processes that precede the performance of an action as 
well as postdictive (reconstructive) processes, such as top-down modulation by 
context and prior assumptions (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore, Wegner, & 
Haggard, 2009). In the light of research showing the influence of both bottom-up 
and top-down cues (Moore & Obhi, 2012), the comparator conceptualisation has 
consequently been extended into the ‘multifactorial weighting account’ of agency 
(Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008a). In the multifactorial account, agency 
depends on the optimal integration of all the available sensory and motor cues that 
are associated with the given movement (Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik, 
Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008a). This fits well with predictive coding accounts, in 
which the brain weighs the various sources of incoming sensorimotor data 
according to their ‘precision’ (reliability) and arrives at a prediction (a best guess), 
for example, that the most probable cause of all the available data is that ‘I did that!’ 
(Wolpe & Rowe, 2014). 
 
Interoception has, until recently, been neglected within the multifactorial model. 
Emotion however, contributes to the representation of actions (Eder, Müsseler, & 
Hommel, 2012) and all affect depends on interoception (Gentsch & Synofzik, 
2014). Seth and colleagues place affect and agency at the heart of self-awareness, 
proposing that the sense of agency depends on the integration of 
interoceptive/affective and exteroceptive sensory signals (Seth et al., 2011). In a 
rare reference to individual differences in interoceptive accuracy, these authors 
suggest that people with high interoceptive accuracy are those who potentially put 
more weight on interoceptive signals, when integrating cues in an optimal manner, 
while individuals with relatively low interoceptive accuracy may rely preferentially 
on exteroceptive sensory signals (Seth et al., 2011). If this is a correct interpretation 
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of individual differences in interoceptive accuracy, it suggests that interoceptive 
accuracy is likely to modulate the sense of agency.  
 
Experiment 6 therefore had a dual purpose. Primarily the aim was to investigate 
whether interoceptive accuracy affects the sense of agency. Equally importantly, 
however, the paradigm allows both EEG and behavioural analysis that can 
discriminate whether interoceptive accuracy affects the preparation of an action 
and/or influences the sensory consequences of that action. 
 
‘Intentional binding’ (Haggard et al., 2002) provides an objective and reliable 
measure for probing the implicit sense of agency (Moore & Obhi, 2012). When 
people make voluntary actions that cause sensory outcomes, they judge the timing 
of their movements as later than they really occur (‘action binding’) and they 
perceive the sensory consequences of their actions as happening earlier (‘effect 
binding’) (Moore & Haggard, 2008). Action binding and effect binding together 
make up intentional binding but they rely on dissociable processes (Waszak, 
Cardoso-Leite, & Hughes, 2012; Wolpe, Haggard, Siebner, & Rowe, 2013). For 
example, theta burst TMS stimulation over the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-
SMA) disrupts effect binding but not action binding (Moore, Ruge, Wenke, 
Rothwell, & Haggard, 2010). Similarly, effect binding but not action binding is 
influenced by causal beliefs about the authorship of a sound (Desantis, Roussel, & 
Waszak, 2011).  
 
For intentional binding to occur there must be both an intentional actor and a causal 
relationship between action and outcome (Haggard, Poonian, & Walsh, 2009; 
Moore & Obhi, 2012). Consequently, factors that impact on intentional binding 
include learned action-effect associations, as well as beliefs about causal factors 
(Desantis, Roussel, & Waszak, 2011; Haggard & Cole, 2007; Haggard et al., 2009; 
Moore et al., 2010). An observer will, for example, bind the actions of another 
individual on the assumption that the person is an intentional agent (Poonian & 
Cunnington, 2013) but they may also bind the actions of a computer on the basis of 
learned causality (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009). Importantly, emotion has been 
shown to affect intentional binding, which is stronger for positive rather than 
negatively valenced outcomes (Yoshie & Haggard, 2013) and is likewise stronger 
 126 
when the action is associated with a monetary reward (Takahata et al., 2012). 
Intriguingly, there are considerable inter-individual differences in intentional 
binding (Wolpe et al., 2013), the sources of which have not yet been established 
(Haggard & Cole, 2007; Moore & Obhi, 2012). Potentially interoceptive accuracy 
may be a contributing factor. 
 
In accordance with Libet’s classic paradigm (Libet et al., 1983), Experiment 6 
included EEG recording while participants made spontaneous button presses and 
heard sounds. This allows analysis of the readiness potential, which is a slow 
negative deflection observed over frontocentral electrodes when people prepare an 
action. The paradigm also enables analysis of the auditory-evoked potentials, which 
are produced by a tone generated either at random by the computer, or as a result 
of the participant’s action. 
 
The readiness potential (RP) produced during the preparation of a voluntary action 
can be divided into two parts. These are the ‘early readiness potential’, originating 
in the pre-SMA, which lasts from about 2sec to 500ms before the movement onset, 
and a steeper ‘late readiness potential’, from 500ms to action onset, with origins in 
primary motor cortex and lateral premotor cortex (Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006). The 
amplitude of the late readiness potential depends on motor factors such as the speed, 
precision and the complexity of the action (Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006). By contrast, 
the amplitude of the early readiness potential has recently been shown to correlate 
with effect binding (Jo, Wittmann, Hinterberger, & Schmidt, 2014). Moreover, 
belief in free will, which presumably affects the sense of agency, modulates the 
amplitude of the early readiness potential (Rigoni, Kühn, Sartori, & Brass, 2011). 
In Experiments 4 and 5 no link was identified between interoceptive accuracy and 
preparation of action. However, the paradigm in Experiment 6 allowed this to be 
examined more closely. If a relationship were to exist between interoceptive 
accuracy and action, then this should be reflected in the behavioural measure of 
action binding and also perhaps in the amplitude of the late readiness potential in 
EEG. 
 
An additional test of the possible effects on interoceptive accuracy on the 
preparation of action is provided by the paradigm. Libet famously showed that 
 127 
although the readiness potential can be observed up to 2.5sec before the onset of 
movement, people only become aware of their ‘urge’ to move (known as the W 
judgment) about 200ms before making a key press (Libet et al., 1983). It is not 
necessary to ask participants for the W judgment in order to calculate intentional 
binding, however, the urge to move is linked to the time at which a motor plan is 
specified (Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Wolpe & Rowe, 2014). Moreover, attention to 
the intention to move (i.e. to W) is associated with increased activity in the pre-
SMA, which is the source of the early readiness potential (Lau, Rogers, & 
Passingham, 2006). The participant’s judgment of when they moved (M) and their 
sense of when they felt the urge to move (W) are dissociable and they activate 
different neural circuits (Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, & Passingham, 2004). For 
example, the W but not M judgment is disrupted in Tourette’s syndrome (Moretto, 
Schwingenschuh, Katschnig, Bhatia, & Haggard, 2011). Given that interoceptive 
accuracy measures an individual’s consciousness of internal bodily signals, it has 
been suggested that a person with high interoceptive accuracy might have earlier 
access to awareness of their own actions and might therefore report earlier W 
judgments (Penton, Thierry, & Davis, 2014).  
 
In the light of the results of Experiments 4 and 5, which showed no relationship 
between interoceptive accuracy and action, it was hypothesised that interoceptive 
accuracy would not modulate action binding. However, interoceptive accuracy may 
be characterised as an individual’s tendency to attend preferentially to interoceptive 
signals (Herbert & Pollatos, 2012; Seth et al., 2011). This could imply that heartbeat 
perception will impact on effect binding. The resistance of people with high 
interoceptive accuracy to the rubber hand illusion (Tsakiris et al., 2011), has been 
interpreted as implying stronger feelings of body ownership and better ability to 
distinguish self from other, which might imply that they also feel a stronger sense 
of agency. 
 
A further advantage of the Libet paradigm is that sensory attenuation can be 
observed between the amplitude of the auditory-evoked potential for a randomly 
generated tone and the comparable evoked potential when the sound is produced by 
the participant’s own actions (Hughes, Desantis, & Waszak, 2013; Roussel, 
Hughes, & Waszak, 2013). Sensory attenuation is an essential aspect of self-
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generated action (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000; Shergill, Bays, Frith, & 
Wolpert, 2003) and is itself an indication that the individual is the author of the 
action. It has been proposed as an alternative measure of feelings of agency (Wolpe 
& Rowe, 2014). There are various theoretical explanations for sensory attenuation 
(Blakemore et al., 2002; Brown, Adams, Parees, Edwards, & Friston, 2013; Wolpe 
& Rowe, 2014) but all rely on the expected sensory consequences of the action. 
Sensory attenuation can be studied within the Libet paradigm as the difference in 
amplitude of the auditory-evoked potential between self-generated and computer-
generated tones. If interoceptive accuracy reflects the tendency to attend to 
interoceptive rather than exteroceptive consequences of an action, then sensory 
attenuation might be modulated by heartbeat perception. 
 
In Experiment 6 all participants performed the classic Libet clock experiment in six 
blocked conditions under EEG. They reported the time at which they had heard a 
computer-generated tone (the S judgment) or they made freely chosen, spontaneous 
button presses and reported either the time at which they had ‘felt the urge to move’ 
(the W judgment), or when they had made the button press (M judgment). In three 
further operant conditions (SO, WO and MO), similar judgments were required but 
now the participant’s button press caused an auditory tone. Intentional binding was 
calculated as the sum of action binding (the perceived shift in the timing of the 
movement towards the tone it causes) and effect binding (a perceived shift in the 
timing of the tone towards the action that created it) (Haggard et al., 2002). The 
amplitude of readiness potentials in all five conditions that involved movement 
were analysed, as well as the amplitude of auditory-evoked potentials in the 
conditions involving sound.  
 
There were six hypotheses. (i) It was anticipated that individual differences in the 
behavioural measures of agency (indexed by intentional binding) would be 
associated with individual differences in interoceptive accuracy. However, given 
that higher interoceptive accuracy does not appear to be associated with awareness 
of action in Experiments 4 and 5, it was expected that interoceptive accuracy would 
modulate effect binding but not action binding. (ii) It was similarly hypothesised 
that interoceptive accuracy would not be related to the amplitude of the readiness 
potentials in any condition; and moreover, (iii) that interoceptive accuracy would 
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not correlate with behavioural measures of the conscious awareness of the urge to 
move (the W judgment). (iv) Following the results of Jo et al. (2014), it was 
anticipated that effect binding would correlate with the amplitude of the early 
readiness potential. (v) Given that they are both measures of agency (Wolpe & 
Rowe, 2014), it was anticipated that effect binding would correlate with sensory 
attenuation, measured as the difference in amplitude between the auditory-evoked 
potential in the condition in which a tone was computer-generated (S) and the 
operant condition in which it was self-generated (SO). (vi) From the hypothesis that 
interoceptive accuracy would be linked to effect binding, it was further anticipated 
that interoceptive accuracy would correlate with sensory attenuation. Moreover, if 
people with high interoceptive accuracy attend preferentially to the interoceptive 
rather than the exteroceptive consequences of their actions, then it was expected 
that this correlation would be accounted for by a relationship between interoceptive 
accuracy and lower amplitude of the auditory-evoked potential in the SO condition. 
5.1.2 Methods  
5.1.2.1 Participants 
30 students (4 men) at Royal Holloway University of London took part for payment. 
All declared themselves right handed and used their right hand for key presses. Due 
to technical failure, data for one participant was lost in all three operant conditions 
and this individual was necessarily excluded. Data for a single participant who 
showed neither effect binding nor action binding was also excluded (following Jo 
et al., 2014). One participant recorded no data in the operant movement condition 
(MO) but data for the other five conditions was available and was included in the 
analysis wherever possible. There were therefore 28 participants (4 men), mean age 
20.3 years (SD = 3.0). The experiment was approved by the Ethics Committee of 
the Psychology Department, Royal Holloway University of London. 
5.1.2.2 Procedure 
Participants reported their gender, age, height and weight. They then performed the 
Mental Tracking Task, including the time modulus measure and finally completed 
the Libet experiment in all six conditions. 
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5.1.2.3 Interoceptive Accuracy 
Interoceptive accuracy was measured as in Experiment 1 (section 2.2.2.3). The 
participant’s ability to estimate elapsed time was assessed by the ‘time modulus’ 
measure, as described in Experiments 4 and 5 (section 4.2.2.3). 
5.1.2.4 Libet Paradigm 
The EEG experiment followed Libet’s classic paradigm (Libet et al., 1983). Stimuli 
were displayed on a standard PC, using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral 
Systems, Albany, CA). Participants sat at a distance of 50cm from the monitor, on 
which was displayed a white clock face, 13cm in diameter, marked from 5 to 60, in 
units of 5. A red dot rotated clockwise round the clock face, completing one rotation 
every 2,560ms. Participants were instructed to allow the dot to make at least one 
full rotation before making a voluntary and spontaneous key press, at a freely 
chosen time. The dot continued to rotate for a random period between 1.5s and 2.4s 
following the key press (Figure 5.1). After each trial, participants were prompted 
by the computer to make timing judgments. There were six conditions, each 
consisting of 40 trials, presented in blocks. The order of presentation of the 
conditions was counterbalanced. In the sound condition (S) the participants were 
instructed not to make any movement but to report when they had heard a computer-
generated sound that occurred at a random interval between 2.5s and 8s after the 
start of the trial. In the other five conditions participants made a spontaneous key 
press at a time of their own choosing. In the movement condition (M) they reported 
the time on the clock face at which they judged that they had made the freely chosen 
action. In the W condition they reported when they had first ‘felt the urge to move’. 
In each of three further operant conditions the computer generated a tone 250ms 
after the key press. In the operant movement condition (MO) participants were 
asked to report when they had made the spontaneous key press; in the operant ‘urge’ 
condition (WO) when they had first ‘felt the urge to move’; and in the operant sound 
condition (SO) when they had heard the sound that had been caused by their key 
press (Table 5.1).  
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Figure 5.1 Schematic Depiction of a Single Libet Trial 
 
 
EEG activity was recorded using Ag/AgCl electrodes, fixed with a head cap and 
electrolyte gel (BioSemi Active Two system). Impedance was kept below 5kΩ and 
the sampling rate was 512Hz. 64 electrodes were arranged using the 10/20 system, 
with a further 7 external electrodes (two were attached to the ear lobes, two recorded 
vertical and two horizontal eyes movement, one was placed on the left chest to 
provide heartbeat data).   
 
The EEG data was analysed using Brain Vision Analyzer software (Brain Products, 
Munich, Germany). Data was downsampled to 250Hz and re-reference to linked 
earlobes. Filters of 70Hz and 0.01Hz were applied. To analyse readiness potentials, 
data was segmented into epochs of -2500ms to +500ms, with respect to the key 
press. A baseline of 200ms (-2500ms to -2300ms) was applied. Artefact rejection 
was performed semi-automatically. The maximum voltage change allowed was 
80µv/ms, with lowest allowable activity 0.5µv. All epochs were visually inspected 
for movement artefacts and for trials in which participants made key presses 
without allowing a full rotation of the clock, so that a full readiness potential could 
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not be recorded.  No artefact correction was applied. 25% of trials were rejected, of 
which 9% were for not obeying the instructions and 16% for movement artefacts.  
 
In order to compare auditory-evoked potentials for the sound (S) and operant sound 
conditions (SO), an epoch of -100ms to +500ms was selected, with a baseline of -
100ms to sound onset (Figure 5.1). Filters and artefact rejection were applied as 
above. 14% of trials were rejected for movement artefacts. 
5.1.3 Results 
Behavioural Data  
5.1.3.1 Interoceptive Accuracy 
Interoceptive accuracy (IA) was calculated in the standard manner (section 2.2.2.4). 
Mean IA = .63, SD = .16 (median = .61). The time modulus measure of accuracy 
in estimating elapsed time was calculated similarly (section 4.2.2.3).  
 
5.1.3.2 Intentional Binding 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the mean timing judgments (Table 
5.1). The nature of the timing judgement (urge to move, actual movement, or 
perception of the sound) and whether the condition was operant vs. non-operant 
were within-subjects variables. Mauchley’s test of Sphericity was significant, so 
Greenhouse Geisser corrections were applied. There was a main effect of judgment, 
F(2, 52) = 25.20, p < .001, η2 = .49; and a main effect of whether the condition was 
operant or non-operant, F(1, 26) = 6.57, p = .02,  η2 = .20; as well as an interaction, 
F(2, 52) = 20.99, p < .001, η2 = .45. Paired samples t tests showed that the judgement 
of the timing of the sound differed significantly between the operant and non-
operant conditions (S and SO), t(27) = 6.68, p < .001. Similarly, the judgment of 
movement differed significantly between non-operant and operant conditions (M 
and MO), t(26) = 2.43, p = .02, indicating, respectively, significant effect binding 
and significant action binding. There was no significant difference between the W 
and WO judgements, t(27) = 0.34, p =.74.  
 
Intentional binding (Haggard et al., 2002) was calculated for each participant, from 
mean timing judgments, as the sum of effect binding (S - SO), whereby the sound 
was perceived as closer to the button press in the operant condition, and action 
binding (MO - M), whereby the participant perceived the time of movement as 
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closer to the sound in the operant condition. No outliers were excluded. Times for 
M, W, MO and WO were calculated with respect to the key press. Times for S and 
SO were measured with respect to the onset of sound. Negative values indicate that 
the judgment of time was in advance of the key press or the onset of the tone.  
 
Figure 5.2 Diagrammatic Representation of the Mean Results for the Six 
Measures 
 
The results indicated that intentional binding was driven by effect binding (Figure 
5.2 and Table 5.1). Two participants exhibited no effect binding, while eleven 
showed no action binding. Applying a less stringent criterion than Jo et al. (2014), 
who excluded all those participants demonstrating no effect binding, in this 
experiment the single participant who exhibited neither effect binding nor action 
binding was omitted from the analysis. 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics for Mean Judgment of Timing in each Condition 
and for Mean Effect Binding and Intentional Binding 
Measure  Judgment required from the 
participant 
Mean 
(ms) 
SD 
M No sound. Report when you pressed the 
key. 
-12.9 51.2 
W No sound. Report when you felt the urge 
to move 
-161.3 156.1 
S No key press. Report when you heard the 
computer-generated sound 
28.6 73.6 
MO Sound generated by the key press. Report 
when you pressed the key. 
18.6 78.2 
WO Sound generated by the key press. Report 
when you felt the urge to move. 
-166.5 178.6 
SO Sound generated by the key press. Report 
when you heard the sound. 
-87.9 85.5 
Effect binding S - SO 116.5 90.2 
Action binding MO - M 29.7 61.4 
Intentional 
binding 
(MO – M) + (S –SO) 138.5 102.0 
 
Interoceptive accuracy was significantly correlated with intentional binding (Table 
5.2), which was wholly accounted for by the correlation between interoceptive 
accuracy and effect binding. (Figure 5.3). Power was calculated, post hoc, for the 
given parameters, which are n = 28, and r = .39, α = .05, using a statistical table 
(www.statstodo.com/SSizCorr_Pgm.php), which indicated that the experiment was 
somewhat underpowered (power = .68). A sample size of 39 would be necessary 
for the generally recommended level of power of .8. 
 
Hypothesis (i) was thus confirmed. Interoceptive accuracy was correlated with 
effect binding. In the operant sound condition, the higher their interoceptive 
accuracy, the closer participants perceived the self-generated sound to the key press 
that had caused it. There was no relationship between interoceptive accuracy and 
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action binding, r = -.01, p = .95. Interoceptive accuracy was not correlated with the 
judgment of timing in any other condition, p > .58. Confirming hypothesis (iii), 
interoceptive accuracy was not related to the timing at which individuals reported 
their awareness of the urge to move: for W, r = -.07, p = .71; and for WO, r = .08, 
p = .70. Because a fundamental hypothesis of Experiment 6 was that interoceptive 
accuracy and effect binding would be correlated and that there would be no 
correlation between interoceptive accuracy and any other behavioural measure, no 
correction was made for multiple comparisons. 
 
Table 5.2 Correlations between Interoceptive Accuracy and the Behavioural 
Measures 
M  
 
r = -.11 
p = .60 
MO  
 
r = -.11 
p =.71 
MO - M  
(action binding) 
r = -.01 
p = .95 
Intentional binding 
r = .39 
p = .04* 
S 
 
r = .05 
p =.79 
SO 
 
r = -.36 
p = .06† 
S – SO 
(effect binding) 
r = .42 
p = .03* 
 
W 
 
r = -.07 
p = .71 
WO 
 
r = .08 
p = .70 
WO – W 
 
r = .23 
p = .25 
 
*significant at the 5% level 
†significant at the 10% level 
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Figure 5.3 Scatter Diagram Showing the Correlation of Interoceptive Accuracy 
and Effect Binding 
 
 
The time modulus measure (of participants’ ability to estimate the length of an 
elapsed interval) was correlated with interoceptive accuracy, r = .39, p = .04. To 
check for potential confounding effects, the time modulus measure, as well as the 
participant’s resting heart rate, were added as regressors into a multiple regression 
with effect binding as the dependent variable. Interoceptive accuracy was the sole 
significant predictor of effect binding. These results indicate that participants’ 
ability to estimate elapsed time and their true resting heart rates were not significant 
confounds in this experiment. 
 
EEG Data 
5.1.3.3 Readiness Potentials  
Readiness potentials were analysed as the average activity at the 9 frontocentral 
electrodes where activity was greatest during the trial epoch of -2500ms to +500ms 
(FC1, FCz, FC2, C1, Cz, C2, Cp1, CPz, CP2) (Figures 5.2 and 5.3).  
In the sound condition S, where the participants did not move but simply reported 
when they had heard a tone, the amplitude of the whole negative deflection, in the 
interval -2,300ms to the key press, did not differ significantly from zero, t(27) = 
0.48, p =  .63, confirming that, in the absence of movement, there was no readiness 
potential. 
 
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
E
ff
ec
t 
b
in
d
in
g
 (
m
s)
Interoceptive accuracy
 137 
Figure 5.4Readiness Potential, at Cz, for the Operant Conditions MO (black), 
WO (red), SO (blue), Grand Averages 
 
 
To compare the amplitudes of the readiness potentials in the other five conditions, 
which did involve movement, the readiness potential was split into an early RP 
component, from -2300 to -800ms, and a late RP, from -500ms to movement onset 
(Jo et al., 2014; Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006). Repeated measure ANOVA on the 
amplitudes of the PRs with early vs. late RP and condition (M, W, MO, WO, SO) 
as within-subjects variables, showed no main effect of condition F(4, 100) = 1.45, 
p = .22 and no interaction of early vs. late RP with conditions, F(4, 100) = 0.57, p 
= .67. There was the expected main effect of early vs. late RP, as the readiness 
potential naturally increases in amplitude over its time course, F(1, 100) = 46.4, p 
< .001 (Figure 5.2). 
 
In the operant sound condition SO, the correlation was significant between mean 
effect binding for a given individual and mean amplitude of the early RP for that 
participant, r = -.40, p = .04. However, a similar correlation of effect binding and 
the amplitude of the late RP in SO was not significant, r = -.29, p = .14, confirming 
hypothesis (iv) and replicating the results of Jo et al. (2014). -In this experiment but 
not in Jo et al., there was a significant relationship between effect binding and the 
amplitude of the whole RP, r = -.42, p = .03. Effect binding was not correlated with 
the amplitude of the early or late RP in any other experimental condition, p > .51.   
 
Interoceptive accuracy was not correlated with the amplitude of the early or late RP 
in either condition M or MO, p > .66, therefore hypothesis (ii) was confirmed. 
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Interoceptive accuracy did not affect the preparation of action. Moreover, 
interoceptive accuracy was not correlated with the amplitude of the early or the late 
RP in either condition W or condition WO, p > .43, further confirming hypothesis 
(iii) that there was no relationship between interoceptive accuracy and the W 
judgment. Interoceptive accuracy was not correlated with the amplitude of the early 
or late RP in condition SO, p > .60. 
5.1.3.4 Auditory-evoked Potentials 
Taking the average amplitude of the same 9 electrodes (FC1, FCz, FC2, C1, Cz, 
C2, CP1, CPz, CP2), the N1 component of the auditory-evoked potential, was 
visible in the interval 100-200ms, peaking around 155ms (Figures 5.3 and 5.4).  
 
The grand averages for auditory-evoked potentials for the sound condition S and 
the operant sound condition SO were compared (Figure 5.4). Comparison of the 
latency of the peak of N1 for the grand averages, showed that N1 peaked 
significantly earlier in the operant sound condition SO, t(27) = 4.1, p < .001, (Wolpe 
et al., 2013).  
 
Figure 5.5 Comparison of the Scalp Distribution of Auditory-Evoked Potentials, 
at Cz, for Conditions S and SO, from Grand Averages
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Figure 5.6 Auditory-Evoked Potentials for the Sound Condition (S) and the 
Operant Sound Condition (SO), Grand Averages 
 
Repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with four time intervals (0-100ms, 
100-200ms, 200-300ms and 300-400ms) and two conditions (S vs. SO) as within-
subjects variables. Mauchley’s test of Sphericity was significant, so Greenhouse-
Geisser corrections were applied. The ANOVA demonstrated a main effect of 
condition (S vs. SO), F(1, 28) = 9.62, p = .004; and of time interval, F(4, 84) = 84.7, 
p < .001; as well as an interaction F(3, 81) = 29.4, p < .001, (Figure 5.4). Paired 
samples t tests showed that the amplitude of the auditory-evoked potentials differed 
significantly in each of the three time intervals 100-200ms, 200-300ms and 300-
400ms, p < .03. The auditory-evoked potential in the SO condition had a less 
negative amplitude in S than SO, in time interval 100-200ms; and less positive 
amplitude, in time intervals 200-300ms and 300-400ms, reflecting attenuated 
auditory processing of the self-generated sound. 
 
In order to explore the sensory attenuation of N1, the interval 140-170ms was 
selected (following van Elk, Lenggenhager, Heydrich, & Blanke, 2014). In this time 
interval, effect binding correlated with sensory attenuation, measured as the 
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difference between the amplitude of N1 in conditions S and SO, r = .38, p = .04, 
confirming hypothesis (v) (Figure 5.5). 
 
Figure 5.7 Scatterplot for the Correlation between Effect Binding and Sensory 
Attenuation 
 
 
Interoceptive accuracy, however, was not correlated with sensory attenuation 
(measured as the difference between the amplitudes of N1 in S and SO in the 
interval 140-170ms), r = -.04, p = .83, contrary to hypothesis (vi). Nor was 
interoceptive accuracy correlated with the mean amplitudes of either evoked 
potential in this time interval: in condition S, r = .19, p = .32; and in condition SO, 
r = .26, p = .19. 
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Table 5.3 Multiple Regression (entry method) with Effect Binding as the 
Dependent Variable 
Predictor Adjusted R2  
(Sig.) 
 R2  
Step 1 
Sensory Attenuation  
(Sig.) 
 
 
 
.12  
(.04*) 
  
.39 
(.04*) 
Step 2 
Sensory Attenuation 
(Sig.) 
Interoceptive Accuracy  
(Sig.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.26  
(.01**) 
 
 
 
 
 
.14 
 
.41 
(.02*) 
.40 
(.02*) 
Step 3 
Sensory Attenuation (SA) 
(Sig.) 
Interoceptive Accuracy (IA) 
(Sig.) 
Interaction of SA and IA 
(Sig.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.26  
(.03*) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
.41 
(.02*) 
.40 
(.03*) 
-.06 
(.75) 
*significant at the 5% level 
**significant at the 1% level 
 
The various relationships between effect binding, sensory attenuation and 
interoceptive accuracy were explored further using multiple regression (entry 
method). Interoceptive accuracy and the sensory attenuation of the N1 component 
(measured as the difference in the amplitudes between the two conditions, S and 
SO, for the interval 140-170ms) together accounted for 26% of the variance in effect 
binding (Table 5.3). Power was calculated, post hoc, for the given parameters, 
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which are sample size = 28, two regressors, r2 = .26 and α level of .05, using a 
statistical table (www.statstodo.com/SSizMReg_Pgm.php), which indicated power 
= .74. A sample size of 33 would be required for the more generally recommended level 
of power = .8. These two regressors appear to have independent influence, as their 
interaction did not add to the explanatory power of the model. The time modulus 
measure was added to the multiple regression, as a potential confound. This had no 
significant effect and did not improve the explanatory power of the model. 
5.1.4 Discussion 
Intentional binding was calculated using the Libet clock method and the Haggard 
task with operant actions. Readiness potentials and auditory-evoked potentials were 
recorded with EEG. Participants were required to make judgments about timing in 
six conditions. These were: M when they had made a spontaneous key press; W 
when they had first felt the urge to move; S when they had heard a computer-
generated sound; plus three further operant conditions in which the key press was 
followed by a sound and the timing judgments required were: MO when they had 
pressed the key; WO when they had felt the urge to move; and SO when they had 
heard the sound caused by their action. Intentional binding was calculated from the 
behavioural data as the sum of effect binding (S - SO) and action binding (MO - M) 
(Haggard et al., 2002). Interoceptive accuracy was positively correlated with 
intentional binding and this was wholly concentrated in effect binding. In the 
operant sound condition (SO) only, the amplitude of the early readiness potential (-
2300ms to -800ms, before the key press) was correlated with effect binding, 
replicating a recent report by Jo et al. (2014). Action binding was not linked to the 
amplitude of either the early or the late readiness potential in any condition. There 
was no link between interoceptive accuracy and action binding. Interoceptive 
accuracy was not related to the judgment of when participants felt the urge to move 
(W or WO), nor to the amplitude of the readiness potentials in conditions W or WO, 
indicating that the awareness of internal bodily cues indexed by interoceptive 
accuracy does not impact on awareness of the preparation of a movement. Effect 
binding was correlated with sensory attenuation, measured as the difference in 
amplitude of the N1 component of the auditory evoked potential between the sound 
only (S) and operant sound (SO) conditions, in the interval 140-170ms post stimulus 
onset, confirming reports that the two are equivalent measures of agency (Wolpe & 
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Rowe, 2014). Moreover the auditory-evoked potential produced by the self-
generated sound peaked significantly earlier than for the identical computer-
generated sound. This is in accordance with a theory that an action primes the 
representation of its predicted sensory consequences and thus increases the 
excitability of its neural representation (Waszak et al., 2012), so that the expected 
tone reaches the threshold of detectability earlier (Wolpe et al., 2013). Interoceptive 
accuracy and sensory attenuation were not correlated but together accounted for 
25% of the variance in effect binding.  
 
There are a number of potential explanations for these findings. Importantly in this 
experiment, interoceptive accuracy was correlated with effect binding and not with 
action binding, which depend on separable processes (Haggard, 2008; Wolpe et al., 
2013). Feelings of agency rely on both predictive and postdictive (reconstructive 
inference) cues, which are motor and sensory (Moore et al., 2009). In contrast to 
action binding, effect binding potentially depends on the predicted exteroceptive 
consequences of the action and is linked to sensory attenuation (Waszak et al., 2012; 
Wolpe et al., 2013). It can therefore be assumed that interoceptive accuracy 
modulated effect binding through the predicted sensory consequences of the action.  
 
The underlying bases of action binding and effect binding remain unclear (Wolpe 
et al., 1013). Effect binding appears to rely on predictive processes, whereby a 
signal is sent from the pre-SMA, carrying information about the expected sensory 
consequences of the action (Moore et al., 2010). This signal is an activation of the 
learned SR bond between an action and its sensory effects. Expectations therefore 
powerfully influence the sense of agency, by modulating the extent to which these 
associative bonds are activated (Moore & Fletcher, 2012). It has been proposed that 
this signal from the pre-SMA preactivates sensory processing, so that the predicted 
auditory consequences (in this experiment) reach the perceptual threshold more 
rapidly (Waszak et al., 2012).  
 
That interoception necessarily plays a role in movement is implicit in the 
evolutionary purpose of action, which is to meet homeostatic needs and/or fulfil 
Darwinian drives. Many freely chosen actions in the real world are selected for their 
important interoceptive consequences (Quattrocki and Friston, 2014). A person’s 
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sense of agency will rely on the stimulus-response bonds that they learn, between 
actions and their interoceptive as well as exteroceptive consequences. Curiously, 
some people seem to have a stronger sense of agency than others, as evidenced by 
- as yet unexplained - individual differences in intentional binding (Wolpe et al., 
2013). Potentially, people with high interoceptive accuracy may, over their 
lifetimes, develop stronger action-effect associative bonds than those in whom 
interoceptive accuracy is low, because these individuals have the regular benefit of 
salient input about the self-specifying, interoceptive effects of all their actions. 
These people may therefore have generally stronger action-effect bonds and hence 
habitually greater feelings of agency, which could influence the results in this 
experiment, despite the limited interoceptive consequences of the particular button 
pressing action. People with poor interoceptive accuracy, by contrast may have 
weaker input from the interoceptive consequences of their actions and therefore 
experience a generally less strong sense of agency. Although highly speculative, 
such an explanation might account for the results of Experiment 6 and merits further 
investigation. 
 
Potentially, the ability to judge time might also play a role in these findings. Hughes 
and colleagues have criticised the intentional binding paradigm used in this 
experiment because it cannot distinguish between the participant’s ability to predict 
when a sensory event will occur (‘temporal prediction’) and their ability to use their 
own action to predict/control when the event will happen (‘temporal control’) 
(Hughes et al., 2013). It has been shown that attention to interoceptive processes 
improves the retrospective estimation of time (Pollatos, Laubrock, & Wittmann, 
2014). Further research is, therefore, required to establish whether the link between 
interoceptive accuracy and effect binding in Experiment 6 might be mediated by 
individual differences in the perception of time (Meissner & Wittmann, 2011). 
However, effect binding relies on the judgement of the timing of a sensation that 
has been produced by one’s own action, whereas the reported links between 
interoceptive accuracy and timing relate to an individual’s accuracy in explicitly 
judging the length of an elapsed interval. This explanation therefore seems unlikely, 
given that the time modulus measure in this experiment had no influence on the 
relationship between interoceptive accuracy, effect binding and sensory attenuation 
(Table 5.3).  
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Postdictive, top-down, motivational and emotional priors linked to interoceptive 
accuracy, such as mood or how the participant construed the social context, might 
have influenced the results presented here (Synofzik et al., 2008b). Where links 
have previously been found between interoceptive accuracy and variables such as 
memory or intuitive decision-making, the effects can often be attributed to the 
association between interoceptive accuracy and emotional arousal (Dunn, Galton, 
et al., 2010; Pollatos & Schandry, 2008; Wiens, 2005). Feelings of agency are also 
modulated by affective state (Synofzik et al., 2008b). Thus, effect binding is 
stronger when outcomes are positively emotionally valenced or are associated with 
a monetary reward (Takahata et al., 2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). Moreover, 
‘affective style’, which describes an individual’s ability to regulate emotion, also 
influences feelings of agency, for example in depersonalisation disorder, which is 
characterised by emotion suppression, reduced feelings of agency and low 
interoceptive accuracy (Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014). It was consequently important 
that the simple Libet task used in Experiment 6 had neutral cues without affective 
significance. The positive correlation found between interoceptive accuracy and 
intentional binding in this study is therefore unlikely to be mediated by emotion but 
more probably depends on the role that interoception plays in delineating the self. 
This role is predicted by the theoretical literature that links interoception with the 
experience of selfhood but has rarely been subject to empirical investigation (Craig, 
2010; Seth et al., 2011). It is unlikely that the results depended on enhanced 
motivation amongst people with high interoceptive accuracy, as this would have 
been observed in increased amplitude of the readiness potential, which is influenced 
by the level of intentionality of the participant (Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006).  
 
It is similarly unlikely that interoceptive accuracy had its effect on intentional 
binding through predictive motor processes at the pre-conceptual level (Wolpe & 
Rowe, 2014). This would have impacted on action binding, or on the amplitude of 
the late readiness potentials in condition M or MO, which was not observed in this 
experiment. Similarly, the timing of the urge to move (the W judgement) was not 
linked to interoceptive accuracy. These results therefore tend to confirm the 
findings of Experiment 4 and 5, which concluded that interoceptive accuracy does 
not modulate the preparation of action in these types of button-pressing paradigms 
where the interoceptive consequences of the action are small.  
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The experiment had a number of limitations. Variables not measured included 
anxiety, schizotypy and the ability to divide one’s attention between competing 
cues, which have top-down modulating effects on intentional binding or on 
interoceptive accuracy (Matthias et al., 2009; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Wolpe & 
Rowe, 2014). The experiment was potentially underpowered, with a large number 
of error trials caused either by movement artefacts, or by participant’s failure to 
follow instructions. While 40 trials are sufficient to extract readiness potentials, 
more are recommended for auditory-evoked potentials (Luck, 2005; Roussel et al., 
2013). However, it is unlikely that this would account for the absence of any link 
between interoceptive accuracy and sensory attenuation.  
5.1.5 Conclusion 
Interoceptive accuracy, measured by heartbeat perception, correlated with effect 
binding, measured as the perceived shift in timing of a self-generated sound towards 
the key press that caused it, compared with a condition in which the tone was 
computer-generated. Effect binding was correlated with the amplitude of the early 
readiness potential (from -2300 to -800ms with respect to the action), in the operant 
sound condition, confirming a recent report (Jo et al., 2014).  However, 
interoceptive accuracy was not correlated with the amplitude of the early or late 
readiness potential in any condition of the experiment, implying that heartbeat 
perception does not modulate the preparation of action in this experimental context. 
Effect binding correlated with the sensory attenuation of self-generated sound for 
the N1 component of the auditory-evoked potential, defined as the difference 
between the amplitude around the N1 peak in the two sound conditions. However, 
interoceptive accuracy was not related to this measure of sensory attenuation. The 
results may be explained if people with high interoceptive accuracy habitually 
attend to the interoceptive consequences of their actions. These would then be a 
source of additional input to the SR bonds that individuals learn between their 
actions and the resultant effects, which could lead to a stronger general sense of 
agency in people with high interoceptive accuracy.  
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Chapter 6. Discussing Interoceptive Accuracy and Aspects 
of Self-processing 
6.1 Summary  
The purpose of the experiments presented in this thesis was to investigate how 
interoceptive accuracy, measured by the Mental Tracking Method (Schandry, 
1981), modulates aspects of self-processing. The research was based on the 
fundamental assumption that the interoceptive senses provide a set of (often 
neglected) sensory inputs in contexts that rely on multisensory and/or sensorimotor 
integration. This characterisation of interoception reflects the early work of 
anatomists such as Sherrington and Pavlov, who demonstrated the presence of 
receptors within the body, showing that they affect emotion, behaviour and 
cognition, with or without awareness (Ádám, 2010; Cameron, 2002; Sherrington, 
1899; Vaitl, 1996). The experiments fall into two strands. The first three considered 
how interoceptive accuracy interacts with exteroceptive attention to the self, while 
the latter three investigated whether movement preparation, agency and self/other 
distinction in the domain of action are modulated by interoceptive accuracy (Figure 
6.1). 
Figure 6.1 Overall Schematic Diagram of the Experiments and Principal 
Conclusions of this Thesis (principal conclusion are in red font).  
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6.1.1 Investigating the Interaction of Interoceptive and Exteroceptive 
Representations of the Self 
 
It was assumed throughout this thesis that the self is a sensorimotor process (Ruby 
& Legrand, 2007) which is the product of multiple inputs in different modalities 
(Apps & Tsakiris, 2013). As the interoceptive senses are uniquely self-specifying 
(Legrand & Ruby, 2009), they are potentially important in helping to distinguishing 
‘self’ from ‘other’. It has been established that interoceptive and exteroceptive 
representations of the self interact in body ownership, which is a fundamental aspect 
of self (Aspell et al., 2013; Suzuki et al., 2013; Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2013; 
Tsakiris et al., 2011). It was therefore hypothesised that heightened attention to 
exteroceptive aspects of the self would interact with interoceptive representations 
in other experimental settings. The potential for such interaction was the subject of 
Experiments 1, 2 and 3 (Figure 6.1). 
 
Experiment 1 drew on a manipulation commonly employed in social psychology, 
where self-awareness has been studied in terms of self-focus. An early experiment 
(Weisz et al., 1988) reported that the accidental presence of a mirror improved 
performance on one, but not on another, measure of heartbeat perception. 
Experiment 1 employed instructed and controlled use of a mirror to heighten 
attention to the self, with a relatively large, heterogeneous sample of participants. 
Interoceptive accuracy in a baseline condition, where participants looked at a blank 
screen, was contrasted with the same measure while they gazed at their face in a 
mirror. Results demonstrated that mirror self-observation increased the heartbeat 
perception scores of people who had below median interoceptive accuracy in the 
baseline.  
 
It was not clear whether the effect in Experiment 1 relied on real time self-
observation or could be induced with a still self-photograph. Moreover, models of 
the self typically discriminate between ‘bodily’ and ‘narrative’ selves (Damasio, 
2010; James, 1890). Within that tradition, it has been assumed that a mirror 
enhances attention to bodily aspects of the self. However, according to both 
predictive coding accounts of the self (Apps & Tsakiris, 2013) and the ‘perceptual 
accuracy hypothesis’ (Silvia & Gendolla, 2001), any type of heightened self-focus 
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will improve the accuracy of judgments about the self. Experiment 2 therefore 
tested whether heartbeat perception could be improved by stimuli designed to 
enhance attention to narrative aspects of the self. Participants performed the Mental 
Tracking task in three conditions. In the baseline they gazed at a blank screen; in 
the ‘self-face’ condition they looked at a photograph; and in the ‘self-relevant 
words’ condition they saw self-generated words, that were designed to enhance 
attention to narrative aspects of themselves. Both experimental manipulations 
raised interoceptive accuracy, compared with the baseline. Similarly to Experiment 
1, the effect was concentrated in people whose scores in the baseline were below 
the median value for interoceptive accuracy generally reported in large samples. 
 
An essential aspect of human self-awareness, invoked by self-focus, is the ability 
to perceive ourselves as the object of our own and other people’s perception (Duval 
& Wicklund, 1972). In the original literature on ‘self-objectification’ Fredrickson 
and Roberts proposed that women’s tendency to prioritise awareness of their bodies 
from a third-person, objectified perspective accounts for reported gender 
differences in interoceptive accuracy (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Experiment 3 
tested this hypothesis, examining whether the tendency for women to self-objectify 
is related to their interoceptive accuracy measured by heartbeat perception. Results 
indicated that scores for heartbeat perception, together with Public and Private 
Body Consciousness (Miller et al., 1981), accounted for a substantial proportion of 
the variance in reported Self-objectification. Awareness of their bodies from within 
appears to give women some protection against self-objectification.  
 
The results of Experiments 1 to 3 contribute to a growing literature showing that 
interoceptive and exteroceptive representations interact. They support the concept 
that the interoceptive senses provide a crucial set of self-specifying input in 
multisensory contexts (Aspell et al., 2013; Suzuki et al., 2013; Tsakiris et al., 2011). 
However, the possible impact of interoceptive senses in the action system has 
previously been ignored. Experiments 4, 5 and 6 were accordingly designed to 
probe the effect of interoceptive accuracy on self/other distinction in the action 
system, employing three classic experimental paradigms (Figure 6.1).   
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6.1.2 Interoception and the Action System 
A growing body of research demonstrates that the interoceptive senses contribute 
to the multisensory integration that underpins body ownership. However, 
interoception must have impact in the action system, given that the fundamental 
basis of all action is to fulfil an organism’s homeostatic goals and drives which are 
signalled interoceptively (Craig, 2010; Damasio, 2010). Recent theoretical 
accounts of action propose that movement is coded in terms of its sensory 
consequences (Catmur et al., 2009; Karl Friston, 2009; Hommel, 2009; Schütz-
Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). That this must include the interoceptive consequences of 
action appears to have been largely overlooked (Heyes & Bird, 2007). The aim of 
Experiments 4, 5 and 6 was to explore the potential role of interoception in the 
domain of action. Three well-established paradigm were selected, that relate 
respectively to joint action, the involuntary imitation of an observed action and 
volition (freely chosen action). 
 
In joint action, people must represent their own action and that of the coactor, while 
maintaining the distinction between self and other. Experiment 4 employed the 
‘social Simon task’ to investigate whether the modulating effects of interoceptive 
accuracy on self/other overlap in body ownership illusions would extend to joint 
action. All participants performed the Simon task in three conditions, with two sets 
of stimuli, which were pictures of hands and arrows. In the ‘two-choice’ condition 
they responded with both hands (e.g. right for red cues and left for green) by making 
a key press when they saw a colour cue (e.g. red), while ignoring an irrelevant 
aspect of the cue, which was the direction (right or left) in which the stimulus was 
pointing. The ‘Simon effect’ refers to the robust finding that people are faster on 
trials where the directional cue is congruent with the colour cue (e.g. red points 
right) and slower on incongruent trials (Simon & Berbaum, 1990). This reaction 
time difference is termed the ‘congruency effect’ (Hommel, 2011). In the 
‘individual’ condition participants responded with the right hand only to one colour 
(e.g. red). No congruency effect is anticipated in this condition. In the crucial 
‘social’ condition they again responded with only their right hand (e.g. to the red 
cues) while a coactor now sat on their left and responded to the other colour cues.  
In this social condition a congruency effect has been observed and is known as the 
‘social Simon effect’ (Natalie Sebanz et al., 2003). It has been attributed to 
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participants involuntarily representing the motor program of the confederate. The 
effect is therefore potentially a measure of self/other overlap in the domain of 
action. It was hypothesised that participants with high interoceptive accuracy would 
make better self/other distinctions and would therefore demonstrate a smaller social 
Simon effect. However, no significant relationships were found, either because the 
social Simon task is flawed and is confounded by spatial distraction (Dolk et al., 
2011), or because interoceptive accuracy does not modulate self/other distinction 
in this context. 
 
Experiment 5 employed a further measure of self/other distinction in the action 
system. The congruency effect in ‘automatic imitation’ was measured using a well-
validated paradigm (Brass et al., 2001). Participants were required to lift either their 
index (1) or middle (2) finger when they saw the numeral 1 or 2 respectively. These 
numerals appeared against the background of a videoed hand, which performed 
finger-lifting actions that might be congruent, incongruent or neutral with respect 
to the required action. The congruency effect was calculated as the difference 
between the participant’s (faster) reaction times on congruent trials, where the 
numeral (e.g. 2) corresponded to the finger (i.e. middle) that the participant was 
required to lift, versus reaction times on incongruent trials. Smaller congruency 
effects have been found with enhanced self-focus and the task is thought to index 
the ability to make self/other distinctions (Spengler et al., 2010). It was 
hypothesised that good heartbeat perceivers would demonstrate better self/other 
distinction and hence smaller congruency effects. Surprisingly, high interoceptive 
accuracy was correlated with larger congruency effects and this was entirely 
accounted for by incongruent trials, indicating that it depended on ‘output 
modulation’ by some unidentified social top-down effect (Heyes, 2011). There was 
no relationship between heartbeat perception and reaction times on congruent trials, 
indicating that interoceptive accuracy did not modulate the preparation of action in 
this experiment.   
 
For Experiment 6, a paradigm was chosen that specifically separates sensory and 
action effects and includes EEG recording of readiness potentials and auditory-
evoked potentials. The experiment investigated whether interoceptive accuracy 
modulates ‘intentional binding’ (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002), using the 
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classic Libet clock (Libet et al., 1983). Participants made spontaneous key presses, 
in six blocked conditions, and reported the following judgments: W when they had 
first felt the ‘urge’ to move; M when they had made a key press: WO when they 
had felt the urge to move in an operant condition that resulted in a tone; MO when 
they judged that they had made the key press in the operant condition; SO when 
they had heard the tone in the operant condition; and finally, in a condition without 
movement by the participant, S when they had heard a randomly generated tone. 
From the behavioural data, intentional binding was calculated as the sum of ‘effect 
binding’ (S - SO) (indicating how the sound in the operant condition was perceived 
as shifted towards the key press) and ‘action binding’ (MO - M) (indicating how 
the perceived time of the button press in the operant condition was shifted towards 
the sound). Interoceptive accuracy was positively correlated with intentional 
binding and this was wholly accounted for by a correlation with effect binding. 
Interoceptive accuracy was unrelated to the amplitudes of the readiness potentials 
(RPs) in any condition, indicating that the preparation of the action was not affected 
by heartbeat perception scores. However, in the operant sound condition, the 
amplitude of the early RP (from -2300ms to -800ms, with respect to the button 
press) correlated with effect binding, replicating a recent report (Jo et al., 2014). 
Moreover, the behavioural measure of effect binding (S - SO) was correlated with 
sensory attenuation of the tone, measured as the difference between the amplitude 
of the auditory-evoked potentials in the sound (S) and operant sound (SO) 
conditions, in the intervals 140-170ms, which included the peak of the N1 
component (van Elk et al., 2014). Together interoceptive accuracy and sensory 
attenuation explained a significant portion of the variance in effect binding. 
However, these two predictors were not inter-correlated and appear to act 
independently. An outline of the six experiments and the principal findings of this 
thesis are shown in Figure 6.1. In this diagram ellipses represent the results of the 
experiments. Principal conclusions are in red font.  
6.2 Methodological Issues  
6.2.1 Confounds of Heartbeat Perception Tasks 
Heartbeat perception tasks are reportedly confounded by gender, body mass index 
(BMI) and cardiovascular parameters (Ádám, 2010; Vaitl, 1996). Moreover, these 
factors potentially interact, for example, women generally have more body fat and 
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smaller hearts than men (Jones, 1995). Performance on the Whitehead method of 
heartbeat perception (Whitehead & Drescher, 1980) declines with age (Khalsa, 
Rudrauf, & Tranel, 2009), possibly through reduced fitness, although this result has 
not been reported for the Mental Tracking Method.  
 
A large number of people were tested using Mental Tracking during the 
experiments presented in this thesis (see the Appendix). Gender, age and resting 
heart rate were available for all these individuals. In most experiments, participants 
reported their weight and height, from which body mass index (BMI) was 
calculated. This data was analysed to examine the potential impact of confounds on 
the experimental findings (discussed in the Appendix). 
 
A robust and reliable finding, across all studies, was that heartbeat perception and 
resting heart rate were negatively correlated, in both genders, indicating that slow 
hearts are more easily counted. This was seen in almost every experimental sample 
and is likely to depend on cardiovascular variables, such as the larger stoke volume 
associated with a slower heart.  
 
There were no gender differences in interoceptive accuracy, BMI, or the ability to 
estimate elapsed time, although men had significantly slower (possibly larger) 
hearts. In males only, there was a positive correlation of self-reported BMI and 
interoceptive accuracy but this became nonsignificant when heart rate was 
partialled out because higher BMI was associated with a slower heart rate in men. 
 
In this large data set, the correlation between age and interoceptive accuracy 
measured by the Mental Tracking Method was nonsignificant. Potentially the 
difference between this result and that reported using the Whitehead method 
(Khalsa, Rudrauf, & Tranel, 2009) is that the latter task relies on the integration of 
an interoceptive signal (the heartbeat) with exteroceptive signals (a set of tones), 
which may become more difficult with age.  
 
 
 
 154 
6.2.2 Validity of the Mental Tracking Method 
The Mental Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981), used throughout this thesis, has 
been subject to considerable criticism. In particular, it has been suggested that 
participants guess their heartbeats by counting seconds (Brener & Ring, 1995; Dunn 
et al., 2010; Ring & Brener, 1996). In Experiments 4, 5 and 6, participants were 
asked to estimate the length of short intervals of elapsed time, from which a ‘time 
modulus’ measure of accuracy was calculated (Dunn et al., 2010).  
 
If people perform the Mental Tracking Task by simply counting seconds, they could 
be expected to be accurate (and thus to be apparently good heartbeat perceivers) if 
their heart rates happen to beat at around 60bpm i.e. if their hearts are slow. During 
the task, individuals almost always count fewer than the correct number of 
heartbeats, which might tend to support this interpretation. In this large data set the 
time modulus measure was positively correlated with interoceptive accuracy, which 
could imply that people were counting elapsed time in the Mental Tracking task. 
Partial correlations showed that when heart rate was controlled, interoceptive 
accuracy and the time modulus continued to be correlated.  
 
The time modulus measure and the participant’s resting heart rate were therefore 
treated as potential confounds of interoceptive accuracy throughout the experiments 
presented in this thesis. This is discussed further in the Appendix. These confounds 
could not, however, account for the changes in interoceptive accuracy observed in 
Experiments 1 and 2, where they would have applied equally in all experimental 
conditions. In Experiment 3, heart rate and the interaction of heart rate and 
interoceptive accuracy were added as extra regressors but contributed nothing to 
the power of the regression model in explaining self-objectification. In Experiment 
4, confounds of heartbeat perception are unlikely to have been responsible for the 
failure to find any significant effect of interoceptive accuracy on the social Simon 
effect, which more probably depended on the flawed experimental paradigm. In 
Experiments 5 and 6, resting hearts rates and the time modulus measure (and the 
interactions of these variables) were entered as additional regressors in all multiple 
regression equations but had no significant effect on the results. 
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6.2.3 Limitations of Applicability to other Interoceptive Modalities 
An important limitation of the results presented in this thesis it that it has not been 
established that awareness of heartbeats correlates reliably with the ability to detect 
interoceptive signals in other interoceptive modalities. Two studies have found 
links between heartbeat perception and visceral sensation (Herbert, Muth, Pollatos, 
& Herbert, 2012; Whitehead & Drescher, 1980, but see also Horing, Kugel, 
Brenner, Zipfel, & Enck, 2013). However, no relationship has been reported 
between heartbeat perception and signals from the respiratory system (Harver et al., 
1993). The results presented in this thesis must therefore be interpreted primarily in 
relation to interoceptive signals from within the cardiovascular system.  
6.3 Implications for the Role of Interoception in Self-processing 
6.3.1 Summary Conclusions from Experiments 1, 2 and 3 
Taken together, the results of Experiments 1, 2 and 3 extend the literature that 
demonstrates interactions between exteroceptive and interoceptive representations 
of the self at the sensory level. They support the theory that interoceptive signals 
contribute to the multisensory integration that underpins the self. Importantly, 
Experiment 3 implies that trait interoceptive accuracy indexes the reliability and 
salience of interoceptive cues and can be characterised as the capacity for, and habit 
of attention to, interoceptive signals.  
6.3.2 Summary Conclusions from Experiments 4, 5 and 6 
Experiment 6 provided further support for the conclusion that interoception 
contributes to the integration of self-relevant information from many sensory 
modalities. There was a significant correlation in that Experiment between high 
interoceptive accuracy and judgment of the timing of the tone caused by the 
participant’s action, implying that interoception impacts on judgements that rely on 
activating SR bonds between an action and its predicted sensory consequences. 
 
In marked contrast to the role of interoceptive accuracy in distinguishing self from 
other in contexts that rely on the multisensory integration, the results of 
Experiments 4 and 5 imply that people with good heartbeat perceivers do not make 
better self/other distinctions in the motor domain. Moreover, the EEG evidence in 
Experiment 6 demonstrated that interoceptive accuracy was not linked to the 
preparation of action, in any condition, as indexed by the amplitude of the readiness 
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potentials. Furthermore, at the behavioural level, Experiment 6, found no 
correlation between interoceptive accuracy and action binding.  
 
However, the modulating effect of interoceptive accuracy on self/other distinction 
has previously been demonstrated only in body ownership paradigms, where the 
engagement of autonomic factors (which are coded interoceptively) has been 
clearly shown (Barnsley et al., 2012; Ehrsson et al., 2007; Moseley et al., 2008). A 
possible explanation for the failure to find any modulation of action by 
interoceptive accuracy in Experiments 4, 5 and 6 is that the actions involved in these 
studies did not have sufficiently strong interoceptive effects. Actions that have 
significant interoceptive consequences are potentially limited to those that fulfil 
drives, maintain homeostasis or involve substantial social interaction (Quattrocki & 
Friston, 2014). An example is given by Katkin and colleague’s masked fear 
conditioning experiment, where electric shocks were used to give some of the 
stimuli interoceptive consequences (Katkin et al., 2001), with the result that the 
ability of participants to discriminate between stimulus type was modulated by the 
individual’s interoceptive accuracy. By contrast, the interoceptive consequences of 
key presses in Experiments 4, 5 and 6 are likely to have been too small for 
individual differences to have measureable impact. Potential ways to add 
interoceptive effects to experimental conditions is discussed further in section 6.5 
below. 
 
The evidence from all the successful experiments presented in this thesis can be 
explained if good heartbeat perceivers are people who habitually attend to and 
weight their interoceptive signals, potentially at the expense of attention to 
exteroception. This idea is fundamental to the predictive coding model presented 
below. 
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6.4 A Predictive Coding Account of Individual Differences in 
Interoceptive Accuracy 
Why people can detect their heartbeats has never been adequately explained 
(Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2012). According to predictive coding accounts of cortical 
function, heartbeat perception should scarcely be possible and the phenomenon 
requires explanation. The strength, rhythm, and variability of one’s own heartbeat 
is constantly present throughout one’s life and should therefore be fully predicted 
by the brain. Support for the habituation of the brain to heartbeat signals is provided 
by van Elk and colleagues, who recently showed that the N1 auditory evoked 
potential is attenuated when people are played their own heartbeats, compared with 
similar stimuli (van Elk et al., 2014). This is to be expected for a constantly present 
and predictable stimulus.  
 
The model presented below (section 6.4.2.5) attempts to explain how heartbeat 
perception occurs and proposes that individual differences in heartbeat perception 
can be characterised in terms of individual differences in ‘precision’ in the 
interoceptive system. It is necessary first to outline the theoretical elements that 
make up predictive coding models. 
6.4.1 Preliminary Predictive Coding Concepts 
The predictive coding framework (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010) provides a general 
model of brain function with great depth and potential explanatory power (Hohwy, 
2010). Perception (Friston, 2012); action (Adams et al., 2012); attention (Feldman 
& Friston, 2010); and learning (Moran et al., 2013) have all been described within 
a predictive coding framework. Interoception has recently been added to this 
framework (Seth et al., 2011; Seth, 2013) but individual differences in interoceptive 
accuracy have scarcely been considered (Fotopoulou, 2013; Seth et al., 2011).  
6.4.1.1 Free Energy 
The fundamental principle of free energy is that, in order to survive, a living 
organism must maintain its body within a narrow range of ‘desirable’ states (K 
Friston, 2010; Karl Friston, 2009). It is proposed that this is achieved by minimising 
the sum of differences between the desired and the actual states of the body (‘free 
energy’), across time. It is now appreciated that interoception provides the organism 
 158 
with the vital models of the internal states of its body, which underpin both 
homeostasis and free energy minimisation (Gu & Fitzgerald, 2014). 
 
The free energy model is operationalised using predictive coding and Bayesian 
inference (Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Huang & Rao, 2011). Predictive coding builds 
on Helmholtz’s insight that no living organism has veridical access to the true state 
of its environment (Helmholtz, 1860). Instead, it has to infer the hidden state of the 
external world from the effects that the environment has on the organism’s internal 
neural states, through the activity of its sensory receptors (Clark, 2013). Within 
predictive coding, it is proposed that incoming sensory data is compared against the 
brain’s probabilistic ‘prior prediction’ (best guess) about what hidden events in the 
environment have caused any given set of changes within the organism’s own 
nervous system. If the two are not compatible, ‘prediction errors’ arise between the 
prediction and the data and these are passed to a higher level in the cortical 
hierarchy for resolution.  
 
An essential assumption is that predictive coding is hierarchical. The nature of 
hierarchies in interoceptive systems has yet to be fully established (Seth, 2013) but 
the most detailed model is provided by Critchley and Harrison (2013), who identify 
three pathways for interoceptive signals. One pathway conveys motivational 
information (e.g. hunger) and travels along the vagus nerve to the nucleus of the 
solitary tract. Another (often signalling tissue damage) arises in the viscera and 
projects by way of spinal laminar 1 to the spinothalamic tract. A third carries 
humoral information and influences principally circumventricular organs and the 
hypothalamus. All pathways converge on the insula and anterior cingulate cortices, 
which in turn have widespread connections with prefrontal and temporal areas. 
Information is potentially integrated at every level of this hierarchy as well as in the 
insula itself, which has a posterior to anterior gradient, whereby interoceptive 
information from all modalities is mapped and remapped and integrated with 
exteroceptive cues (Craig, 2009).  It is assumed that the self is a widely distributed 
hierarchical percept, to which many systems contribute (Apps & Tsakiris, 2013; 
Limanowski & Blankenburg, 2013). Within hierarchies, only bottom-up data that 
is not compatible with the top-down prediction is passed to a higher cortical level, 
in the form of prediction error (Clark, 2013; Fiston, 2010). A percept is formed, in 
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a ‘winner takes all’ manner (Summerfield et al., 2006), once prediction error (and 
thus free energy) is minimised at every level in the system. The process of forming 
a percept by this type of hypothesis testing is known as ‘perceptual inference’ (K 
Friston, 2005). The resulting percept will not necessarily be accurate but will be the 
best available. In exteroception the percept is often assumed to be conscious, 
although the process may equally be applied to interoceptive or exteroceptive 
stimuli that do not reach awareness (Hohwy, 2012).  
6.4.1.2 Precision  
An important aspect of both (top-down) prior predictions and the incoming sensory 
data (which gives rise to the prediction errors) is that they vary in the reliability of 
the information that they convey (e.g. how noisy they are). ‘Precision’ is therefore 
a key concept in predictive coding. All priors  and prediction errors are represented 
probabilistically, with ‘precision’ defined as the inverse variance (the uncertainty) 
of the probability distribution associated with the prediction or with the prediction 
errors arising from the available sensory data (Karl Friston, 2009). Thus, in any 
modality and context, the brain makes both a ‘first-order prior prediction’ (a best 
guess) about what percept can best account for the incoming sensory data and also 
a ‘second order’ estimate of the reliability (precision) of both the prior prediction 
and the incoming data (Brown et al., 2011; Hohwy, 2012). Precision therefore 
applies weighting to prior predictions and prediction errors and determines their 
relative impact on the final percept. Precision is always an estimate that depends on 
context, previous learning and attention (Hohwy, 2012). Sensory data (and 
consequent prediction error) that is compatible with only a narrow range of 
potential priors has ‘high precision’ and thus carries information that is reliable. Its 
likely effect is that an imprecise prior prediction will alter to take account of precise 
prediction errors, in other words precise prediction errors affect the final percept. 
The result is a new ‘posterior prediction’. By contrast, sensory signals with ‘low 
precision’ are compatible with a wide range of potential prior predictions and the 
resulting imprecise prediction errors they set up are likely to be treated as unreliable 
information and consequently suppressed by (i.e. encompassed within) a precise 
prior (Moran et al., 2013). Precision is partly learned (Feldman & Friston, 2010) 
but also depends on the effect of neuromodulators (K Friston et al., 2012; Moran et 
al., 2013). In the interoceptive system, precision may be governed by oxytocin 
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(Quattrocki & Friston, 2014). Attention and precision interact reciprocally, in that 
people will attend preferentially to signals that their brain’s estimate to be relatively 
precise but, conversely, attending to a particular sensory channel has the effect of 
increasing the precision of prediction errors in that modality (Jiang, Summerfield, 
& Egner, 2013).  
 
A central aspect of predictive coding is that information from any sensory modality 
can be used to explain away prediction error in any other (Apps & Tsakiris, 2013). 
Precision is crucial when selecting amongst information in a variety of modalities 
because the brain preferentially weights signals that are the most precise in the 
current context. For example, when vision is imprecise at night interoceptive input 
has relatively greater precision (Pezzulo, 2013). 
 
In order to minimise prediction error, the organism must learn over time to assign 
the best possible set of the weights, in other words to optimise the relative precisions 
of priors and prediction errors across all modalities (Fotopoulou, 2013). Although 
weighting prior predictions and prediction errors by their precision is an optimal 
strategy for reducing prediction error (and thus free energy) in the long term, it does 
not follow that the perceptual outcome is always accurate. Errors and illusions can 
be explained by inaccurate precision as well as by inaccurate predictions (Edwards, 
Adams, Brown, Pareés, & Friston, 2012). 
6.4.1.3 Active Inference 
While precise prediction errors can have the effect of updating a relatively 
imprecise prior prediction, they may also lead to ‘active inference’ (particularly if 
they interact with a precise prediction). Active inference describes how the 
organism moves to sample the environment and gain more sensory input with which 
to confirm, or correct, its predictions (Adams et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2011).  
 
The central assumption of active inference is that an organism moves by forming a 
prediction of the proprioceptive consequences of the intended/desired action. This 
immediately gives rise to proprioceptive predictions errors between the current 
proprioceptive state of the organism and the predicted/desired proprioceptive state. 
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It is these proprioceptive prediction errors that crucially provide motor control, 
fulfilled at the lowest level by peripheral motor reflexes (Friston, 2013).  
 
The role of attention is essential in active inference. Attention to the sensory 
consequences of an action (e.g. the visual, auditory, somatosensory, proprioceptive, 
and presumably also the interoceptive, outcomes) tends to stop the action (Brown 
et al., 2013). Therefore, within a predictive coding framework, sensory attenuation 
is explained as a transitory reduction in the precision of reafferent signals (Brown 
et al., 2013). This has the counterintuitive implication that the organism must 
temporarily withdraw its attention from the sensory consequences of its own 
behaviour in order for an action to happen.  
6.4.1.4 Interoception within a Predictive Coding Framework 
Although interoception necessarily plays a crucial role in free energy minimisation, 
this has only recently been discussed within this literature. An innovative model by 
Seth and colleagues proposes ‘interoceptive inference’ as directly analogous to 
perceptual inference in exterosensory systems (Seth et al., 2011; Seth, 2013). If 
interoceptive inference indicates that there are deviations from the desired inner 
state of the body, one way to resolve the consequent (precise) interoceptive 
prediction errors would be to update interoceptive predictions about the internal 
state of the body (Friston, 2013; Seth et al., 2011). However, this has limited 
applicability because only narrow deviations from desirable interoceptive states are 
compatible with life.  Mechanisms equivalent to those that underlie active inference 
therefore come into play. For example, if body temperature falls below normal 
levels, the consequently precise interoceptive prediction errors result in homeostatic 
change, by becoming instructions that enslave autonomic reflexes (e.g. initiate 
shivering), in a manner exactly analogous to the way in which precise 
proprioceptive prediction errors cause active inference (Gu & Fitzgerald, 2014; 
Seth, 2013). The insula, in which the processing of interoceptive predictions and 
prediction errors occurs, has consequently been characterised as an extension of the 
sensorimotor strips into interoceptive territory (Gu et al., 2013). Precise 
interoceptive prediction errors can, however, have another effect. In animals that 
move, they may be resolved by action, such as finding shelter (Gu & Fitzgerald, 
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2014). Interoceptive inference is thus seamlessly linked to perceptual inference and 
to active inference, within the predictive coding framework. 
 
While Seth’s seminal model has clarified the role that interoception plays at the 
heart of free energy minimisation, there is a potential flaw. His model defines 
emotion as interoceptive inference i.e. as interoceptive percept. A more convincing 
account proposes that emotion is interoceptive prediction error. This implies that 
emotion indexes deviations from those desired states of the body that are consistent 
with the organism’s Darwinian success (Joffily & Coricelli, 2013). The model 
below adopts this latter definition of emotion, as more in keeping with the free 
energy principle, as well as having better explanatory power.  
 
An aspect of interoceptive signalling that has yet not been addressed within 
predictive coding models of interoception is precision, which must necessarily play 
as important a role in the interoceptive system as it does in perceptual inference and 
active inference (Hohwy, 2012). Evidence for the influence of precision in 
interoception is provided by studies that have experimentally enhanced attention to 
interoception (and thus precision). Subliminal fear conditioning, for example, is 
stronger after practice on a heartbeat perception task (Raes & De Raedt, 2011). 
Similarly, attention to heartbeats enhances insula activity during later judgments 
about emotional faces (Ernst, Northoff, Böker, Seifritz, & Grimm, 2013), 
presumably because attention increases the precision of interoceptive prediction 
errors, which then must be integrated with interoceptive predictions in the insula 
(Gu et al., 2013).  
6.4.2 Accounting for Individual Differences in Interoceptive Accuracy 
within a Predictive Coding Framework  
Predictive coding crucially dictates that if there is no prediction error there is 
nothing to be aware of (Hohwy, 2012). It follows that any bottom-up sensory 
stimulus that is fully predicted will be ignored. Crucially, this implies that when 
people do sense their hearts, the heartbeat is not at that moment fully predicted.  
 
Within a predictive coding account there are four variables that could potentially 
account for heartbeat perception, as well as for individual differences in 
performance on heartbeat perception tasks. These are (i) cardiodynamics; (ii) the 
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precision of the prior interoceptive prediction of the heartbeat; (iii) the precision of 
the incoming sensory data from the heartbeat; and (iv) the accuracy of the 
interoceptive prior prediction. The likely importance of each of these in explaining 
heartbeat perception is considered in turn below. 
6.4.2.1 Cardiodynamics 
The precision of the predicted prior heartbeat is likely to be at least partly dictated 
by physiology, as a function of the strength of signals arising from within the body 
(Craig, 2004) or, more correctly, by the salience of their cortical representation in 
the insula (Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004; Pollatos, Gramann, 
& Schandry, 2007). Although recent research reports no difference between good 
and poor heartbeat perceivers in cardiac parameters at rest (Herbert et al., 2010; 
Herbert, Ulbrich, et al., 2007), it has often been proposed that cardiac perception is 
affected by physiological variable such as the stroke volume of the heart or the 
individual’s distribution of body fat (Jones, 1995; Schandry & Bestler, 1995). In 
the experiments presented in this thesis, interoceptive accuracy and resting heart 
rate were robustly negatively correlated (see Appendix), implying that people with 
larger slower hearts have an advantage in Mental Tracking. 
 
This can be explained in terms of precision. Strong bottom-up interoceptive signals 
are represented in the brain as more precise (Feldman & Friston, 2010) and tend to 
make the heartbeat innately more salient. The saliency of the heartbeat signal will, 
in turn, have the effect of further increasing the precision of the prior predicted 
heartbeat, whose unique pattern and rhythm is a constant presence for the 
individual. It can therefore be assumed that people with large slow hearts are more 
likely to have interoceptive signals that are precise. 
6.4.2.2 The Precision of Top-down Interoceptive Predictions 
Although interoceptive signalling is a cascade of sensory data that continually gives 
rise to predictions and predictions errors, this signalling is largely silent, indicating 
that it is generally fully predicted, unless some variable in the inner body deviates 
from established norms (which are the desirable and predicted bodily states). An 
person with high interoceptive accuracy, however, is one who perceives the small 
changes that arise when interoceptive states deviate from what is normal (i.e. 
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predicted) for that individual. This implies that good heartbeat perceivers are people 
with precise interoceptive predictions.  
 
By contrast, an example of a person with low interoceptive accuracy would be a 
woman who goes into labour unaware that she is pregnant. Her experience can be 
explained if she has imprecise interoceptive predictions, such that substantial 
deviations from previous norms go unattended and unrecognized. An interesting 
digression in this respect is that regulated homeostatic variables often do not 
actually have the completely invariant set points that are usually assumed in 
arguments that invoke homeostasis (Ramsay & Woods, 2014). It is biologically 
sound for interoceptive set points to alter somewhat in the face of environmental 
demands, in a process known as ‘allostasis’. An important conclusions is that 
imprecise interoceptive predictions are not necessarily rare and, moreover, that the 
resultant low interoceptive accuracy may sometimes be of benefit to an organism.  
 
The precision of interoceptive predictions is influenced by neuromodulation 
(Quattrocki & Friston, 2014) but is also likely to depend, at least in part, on learned 
experience of what is normal for oneself. Speculatively, this might be mediated by 
caregiving in infancy, where prompt and appropriate responses to an infant’s 
interoceptive needs (signalled within the child as interoceptive prediction errors) 
may scaffold the formation of associative bonds between the sensation (e.g. hunger, 
which indicates a prediction error) and the successful restoration of the desired 
interoceptive state (Quattrocki & Friston, 2014).  
6.4.2.3 The Precision of Bottom-up Interoceptive Sensory Data and 
Subsequent Interoceptive Prediction Errors  
Healthy people are not generally aware of their heartbeats (Koroboki et al., 2010). 
During the Mental Tracking task people sit quietly and arousal is avoided. The 
person’s heartbeat should therefore be fully predicted and they should not be able 
to hear it. What changes in the task, and must therefore be the source of the 
conscious awareness of the heartbeat, is that people are specifically required to pay 
attention to their heartbeat. Attention, in predictive coding, has the effect of 
increasing precision. It follows that, if interoceptive prediction errors become more 
precise, they can have impact by updating the already precise prior prediction of 
the heartbeat. A new posterior prediction is the result and thus a conscious 
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‘interoceptive percept’ will become available, as a result of this change. This is 
likely to be what underpins good heartbeat perception. However, if the prediction 
of the heartbeat is imprecise, then the new (precise) prediction errors will be 
absorbed into this imprecise prediction (Figure 6.2). There will be no updating of 
the prediction, so the heartbeat will not be heard, which would account for poor 
heartbeat perception. 
 
Support for this argument is provided by the robust finding, within the interoception 
literature, that good heartbeat perceivers experience stronger emotions (Barrett et 
al., 2004; Dunn et al., 2010; Wiens, 2005). Emotion can be defined as deviations 
from the desired interoceptive state of the body, in other words in terms of 
interoceptive prediction error (Joffily & Coricelli, 2013). Therefore, if people with 
high interoceptive accuracy have precise interoceptive predictions they will be 
more prone to notice small deviations from these (i.e. interoceptive predictions 
errors) and their experience of stronger emotions, for similar objective changes in 
physiological arousal, is readily explained (Dunn, Galton, et al., 2010; Wiens et al., 
2000).  
 
Predictive coding, moreover, implies that while interoceptive prediction errors with 
low precision will be suppressed, at least some of those with high precision will be 
resolved, in a manner analogous to active interference (Adams et al., 2012), by 
descending interoceptive predictions that form reference points for the autonomic 
reflexes that regulate homeostasis (Gu & Fitzgerald, 2014; Seth, 2013). This 
implies that individuals with high interoceptive accuracy will have high autonomic 
reactivity to emotional stimuli, which has been reported (Ferri, Ardizzi, 
Ambrosecchia, & Gallese, 2013; Pollatos, Herbert, Matthias, & Schandry, 2007). 
Similarly, it has been shown that people with good interoceptive accuracy perform 
better on tests of masked fear conditioning, in which pictures of snakes and spiders 
are paired with electric shocks (Katkin et al., 2001). Successful detection in that 
task must rely on interoceptive responses to the shocks during the conditioning 
phase, which then produce interoceptive signals when the stimuli are presented in 
the test phase. Only good heartbeat perceivers are able to recognise the relevant 
trials above chance, implying that their interoceptive prediction errors are more 
precise than those of poor heartbeat perceivers. 
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The suggestion that good heartbeat perceivers have precise interoceptive 
predictions, and prediction errors, is supported by Paulus and Stein’s influential 
‘insula model of anxiety’. They presciently proposed that anxious people 
‘experience an augmented signalling of the difference between the observed and 
expected body state’ (Paulus & Stein, 2006). These words imply precise prediction 
errors, leading to increased autonomic reactivity. Their model is equally compatible 
with the accurate (precise) interoceptive prediction errors they suggest are common 
in anxiety as well as the ‘noisy’ (i.e. imprecise) interoceptive signalling sometimes 
reported in depression (Paulus & Stein, 2010). 
6.4.2.4 The Accuracy of the Interoceptive Prediction 
For completeness, it should also be noted that predictions are the brain’s ‘best 
guesses’ about what accounts for the incoming sensory data and they are 
consequently not always accurate, although they will be optimal for that individual 
at a given moment. An inaccurate prior prediction should update in response to 
disconfirming incoming sensory data. The interoceptive predictions of healthy 
people are therefore likely to update to new posteriors, over time, as the brain seeks 
to optimise precision i.e. to assign the best possible set of weights to its predictions 
and prediction errors (Fotopoulou, 2013). However, a number of clinical conditions 
may be explained in terms of predictions that chronically fail to update. Panic 
disorder is an example, where a subset of people with high interoceptive accuracy 
have a tendency to catastrophise about harmless internal changes (i.e. prediction 
errors). This implies that their interoceptive prediction errors and priors predictions 
are both precise (so that the interoceptive change is noted) but that the consequent 
interoceptive prediction is inaccurate, in other words that a new and more accurate 
posterior has not formed (Clark, 1986; Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Van der Does, 
Antony, Ehlers, & Barsky, 2000). The same may be true of specific phobia, where 
the sufferer avoids the fearful stimulus and so never learns to update the inaccurate 
interoceptive prediction that the frightening stimulus poses a serious danger (Ost, 
1996).  
 
Eating disorders are associated with low interoceptive accuracy (Herbert, Blechert, 
Hautzinger, Matthias, & Herbert, 2013; Pollatos et al., 2008), which can be 
explained in terms of  imprecise interoceptive predictions that do not update. For 
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such people, even very precise sensory data (hunger cues) may be unable to update 
their imprecise interoceptive predictions, which are compatible with a wide range 
of sensory input.  
6.4.3 The Proposed Model 
In interpreting the results of this thesis, it is therefore proposed that high 
interoceptive accuracy (measured by heartbeat perception) can be accounted for if 
good heartbeat perceivers have top-down interoceptive predictions (priors and 
posteriors) about interoceptive signals (e.g. heartbeats) that are ‘precise’. This 
precision is likely to be influenced by cardiodynamics but will also depend on 
learning and concentrations of neuromodulators. It is assumed that the effect of a 
heartbeat perception task is to increase attention to the bottom-up sensory data of 
the heartbeat. This sets up precise prediction errors whenever the sensory data 
deviates very slightly from the predicted heartbeat, which is also precise in good 
heartbeat perceivers). These precise prediction errors then update the interoceptive 
prior to form a new posterior percept of the heartbeat and allow this percept to 
temporarily reach consciousness and the heartbeat to be counted. This would also 
explain why the threshold of conscious reportability tends to fluctuate during 
heartbeat counting tasks (Ádám, 2010), as the prior prediction updates to a new 
posterior and is temporarily heard, until that posterior become the new prior so it is 
once again fully predicted and becomes unavailable to perception, before attention 
starts the cycle of updating again. In people with low interoceptive accuracy, by 
contrast, the heartbeat perception task will similarly increase the precision of the 
bottom up prediction errors but these are absorbed into an imprecise prior prediction 
about the heartbeat, which is compatible with a range of prediction errors, so that 
no updating of the prediction occurs and the heartbeat is consequently not heard 
(Figure 6.2). The results of experiments presented in this thesis can be explained 
within such a model.  
6.4.4 Applying the Model 
6.4.4.1 Bodily Self-awareness 
The model is first applied to body ownership illusions because the implication that 
people with high interoceptive accuracy make better self/other distinctions is an 
important assumption in this thesis, for example in Experiments 4 and 5 and which 
investigate self/other distinction in the domain of action.  
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Body ownership can be explained within a predictive coding framework in which 
all representations, including the representation of self, are probabilistic (Apps & 
Tsakiris, 2013; Limanowski & Blankenburg, 2013). To experience the rubber hand 
illusion, participants must form a percept that the prosthetic hand is their own, by 
minimising prediction errors across all modalities. Predictive coding is a ‘winner 
takes all’ strategy in which only one percept is possible, as evidenced by binocular 
rivalry (Hohwy, Roepstorff, & Friston, 2008). The illusion that the prosthetic is part 
of the body appears to invoke a high level, learned prediction that seen touch and 
felt touch usually co-occur (Apps & Tsakiris, 2013). Attention to vision during the 
illusion deliberately enhances the precision of visual predictions. If interoceptive 
predictions are precise, however, they may serve to anchor a participant in their 
body, because the fake hand does not have the internal feeling of being their own. 
However, if interoceptive predictions are imprecise they will be suppressed in 
favour of the typically more reliable visual and somatosensory input, which predicts 
that the rubber hand belongs to them. Therefore, if low interoceptive accuracy 
implies low precision of interoceptive predictions, people with low interoceptive 
accuracy can be expected to be more susceptible to this type of body ownership 
illusion, as has been demonstrated (Tsakiris et al., 2011).  
 
A contrasting paradigm dispenses with a prosthetic hand, by filming the subject’s 
true hand and replaying this to them in real time (Suzuki et al., 2013). An 
‘interoceptive rubber hand illusion’ can be achieved by causing the virtual hand to 
flush in synchrony with the participant’s heartbeat (see Aspell et al., 2013 for a 
similar full body illusion). However, the interoceptive predictions in this version of 
the experiment now indicate that the hand is the person’s own. People for whom 
interoceptive predictions are precise are therefore now more, rather than less, likely 
to claim ownership of it, as this experiment demonstrated (Suzuki et al., 2013).  
6.4.4.2 Enhanced Self-focus 
Experiments 1 and 2 show that attending to self-relevant information, such as one’s 
own face in a mirror, a self-photograph or self-relevant words, temporarily 
enhances the heartbeat perception scores of people with originally below-median 
interoceptive accuracy (see also Maister & Tsakiris, 2014). Predictive coding 
models propose that the self is a multilevel construct, continually renewed in the 
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brain from all available interacting cues, at many levels of the cortical hierarchy. 
Self-relevant signals in any modality, and at any level, are thus brought to bear to 
constitute the self. The likely explanation for the results of Experiments 1 and 2 is, 
therefore, that enhanced self-focus increased attention to (and therefore the 
precision of) high level, multi-modal prior predictions for the self (Apps & Tsakiris, 
2013; Limanowski & Blankenburg, 2013). This would heighten the salience and 
reliability (i.e. the precision) of all interoceptive priors relevant to the self, including 
the heartbeat. Assuming that people with low interoceptive accuracy have imprecise 
prior predictions about their heartbeats, then in these people that prediction would 
become temporarily more precise and they would be enabled to hear their heartbeat 
during Mental Tracking. Good heartbeat perceivers already have precise heartbeat 
predictions and no effect would be observed. This is illustrated in Figure 6.2 where 
the probability distribution of the prior for the heartbeat (when there is no special 
attention to the heartbeat) is shown in red. This prior is precise (i.e. has small 
variance) in those people who have high interoceptive accuracy (left column) and 
is imprecise in those individuals for whom interoceptive accuracy is low (right 
column). Originally (top row), without attention to the heartbeat, the heartbeat in 
both sets of people is fully predicted and not heard because it falls within the 
probability distribution of the existing prior. The effect of paying attention to the 
heartbeat during Mental Tracking (middle row) is to make the incoming sensory 
data more precise (i.e. have less variance). In the case of people with low 
interoceptive accuracy (right column) the more precise sensory data still falls within 
the wide probability distribution for the prior, so there is no updating and the 
posterior is equivalent to the prior. However, for good heartbeat perceivers, the 
increased precision of the data means that it now falls outside the distribution of the 
original prior, so that the prior will update to form a posterior, which is shifted 
towards the new data. Any such shift of prior to new posterior means that a percept 
is formed and the heartbeat is heard.  
 
The effect of enhanced self-focus (bottom row), in Experiments 1 and 2, is to 
increase the precision of priors for all self-relevant information, including the 
heartbeat. In the case of people with low interoceptive awareness (right column), 
attending to the heartbeat under self-focus conditions means that the probability 
distribution for the data now falls outside the probability distribution of the precise 
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prior. This results in a new posterior and the effect of the shift from prior to new 
posterior distribution means that a percept is formed and the heartbeat is heard. 
Something similar happens in people with high interoceptive accuracy (i.e. the prior 
for the heartbeat becomes more precise) but they were already hearing the attended 
heartbeat, so there is no improvement in their interoceptive accuracy as a result of 
the self-focus.  
 
Figure 6.2 Applying the Predictive Coding Model to Heartbeat Perception and 
Enhanced Self-focus
 
A similar enhanced self-focus mechanism may explain the report by Fotopoulou 
and colleagues that two somatoparaphrenic patients who were initially unable to 
recognise their limb as their own when viewed directly, could correctly recognise 
their arm when they saw it in a mirror (Fotopoulou, Jenkinson, Tsakiris, Haggard, 
& Rudd, 2011). Potentially, the exteroceptive (visual) representation of the body 
increased the precision of their interoceptive self-related predictions and resulted in 
improved body-awareness.  
 
The mechanism for improved interoceptive accuracy during heightened self-focus 
is likely to be provided by attention-switching activity in the anterior insula. 
Predictive coding accounts assume that predictions about the interoceptive state of 
the body and prediction errors (consequent upon differences between the expected 
and actual bodily state) are reconciled in the insula (Gu & Fitzgerald, 2014; Seth, 
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2014). This cortical area is engaged in all interoceptive signalling (Cauda et al., 
2011; Craig, 2010; Simmons et al., 2013), including being activated during self-
face recognition (Devue & Brédart, 2011). Performance on cardiac awareness tasks 
correlates with activity and also with grey matter volume in the right anterior insula 
(Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004). Lesions of the insula are 
implicated in disorders of body awareness such as somatoparaphrenia (Baier and 
Karnath, 2008). From converging fMRI and diffusion tensor imaging data (Menon 
& Uddin, 2010), it is proposed that the insula is a hub between brain networks 
involved in externally-directed attention to stimuli in the environment and 
internally-directed attention to cortical midline structures involved in self-
referential processes (Northoff, et al., 2006), a theory also endorsed by Farb, Segal, 
and Anderson (2012).  
 
It is therefore probable that attention to exteroceptive self-relevant information in 
Experiments 1 and 2 resulted in enhanced insula activity, in the same way that 
attention to heartbeats enhances BOLD activity in the insula during subsequent 
emotional processing tasks (Ernst, Northoff, et al., 2013). Such enhancement could, 
in turn, facilitate other aspects of self-processing, by top-down gating of attention. 
The gating of attention would also explain why the experimental effects were not 
significant in individuals with high baseline interoceptive accuracy, who are already 
generally attentive to internal states of their bodies, even in the absence of any 
externally driven focus of attention to the self.  
6.4.4.3 Self-objectification 
Predictive coding accounts assume that the self is a multimodal construct, to which 
many systems contribute, and the brain is assumed to weight these modalities in 
terms of their relative precision. It is furthermore assumed, in the model presented 
here, that high interoceptive accuracy indicates the tendency for interoceptive 
predictions to be weighted as precise. This would explain why, in Experiment 3, 
women with high interoceptive accuracy were less liable to self-objectify. Self-
objectification involves attending to one’s body principally from a third-person, 
exteroceptive, visual perspective, rather than from an interoceptive perspective. 
Habitual attention to a particular channel has the effect of increasing its precision. 
Trait self-objectification consequently implies the woman has heightened precision 
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of exteroceptive, at the potential expense of interoceptive predictions, about her 
body. The precise interoceptive predictions of women with high interoceptive 
accuracy are, conversely, likely to provide some protection against the tendency to 
attend to objectified, visual aspects of self. 
6.4.4.4 The ‘Social Simon Effect’  
Experiment 4 was the first to consider interoceptive accuracy in the domain of 
action. It was assumed that action is coded in terms of its sensory consequences 
(Hommel et al., 2001; James, 1890), which includes interoceptive consequences 
(Heyes & Bird, 2007). It was therefore expected that interoceptive accuracy would 
add self-specifying input that would modulate self/other distinction in the social 
Simon task. It was anticipated that good heartbeat perceivers would experience less 
self/other confusion, resulting in less tendency to represent the planned action of 
the coactor and hence a smaller congruency effect in the social condition. No such 
relationship was observed.  
 
Potentially the ‘social Simon’ paradigm is flawed and results only from the biasing 
of spatial attention towards the coactor. However, the model in section 6.4.3 
proposes that interoceptive accuracy depends on the precision of interoceptive 
predictions (i.e. their salience, reliability) relative to predictions in other sensory 
modalities. It would follow that in situations with notable interoceptive 
consequences, such as the rubber hand illusion, good heartbeat perceivers are more 
able to distinguish between their true hand and a prosthetic because they have 
precise interoceptive predictions about their own bodies. The interoceptive 
consequences of the action in the social Simon task were potentially too small for 
any modulatory effect of interoceptive accuracy to be detected. 
6.4.4.5 Automatic Imitation 
In Experiment 5 it was again anticipated that people with high interoceptive 
accuracy would be better able to distinguish self from other. It was consequently 
hypothesised that they would have faster mean reaction times on incongruent trials, 
during automatic imitation, as observed by Spengler et al. (2010). Contrary to 
expectations, it was observed that good heartbeat perceivers had slower mean 
reaction times in incongruent trials, implying greater difficulty in inhibiting the 
tendency to automatically imitate observed actions. 
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Automatic imitation involves both cued movement and action observation. It had 
also been anticipated that interoceptive accuracy would modulate the long-term, 
stimulus-response bond that links the participant’s representation of their action 
with its sensory consequences, because interoception should contribute to the 
sensory outcomes of an action. However, the concentration of the effect, in 
Experiment 5, in incongruent cues indicates that it was fully accounted for by the 
action-observation aspect of the task and was not related to the cued movement and 
thus to ‘input modulation’, which depends on the common coding of the 
participant’s actions and their sensory outcomes. Analogously with Experiment 4, 
the likely explanation is that good interoceptive accuracy does not promote 
self/other awareness per se but has its effects through the precision of interoceptive 
predictions. Interoceptive accuracy can therefore be expected to modulate only 
those actions with marked interoceptive consequences. As in Experiment 4, the 
interoceptive consequences of the action in Experiment 5 were likely to have been 
too small to have affected the outcome.  
 
In Experiment 5 interoceptive awareness was linked to greater ‘output modulation’, 
which depends on social top-down effects (Heyes, 2011). A possible explanation is 
that good heartbeat perceivers experience the aversive consequences of potential 
errors more strongly. This is demonstrated by the higher amplitude of the error-
positivity response to making a mistake that has been observed in people with high 
interoceptive accuracy (Sueyoshi et al., 2014). Moreover, Band and colleagues have 
demonstrated that an error-related EEG signal, similar to that found when an error 
is made, is experienced when there is no actual mistake but participants experience 
a mismatch between the expected and the actual effect of an action – similarly to 
incongruent trials in automatic imitation (Band et al., 2009). A heightened aversive 
response in good heartbeat perceivers would lead to greater activity in the anterior 
insula and anterior cingulate when they experience the risk of making errors during 
the automatic imitation task (Preuschoff et al., 2008; Singer et al., 2009). The 
resulting greater response conflict would heighten activity in the insula, which 
could slow their reactions. This explanation is consistent with the conclusion that 
good heartbeat perceivers have more precise interoceptive predictions and 
prediction errors because this implies stronger emotions, including aversive 
responses (Joffily & Coricelli, 2013). The explanation thus also depends on the 
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greater emotional arousal experienced by people with high interoceptive accuracy, 
which can be accounted for by the assumption that they have precise interoceptive 
predictions and prediction errors (Barrett et al., 2004; Dunn et al., 2010; Pollatos & 
Schandry, 2008; Wiens et al., 2000). 
6.4.4.6 Feelings of Agency 
In Experiment 6, heartbeat perception was correlated with the effect binding 
measure of participants’ sense of agency. EEG data, however, showed that 
interoceptive accuracy was not related to the amplitude of either the readiness 
potentials or the auditory-evoked potentials. This behavioural relationship, that was 
not mirrored at the physiological level, is reminiscent of the relationship between 
interoceptive accuracy and emotion, where the behavioural measure (the self-
reported strength of emotional feelings) differs between high and low heartbeat 
perceivers, despite there being no difference in objective measures (i.e. 
physiological differences in heart rate or skin conductance) Dunn et al., 2010; 
Wiens et al., 2000). Differences in emotion experience have been explained above 
in terms of precision in interoceptive systems and the same is potentially true of 
effect binding. 
 
The causes of individual differences in intentional binding have yet to be elucidated 
(Wolpe et al., 2013) but predictions and the precision of predictions  is likely to 
play a crucial role. The many factors that influence the sense of agency can best be 
explained by the ‘multifactorial account’ (Synofzik et al., 2013), within which cues 
to agency are combined in a Bayes optimal fashion, according to their reliability. 
Wolpe and Rowe (2014) have recast this into a predictive coding model in which 
the sense of agency depends on reconciling top-down predictions about the 
authorship of an action with the bottom-up sensory data. That effect binding is a 
predictive process is indicated by the manner in which it can be disrupted by theta 
burst TMS over the pre-SMA (Moore et al., 2010). Crucially, within Wolpe and 
Rowe’s account, the sense of agency therefore depends on relative precision, which 
assigns weights to predictions and to all available incoming data, in order to arrive 
at the most probable cause of a sensation. If high interoceptive accuracy is explained 
by high precision of interoceptive cues, then good heartbeat perceivers are likely to 
have stronger learned SR bonds between freely chosen actions and their self-
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specifying interoceptive effects. However, why this should give them a stronger 
sense of agency over the exteroceptive (auditory) effects of their actions is not 
obvious. 
6.5 Future Directions 
The results presented in this thesis raise a number of questions. Firstly, more 
investigation is required to determine the underlying cause of the correlation 
between effect binding and interoceptive accuracy in Experiment 6. Secondly, 
further research is warranted before it can be definitively concluded that 
interoception does not impact on the preparation of action. Thirdly, the predictive 
coding model presented has implications that can potentially be tested. Finally, 
innovative new means of testing interoceptive accuracy are desirable.  
 
The mechanisms that underpin intentional binding remain the subject of debate 
(Hughes et al., 2013; Moore & Obhi, 2012). The classic paradigm, used in 
Experiment 6, does not distinguish between a number of potentially separable 
effects which can be teased out using appropriate experimental controls (Hughes et 
al., 2013).. The results might, for example, be confounded by the participant’s 
ability to estimate time, which has been linked to interoceptive accuracy (Meissner 
& Wittmann, 2011; Pollatos et al., 2014). By contrasting a condition in which a 
computer generated tone occurs at a predictable (cued) time with one where the 
time is unpredictable (Hughes et al., 2013) it would be possible to establish whether 
the results of Experiment 6 indicate that interoceptive accuracy simply correlates 
with the ability to judge the timing of an event. Furthermore, the explanation for 
the results of Experiment 6 presented in section 5.1.4, implies that interoceptive 
accuracy may be related to sensory attenuation, which idea is supported by 
theoretical explanations of their linked origins (Wolpe et al., 2013) This warrants 
more thorough investigation with adequate numbers of trials to extract precise 
auditory-evoked potentials  
 
A potential link between the results of Experiments 4 and 6 is provided by an 
experimental manipulation that combines intentional binding and the inhibition of 
action. Haggard and colleagues required participants to prepare to press a key but 
then (on a subset of trials) to inhibit the action at the last possible moment. Each 
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trial was always followed by a tone. On trials where the key press was completed, 
the time of the tone was perceived as closer to the key press and thus the usual effect 
binding occurred. However, when the action was inhibited the sound was judged as 
occurring later than it truly had (Haggard, Poonian, & Walsh, 2009). There is scope, 
using this paradigm, to investigate the relationship between interoceptive accuracy 
and inhibition and thus to establish whether the automatic imitation results of 
Experiment 4 arose because good heartbeat perceivers have general difficulty 
inhibiting any prepared action. 
 
It is assumed, throughout this thesis, that actions are coded in terms of their sensory 
consequences (Hommel et al., 2001; James, 1890), However, no effect of 
interoceptive accuracy on action was found in Experiments 4, 5 and 6. An 
experimental manipulation in which the participant’s actions have salient 
interoceptive consequences is required to confirm this conclusively. A variant of 
the Libet task, in which a key press produced a mild shock, could conclusively 
establish whether interoceptive accuracy modulates action binding when the action 
has substantial interoceptive consequences.   
 
The predictive coding model presented above proposes that interoceptive awareness 
reflects sensory precision in interoceptive systems (specifically in the 
representation of the heartbeat). This implies that good heartbeat perceivers will 
weight interoceptive signals from their cardiovascular system as salient and 
reliable. If the model is correct, for example, good heartbeat perceivers will report 
less effect of a placebo (Gibbons et al., 1979). This could be tested in a variety of 
experimental paradigms, involving feelings (e.g. reported emotion), behaviour (e.g. 
reaction times) and cognition (e.g. decision making).  
Finally, while two studies indicate that heartbeat perception correlates with visceral 
perception (Herbert, Muth, et al., 2012; Whitehead & Drescher, 1980), there has 
been only one report comparing respiratory resistance with heartbeat perception 
(Harver et al., 1993). That study found no relationship but the experiment used a 
signal detection method to assess heartbeat perception and such tests are not 
sensitive to individual differences, as most people’s performance on them is at 
chance (Eshkevari et al., 2014). Replication using the Mental Tracking task might 
be more successful. Moreover, there is scope to compare heartbeat perception with 
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awareness in other sensory modalities that may be more closely related to 
interoception than exteroception. These include proprioception, which many early 
authorities regarded as an aspect on interoception (Ádám, 2010; Cameron, 2002; 
Vaitl, 1996) and the vestibular sense, which plays an important but previously 
neglected role in body awareness (Ferre, Vagnoni, & Haggard, 2013). The 
experiments presented in this thesis add to the literature showing that an 
individual’s trait performance in heartbeat perception impacts on feelings, 
cognition and behaviour. However, until these effects can be shown to generalise 
to other interoceptive modalities, it can only be inferred that they rely on the 
salience of the heartbeat, rather than on a more general awareness of interoceptive 
sensation.   
6.6 Conclusion 
This thesis used the Mental Tracking Method of heartbeat perception to investigate 
the impact of interoceptive accuracy on aspects of self-processing, including 
experimental manipulations of self-focus and tests of the ability to make self/other 
distinction. The findings support a characterisation of interoception as a set of 
senses that contribute self-specifying input to multisensory integration. Enhanced 
attention to exteroceptive representations of both the bodily and the narrative self 
improved heartbeat perception in people for whom this was initially low. Good 
heartbeat perception in women was shown to confer some protection against self-
objectification. Interoceptive accuracy did not modulate the preparation of action 
in any of the three experiments designed to test this. Good heartbeat perception was 
associated with difficulty in inhibiting the tendency to imitate an observed action 
and this effect depended on social top-down effects. Interoceptive accuracy 
modulated the sense of agency at the behavioural level, where accuracy in heartbeat 
perception was inversely correlated with accuracy in the perception of the timing 
of the auditory consequence of an action. The results can be interpreted in terms of 
a predictive coding model in which high interoceptive accuracy indicates high 
precision of interoceptive representations. 
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Appendix: Investigating Potential Confounds of Heartbeat 
Perception in this Thesis 
A large number of people were tested using the Mental Tracking Task in the course 
of this thesis. Putting all available data together throws light on a number of the 
potential confounds to heartbeat perception.  
7.1 Participants  
The 308 participants included students at Royal Holloway University of London 
and members of the public who took part in Experiment 1, hosted by the ‘Who am 
I?’ Gallery at the Science Museum, London.  
7.2 Methods 
The gender and age of participants were recorded and resting heart rates were 
available from the data collected during the Mental Tracking task. In several 
experiments, self-reported height and weight were requested, from which body 
mass index (BMI) could be ascertained. In Experiments 4, 5 and 6 participants were 
asked to estimate the length of several short intervals of elapsed time (19s, 37s, 49s) 
from which a ‘time modulus’ measure was calculated, this was done using a variant 
of  the Schandry formula, {1/3 Σ [1 - ( |actual elapsed time – estimated time| /actual 
time )]} (Dunn et al., 2010; Schandry, 1981).  
7.3 Results 
Taking the participants as one data set, distributions of interoceptive accuracy (IA), 
body mass index (BMI) and resting heart rate (HR) were approximately Gaussian. 
Age was skewed towards the 18-25yr age group, which included students but also 
constituted the majority of those who volunteered to take part in Experiment 1 in 
the Science Museum. The time modulus measure was highly skewed (Table 7.1).  
 
One-way ANOVA, with gender as the between-subjects variable, showed that were 
no differences between the sexes in interoceptive accuracy, F(1, 306) = 1.77, p = 
.19; in BMI (calculated from self-reported height and weight), F(1, 289) = 0.24, p 
= .63; or in accuracy in estimating elapsed time (the ‘time modulus’ measure), F(1, 
136) = 2.24, p = .14.  However men had significantly slower heart rates, F(1, 306) 
= 4.29, p = .04, which, coupled with a robust relationship between slower hearts 
and better performance on the Mental Tracking Task, might account for previous 
reports of men’s better heartbeat perception.  
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Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics for Interoceptive Accuracy (IA) and Potential 
Confounds 
 Male  Female  All  Skewness 
(for all) 
Kurtosis 
(for all) 
IA  
(SD) 
.65 
(.18) 
n=101 
.62 
(.19) 
n=207 
.63 
(.18) 
n=308 
-.04 -.54 
Age in years 
(SD) 
26.5 
(12.2) 
n=101 
22.7 
(8.4) 
n=207 
24.0 
(10.0) 
n=307 
2.4 5.9 
Resting HR bpm 
(SD) 
77.5 
(11.7) 
n=101 
80.5 
(12.4) 
n=207 
79.5 
(12.2) 
n=308 
.26 .07 
BMI  
(SD) 
22.7 
(4.6) 
n=98 
22.4 
(3.7) 
n=193 
22.5 
(4.0) 
n=291 
.83 1.24 
‘Time modulus’ 
(SD) 
.78 
(.14) 
n=25 
.72 
(.20) 
n=113 
.73 
(.19) 
n=138 
-3.20 21.6 
 
For the participants taken as a whole, interoceptive accuracy was negatively 
correlated with heart rate, r = -.30, p < .001 (Figure 7.1). This result was extremely 
robust and was found in almost every sample of participants (except Experiment 4) 
and was similar for both genders. Age was negatively correlated with heart rate, r 
= -.25, p < .001, which was significant for both genders, indicating that children 
and young people have faster heart rates than adults. Interoceptive accuracy was 
not correlated with age, r = .07, p = .25, for either gender (Figure 7.2). This is 
contrary to the reported effects of age on heartbeat perception measured by the 
Whitehead method (Khalsa, Rudrauf, & Tranel, 2009). Accuracy in the estimation 
of elasped time (the time modulus measure), however, declined with age, r = -.23, 
p = .02.  
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Figure 7.1 Scatterplot for Interoceptive Accuracy and Resting Heart Rate
 
Interoceptive accuracy was postively correlated with the time modulus measure, r 
= .30, p < .001. This relationship continued to be significant after controlling for 
the effects of resting heart rate on interoceptive accuracy, ρ = .29, p = .001. This 
might indicate that people were counting seconds rather than heartbeats on the 
Mental Tracking task, so the time modulus measure was treated in Experiments 4, 
5 and 6 as a potential confound.  
 
Curiously, accuracy in heartbeat perception was correlated with BMI, r = .12, p = 
.02, but only in males, r = .20, p = .05, and the relationship was not in the expected 
direction (i.e. higher BMI was associated with better, not worse, heartbeat 
perception). However, BMI was also negatively correlated with heart rate, again 
only in males, r = -.25, p = .01 (faster heart rates were associated with lower BMI 
in men). Partial correlation showed that when heart rate was controlled, BMI and 
interoceptive awarenness were no longer correlated, in males,  = .15, p = .16, or 
in females,  = .06, p = .41, indicating that the apparent correlation between BMI 
and interoceptive accuracy depended on their shared variance with resting heart 
rate. 
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Figure 7.2 Scatterplot for Interoceptive Accuracy and Age
 
7.4 Conclusion 
The two significant confounds of interoceptive accuracy identified in this analysis 
were resting heart rate and the ability to estimate elapsed time (the time modulus 
measure). Body mass index, age and gender had no significant effect. 
 
